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ABSTRACT PAGE
On May 17, 1954, the United States Supreme Court handed down one of its most important
decisions in the twentieth century. Brown v. Board of Education ordered twenty-one U.S.
states, including Virginia, to end racial segregation in their public schools.
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), a
nationally-known African American civil rights organization, had led the legal campaign to bring
about the Brown decision. After its victory, the organization focused on how to bring about the
implementation of the decision in the South in order to effectuate school desegregation. In the
later 1950s, the NAACP filed lawsuits in many southern states, including Virginia, where
school boards had been unable, or unwilling, to comply.
As the possibility of school desegregation grew, white southerners bitterly attacked the NAACP
and proponents of integration. In Virginia this led to state-sanctioned investigations of the
organization, among other things. Utilizing legislation passed by the state legislature, the
governor of Virginia also closed public schools in several Virginia communities in the fall of
1958 to avoid desegregation. The following January, state and federal courts overturned the
state's school closing laws, and in February 1959 initial school desegregation began in
Virginia. Afterward, the state allowed token, or minimal, school desegregation in an attempt to
both avoid judicial scrutiny but also maintain as much segregation as possible.
In the 1960s the federal government demonstrated a renewed commitment to school
desegregation, and both legislative and executive action pressured the southern states,
including Virginia, to increase the amount of school desegregation taking place within their
borders. In the late 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a series of new school
desegregation decisions, starting with Green v. New Kent County (Virginia) in 1968, which
sped up the desegregation process in the South.
This dissertation examines the NAACP, Virginia's political leaders, white liberals and
moderates, and segregationists during this tumultuous time in Virginia's history. Outside of the
desegregation of public education, the manuscript also considers the desegregation of higher
education, public transportation and accommodations, the expansion of black voting rights and
political activity, racial violence, and related civil rights issues. Blending social, legal, political,
and African-American history, this dissertation seeks to shed new light on the Civil Rights
Movement and white resistance to civil rights in Virginia and the South.
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Introduction

The fiftieth anniversary of the Brown v. Board of Education decision in 2004
brought a significant increase in publications and other scholarly activity related to the
history of school desegregation in the United States. Conferences, journals, books, and
films examined many stories assessed the Brown decision's impact and legacy. Yet an
important part of the Brown story remained largely untold—how African Americans and
predominantly black civil rights organizations worked to implement the Supreme Court's
decision after 1954. This dissertation seeks to address that historiographical gap by
examining African American efforts to put the Brown decision into effect in Virginia.1
While considering how government officials, segregationist organizations, and
white supporters of desegregation influenced the process of implementation, this work
focuses on how the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) and its supporters sought to bring about school desegregation in the state. In
doing so, this dissertation aims more broadly to fill a gap in the historiography of
Virginia during this era by discussing and analyzing the goals and activities of its
African-American population.2

1

As historian Charles Eagles writes in the November 2000 issue of the Journal of Southern
History, "the larger stories of the NAACP as well as its Legal Defense and Educational Fund, especially
after the school desegregation cases, have not been told." Charles W. Eagles, "Toward New Histories of
the Civil Rights Era," The Journal of Southern History, Vol. LXVI, No. 4 (November 2000). Historian
Paul Gaston concurs: "Since Brown occupies such a central place in the lore of the civil rights movement, it
is somewhat surprising that general accounts of the civil rights era frequently de-emphasize the legal
struggle for equal education after 1954...." Matthew Lassiter and Andrew Lewis, editors, The Moderates'
Dilemma: Massive Resistance to School Desegregation in Virginia (Charlottesville: University Press of
Virginia, 1998), 5.
2
Regarding the lack of scholarship on implementing Brown in Virginia, Paul Gaston notes,
"Many important aspects of African-American history during the civil rights era in Virginia remain
unexplored by scholars, including the activities of state and local branches of the NAACP...." Matthew D.
Lassiter and Andrew B. Lewis, editors, The Moderates' Dilemma: Massive Resistance to School
Desegregation in Virginia (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1998), 206.

1

A handful of historians have examined the NAACP's legal campaign leading up
to the Brown decision, from roughly the 1930s to 1954, but few accounts of its school
desegregation campaign after 1954 exist. Furthermore, while histories of the other
leading civil rights organizations have appeared, no comprehensive history of the
NAACP has been written in recent years. These gaps have contributed to a lack of full
understanding of the school desegregation process and the early civil rights era. Equally
important, the scanty attention to the period after Brown has contributed to a lack of
understanding and appreciation of the NAACP as one of the leading civil rights
organizations of this era. The historian Adam Fairclough explains, "The NAACP is,
paradoxically, the most important but also the least studied of the civil rights
organizations."3
Yet this dissertation attempts to provide a holistic portrayal of the school
desegregation struggle in Virginia rather than tell the story from the African-American or
the white perspective exclusively. Events of the time unfolded in a complex, and multiracial, environment, so it is important to tell the story in an appropriately comprehensive
manner. The result—to the extent it is successful—blends African American, Virginia,
southern, legal, and civil rights history in a way that allows the reader to obtain a broad
understanding of the story of how school desegregation came about in Virginia.
Linking the various facets of the school desegregation story in one narrative also
highlights contributions and relationships that were previously unrecognized. Most
published histories of school desegregation in Virginia, for example, have failed to

3

Adam Fairclough, Race and Democracy: The Civil Rights Struggle in Louisiana, 1915-1972
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1995), xiv. See also Aldon Morris in Raymond D'Angelo, The Civil
Rights Movement in America (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001), 155-156.
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incorporate the African-American perspective, thus implying that African-Americans did
not significantly shape or influence the struggle over school desegregation in the state.
One example of this problem concerns the rise of massive resistance in Virginia.
As described in Chapter 3, scholars have generally portrayed this legal and political
movement, which was partly born in Virginia, as a white southern attack on the federal
government countered by that government's determination to bring about school
desegregation in the South. Told largely from the white perspective, these analyses of the
rise of massive resistance in Virginia gloss over the state's black population and its
highly successful NAACP units. Scholars have failed to recognize the important
relationship between the NAACP's actions and the development of the massive
resistance movement in the mid-1950s; in particular, they have not often shown how
worried segregationists were about the association's activities. Examining the rise of
massive resistance in the context of the NAACP's school desegregation efforts, however,
highlights the complex interplay of events which led to and fueled this anti-desegregation
effort. It would also be a mistake to fail to recognize how the actions of white
Virginians—government officials, segregationists, moderates, or liberals—affected
African-Americans in Virginia during this era. Although a growing body of scholarship
rightly, and importantly, addresses activities of black Virginians, it is important that this
story be placed in the context of broader occurrences and influences. To continue the
example from above, it is essential that one recognize not only the impact of the NAACP
on the rise of massive resistance, but also how massive resistance affected the NAACP.
One of the unintended byproducts of my research on the implementation of
Brown v. Board of Education in Virginia has been a better understanding of the early

3

years of the civil rights movement in Virginia more broadly. There is no overarching
monograph on the civil rights era in Virginia, and much civil rights scholarship focuses
on dramatic and sensational events which occurred outside the state. As the historian
Robert Pratt, a native Virginian, mused in 1996: "One of the questions that students ask
most often is, 'While civil rights battles were being fought in the streets of Birmingham
and Selma, what was going on in Virginia?' Unfortunately, I can never provide an
answer that satisfies either them or me." 4
Although this manuscript focuses on the school desegregation story and does not
attempt to convey the broader history of the civil rights era in Virginia, there are many
places where the two phenomena overlap. Indeed, the struggle to implement Brown v.
Board of Education in Virginia fueled, both directly and indirectly, the larger and
ultimately better-known struggle that we call the civil rights movement. When I digress
from telling the history of school desegregation in Virginia, it is often to shed light on the
relationship between the campaign for school desegregation and the broader struggle for
racial equality that occurred about the same time.
This dissertation assumes and asserts the importance of the state—in this case,
Virginia—as a unit in the school desegregation process. Individual states controlled their
respective education policies, and state leaders, sometimes quite eagerly, assumed
primary responsibility for responding to Brown. The NAACP, in planning its
implementation efforts, assumed that each state would react differently, and that the
association should vary its activities depending on the states' responses. After the
association's 1954 annual conference, Marshall stated, "the state level is the

4

Robert A. Pratt, "New Directions in Virginia's Civil Rights History," Virginia Magazine of
History and Biography, 104, volume 1 (Winter 1996), 151.
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implementation level of national policy." And in 1955 he added, "We're going to
actually adopt what we're going to do state by state, that's what I hope. For example,
we're going to treat Georgia one way, we're going to treat Maryland another way."5
Organizing its implementation campaign in this way allowed the NAACP to respond to
the individual policies of the southern states, while also allowing the association to take
full advantage of its State Conferences—vital and important links in the association's
hierarchy.
Virginia played a crucial role throughout the entire process. One of the four cases
decided under the rubric of Brown—Davis v. Prince Edward County—was filed in
Virginia, and that litigation was handled largely by attorneys from the Virginia NAACP,
which was the largest state unit of the organization in the South. Subsequently, Virginia
was the birthplace of massive resistance, and state officials led southern opposition to
school desegregation in a variety of ways. Later, it was a second Virginia school
desegregation lawsuit, the historic Green v. New Kent County, that led the United States
Supreme Court in 1968 to order the fulfillment of Brown v. Board ofEducation some
fourteen years after the original decision.
Even a casual reading of this dissertation, however, shows that it does not
exclusively focus on the state level. If it is important to incorporate a variety of
perspectives within the state of Virginia into the story, it is important to consider local,
regional, and national influences as well. The NAACP, for instance, was a national
organization based in New York City during this period, and its national office

5

Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black
America's Struggle for Equality (New York: Random House, 1975), 757. See also "Remarks of Thurgood
Marshall at Press Conference, June 30, 1954," Supplement to Part 1 (1951-55), reel 10, NAACP Papers
microfilm.
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significantly shaped the association's school desegregation policies. Other national
considerations affected school desegregation in Virginia—including the Brown decision
itself, the policies of a series of presidential administrations, and school desegregation
events outside of the state. On the other hand, local considerations sometimes had the
greatest impact. In the end, I believe that neither a top-down approach (focusing on the
national perspective) nor a bottom-up approach (focusing on localities) provides the best
means of understanding southern school desegregation during this era. Rather, we need
analyses which combine and connect these various layers of analyses.
Understanding such a complex story requires a wide variety of sources of primary
(i.e. contemporary) information. For the NAACP, the key resource is the Papers of the
NAACP collection at the Library of Congress. This manuscript collection includes
records from the national NAACP, the Virginia State Conference, and local branches of
the NAACP from throughout Virginia. Because of this, the collection provides
invaluable insights into the goals and actions of the organization and the AfricanAmerican community more broadly. The records of related organizations, such as the
Virginia Council on Human Relations, or those of other civil rights organizations, help us
understand non-NAACP proponents of school desegregation in Virginia.
Newspapers are another essential tool for understanding and telling this story.
During the era of segregation, newspapers throughout the region catered to raciallydefined audiences, so both white and African-American publications provide useful
insights into the thinking and actions of civil rights proponents and opponents.
Newspapers also place events in Virginia in the broader context of regional and national
events. My own research has also been complemented by a number of interviews that I

6

was able to conduct with individuals who were active in Virginia's school desegregation
campaign during the 1950s and 1960s. Most notable among the individuals I had the
pleasure to speak with at length are the late Judge Robert Merhige, Jr., the late Oliver
Hill, head of the Virginia state NAACP's legal staff during this era, and one of his
proteges, now-State Senator Henry Marsh. Their memories served as an invaluable link
to the records of the past and allowed me to see both how far we have come and how far
we yet have to go to provide a quality education to all children regardless of their race or
background.

7

Chapter 1,1902-1954
"A Source of Great Consternation": The NAACP and the Roots of Brown v. Board of
Education in Virginia

Racial segregation in Virginia's public school systems dated from their founding
just after the Civil War. Thirty years later, the state's 1902 constitution reiterated the
requirement for segregated education. During the debate over the constitution's
adoption, Paul Barringer, chairman of the faculty at the University of Virginia, argued
that educational opportunities for African Americans should be limited to "Sundayschool training," because the principal function of black Virginians was as a "source of
cheap labor for a warm climate." Barringer's words reflected the beliefs of many
Virginia leaders.1
The results were devastating for black education. As elsewhere in the South,
Virginia did not live up to the "separate but equal" doctrine, established by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896. That principle required the state to
provide equal public facilities, including schools, for blacks and whites. Throughout
Virginia, African-American school facilities, teacher salaries, educational equipment,
supplies, and course offerings suffered. Historian J. Douglas Smith points out that state

1

Quotations are from Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education
and Black America's Struggle for Equality (New York: Random House, 1975), 85; see also Ronald
Heinemann, Old Dominion, New Commonwealth: The History of Virginia, 1607-2000 (Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 2008). The new constitution also depressed black voting via a poll tax and
literacy test as requirements for voting; see J. Douglas Smith, Managing White Supremacy (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 20-26; Oliver White Hill, The Big Bang: Brown v. Board of
Education and Beyond (Winter Park, FL: Four-G Publishers, Inc., 2000), xvii-xviii; Andrew Buni, The
Negro in Virginia Politics, 1902-1965 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1967), 23-24; Kluger,
457-458. By the 1920s, state legislation had expanded segregation to include virtually every aspect of life.
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and local governments in Virginia in 1925 spent an average of $40.27 per year on each
white public school student, but only $10.47 on each black. In 1940, L. P. Whitten, a
black citizen of Abingdon, wrote the national NAACP's Director of Branches: "If you
will see that it is carried in the Pittsburgh Courier, I can secure pictures of all schools
here so that the public may know of the deplorable conditions."2
Higher education for African-Americans in Virginia suffered from similar
disparities in state funding. As Paul Barringer's words at the beginning of the twentieth
century showed, many of Virginia's leaders believed that higher education for blacks
should remain limited if it were offered at all. Every college and university in Virginia
was strictly segregated, and the black institutions received significantly less state support.
In 1942, there were thirty-eight institutions of higher learning for whites in Virginia, but
only six for blacks. None of the black schools offered courses in law, engineering, or
medicine—which meant that few blacks worked in these professions. In 1940 there was
one white lawyer for every 636 white persons in Virginia, but only one black lawyer for
every 13,780 blacks. Clearly, segregation restricted the educational opportunities of
African-Americans throughout the Commonwealth.3
In the 1930s, the Virginia NAACP mounted legal attacks against these inequities
as part of a school equalization campaign initiated by the national NAACP. The
coordinated legal effort pressured the South to provide equal educational opportunities to
black and white public school students, relying on the "separate but equal" clause of the
Statistic is from Smith, Managing White Supremacy, 135; see also 234-235. For more on
separate but unequal education in Virginia, see Hill, The Big Bang, 136; Kluger, 134, 472; Special Release,
October 31, 1947 by the Press Service of the NAACP, Part II, Box C211, Virginia State Conference, 1947,
Papers of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Manuscripts Division, Library
of Congress, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as NAACP Papers). Quotation is from Letter from L. P.
Whitten to William Pickens, August 14, 1940, Part II, Box C203, NAACP Papers.
3
Special Release, October 31, 1947 by the Press Service of the NAACP, Part II, Box C211,
Virginia State Conference, 1947, NAACP Papers.
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Plessy decision. As part of the process, the state NAACP filed lawsuits to force Virginia
to appropriate additional money for black elementary and secondary schools and for
black teacher salaries. In addition to improving black educational opportunities, the
campaign sought to highlight the financial cost of segregation in an attempt to undermine
white support for its existence.4 At the same time, the state NAACP filed lawsuits
seeking the admission of qualified black students into white colleges and universities
when those students wanted to enroll in programs not offered at black schools in
Virginia. This effort led to the creation of a graduate school for blacks at Virginia State
University as well as the Educational Equality Act of 1936, which provided state funding
to black students who wanted to attend graduate programs outside Virginia. In 1950 the
state NAACP also obtained a United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
decision ordering the admittance of Gregory Swanson, a black citizen from Danville, into
the University of Virginia's law school.5 Throughout the pre-Brown era, NAACP
attorneys in Virginia played a leading role in the NAACP's South-wide equalization
effort, gaining legal experience and strengthening the state NAACP's relationship with
the national office of the NAACP. 6
Located in New York City, the national office of the NAACP constituted the
highest level of this traditionally hierarchical organization. Its staff made the major
4

"Push Anti-Jim Crow Fight As Va. Legislature Opens," Atlanta Daily World, January 22, 1948,
in Part II, Box C211, Virginia State Conference, 1947, NAACP Papers.
5
Smith, Managing White Supremacy, 244-248.
6
The desegregation of undergraduate education in Virginia began, without a lawsuit, at Virginia
Tech in 1953, when Charlie Yates was admitted to study engineering, a program not available at Virginia's
black colleges and universities. For more on equalization and the Virginia NAACP, see "Push Anti-Jim
Crow Fight As Va. Legislature Opens," Atlanta Daily World, January 22, 1948, in Part II, Box C211,
Virginia State Conference, 1947, NAACP Papers; Memorandum to Mr. Marshall from Robert L. Carter,
January 16, 1946, "RE: State Conference of Branches in Virginia Meeting in Richmond, Virginia", Part II,
Box C211, Virginia State Conference, 1944-46, NAACP Papers; Special Release, October 31, 1947 by the
Press Service of the NAACP, Part II, Box C211, Virginia State Conference, 1947, NAACP Papers; Letter
from W. Lester Banks, O. W. Hill, J. M. Tinsley to NAACP Board of Directors, September 5, 1947, Part II,
Box C211, Virginia State Conference, 1947, NAACP Papers.

10

policy decisions for the NAACP, under the oversight of the association's board of
directors. The executive secretary and his staff ran the office; Walter White served in
that position from 1931 until 1955, and Roy Wilkins thereafter. The national office also
housed the association's many departments and their staffs, which carried out a variety of
tasks. Among the most important for the school desegregation campaign were the
Branch and Membership departments, which oversaw local NAACP chapters and
members.7
The national office worked closely with the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund (the LDF, also known as the Inc. Fund), a separate but closely-related
organization that was created in 1939 to handle much of the NAACP's legal work. Prior
to the creation of the Inc. Fund, the NAACP's litigation had been handled in-house,
initially by a volunteer group of white attorneys, and then, beginning in 1935, by a cadre
of black attorneys led by Charles Hamilton Houston. Houston hired a young black
attorney from Baltimore named Thurgood Marshall in 1937, and Marshall quickly
established himself as a crucial member of the organization. When the NAACP created
the Inc. Fund to take advantage of new laws governing tax-exempt status for non-profit
organizations in 1939, Marshall was chosen to lead the organization.8

7

"Centrality," or hierarchical control, was a key concept for the national NAACP. Minnie Finch,
in The NAACP: Its Fight For Justice (Metchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1981), 20, notes: "From the
very beginning, the national office maintained control and supervised the work of all the branches." See
Scope and Content Note, Guide to Part I, 1909-1950, in John Bracey, and August Meier, editors, Papers of
the NAACP (microfilm) (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 1982) (hereafter cited as NAACP
Papers microfilm); Christopher Robert Reed, The Chicago NAACP and the Rise of Black Professional
Leadership, 1910-1966 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana Univ Press, 1997); Aldon Morris, "Domination, Church,
and the NAACP" in Raymond D'Angelo, The Civil Rights Movement in America (New York: McGrawHill, 2001), 155-156; Adam Fairclough, Race and Democracy: The Civil Rights Struggle in Louisiana,
1915-1972 (Athens: University of GA Press, 1995), 48; Hill, The Big Bang, 186.
8
The NAACP continued to maintain a legal department separate from the Legal Defense Fund;
see Kluger, 165, 221. For more on the Legal Defense Fund, see Warren St. James, NAACP: Triumphs of a
Pressure Group, 1900-1980 (New York: Exposition Press, 1980), 206, which notes that the two
organizations had overlapping board and staff members. See also August Meier and John H. Bracey, Jr.,
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Within the NAACP, the level below the national office (and the Legal Defense
Fund) in the association's hierarchy was occupied by the NAACP's state headquarters,
known as State Conferences. State Conferences were charged with establishing and
overseeing NAACP branches within their jurisdiction, which often meant counseling and
encouraging nearly-defunct branches. Most State Conferences also held annual
gatherings of all the state's membership, which is where the name "conference"
originated. Most important, the State Conferences were expected to publicize and
implement national office policies.
Located in Richmond, the Virginia State Conference had been created in 1935—
the first in the nation. The Virginia NAACP was also the largest in the United States in
1941, with 39 branches. By the late 1940s, the Virginia State Conference oversaw
approximately one hundred local branches throughout the state, and the Virginia State
Conference was regularly lauded by the national NAACP as one of its most important
state units. Its successful implementation of national office policies and its rapid growth
encouraged the national office to create other State Conferences throughout the nation
and allowed the Virginia State Conference to develop a particularly strong relationship
with the national office of the NAACP.9

"The NAACP as a Reform Movement, 1909-1965: 'To reach the conscience of America,'" The Journal of
Southern History, February 1993, volume LIX, number 1, 3-30; Aldon Morris, The Origins of the Civil
Rights Movement (New York: Free Press, 1984), 13; Kenneth Robert Janken, White: The Biography of
Walter White, Mr. NAACP (New York: The New Press, 2003), 73-77; Benjamin Muse, Virginia's Massive
Resistance (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961), 50; Finch, 20.
9
The phrase "State Conference" can also be used to collectively describe the members of the
NAACP in a particular state—e.g., the "Virginia State Conference" was made up of 25,000 members.
Generally, however, the term referred to the state office or headquarters in Richmond. On the Virginia
State Conference in 1941, see Larissa M. Smith, "A Civil Rights Vanguard: Black Attorneys and the
NAACP in Virginia," in Peter Lau, editor, From the Grassroots to the Supreme Court (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2004), 141. See also Finch, 20; Morris, 13; Janken, 73-74, 77; Muse, 50; Buni, 177; Hill,
179; Warren St. James, The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People: A Case Study In
Pressure Groups (Smithtown, NY: Exposition Press, 1958), 75. The NAACP hierarchy also included a
regional office system that was developed in the late 1940s to provide additional support for branches, but

12

The NAACP's State Conferences also handled a significant amount of legal work.
Many State Conferences, including Virginia's, maintained a network of attorneys located
throughout the state who cooperated on civil rights litigation and implemented the
national office's legal strategies. Although generally paid for their NAACP work,
attorneys on the State Conference legal staff earned their livelihoods by handling nonNAACP litigation in private practices; their commitment to civil rights transcended
monetary gain. Oliver White Hill of Richmond led the Virginia State Conference legal
staff during the 1940s and 1950s. In this role, Hill recruited and cultivated a cadre of
black attorneys from throughout Virginia, allowing the State Conference to carry out an
extensive legal campaign in state and federal courts. By expanding the number of cases
that could be handled by the State Conference, Hill's legal staff contributed significantly
to the success of the NAACP's legal efforts. 10
In 1940, Virginia State Conference attorneys working with national NAACP
attorneys including Thurgood Marshall won a major ruling from the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In Alston v. City School Board of Norfolk, the court
held that racial discrimination in teacher salaries in Virginia violated the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear the case
on appeal, allowing a legal precedent to stand that the NAACP went on to use in the
1940s to attack unequal school facilities, transportation, and the like. The Virginia

these offices were understaffed and struggling in the mid-1950s, and the Virginia NAACP does not seem to
have fallen under regional oversight; see Finch, 122; St. James, A Case Study, 98; Memorandum from Mr.
Current to Mr. Wilkins, October 8, 1946, Part 17, reel 14, NAACP Papers microfilm; Western Union
telegram from Roy Wilkins to Franklin Williams, December 19, 1957, and identical telegram the same day
from Wilkins to Ruby Hurley, both in Supplement to Part 1 (1956-60), reel 2, NAACP Papers microfilm.
10
"1961 Freedom Fund Quota" from the Virginia State Conference to Virginia branches, undated
[February 1961], Part III, Box CI60, Virginia State Conference, 1961, NAACP Papers; Letter from John
Morsell to Roy Wilkins, February 6, 1961, Part III, Box CI60, Virginia State Conference, 1961, NAACP
Papers.
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NAACP, and particularly Oliver Hill's legal expertise, had been crucial to obtaining the
decision. The state NAACP's close working relationship with the national office of the
NAACP—on equalization and civil rights issues more generally—would continue through
the remainder of the decade and beyond.11
In 1947, the national office allowed the Virginia State Conference to hire a fulltime executive secretary to coordinate the organization's efforts. In June of that year, W.
Lester Banks, a former school principal and World War II veteran, became the first fulltime, paid State Conference executive secretary in the nation—again reflecting the
importance of the Virginia NAACP. His salary was paid by the national office, which
increased the amount of money it collected from State Conference memberships to cover
the additional expense. By 1954, largely as a result of Banks's efforts, the Virginia State
Conference boasted a membership of twenty-five thousand in more than a hundred
branches around the state, making it the largest in the South.12
Within the NAACP hierarchy, the State Conferences also served as the link
between the national office and the lowest level of the hierarchy, the NAACP's local
branches. A branch, sometimes referred to as a chapter, was made up of a minimum of
fifty dues-paying members (renewed annually). Each branch represented a particular
locality, typically a city or a county. Branches were chartered by the national office, but
were overseen by the State Conference in which they resided. By the 1940s, many
11
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southern communities had NAACP branches, though the level of vitality varied greatly
from chapter to chapter, and branches whose membership fell below the required number
were regularly disbanded by the national office. Before the 1950s, NAACP branches
often depended on the support of the more economically independent, or wealthier,
members of the local black community. Day-to-day branch work was often carried out
by a small, active executive committee, with strong ties to local churches and social and
civic organizations. Branch objectives and policies were determined by the national
office, typically as part of its national or regional strategy, and the national office also
assigned annual membership and fundraising goals to its branches.13
Founded in the 1910s, Virginia's earliest NAACP branches were among the first
in the South. The organization grew slowly until the establishment of the State
Conference in 1935, and then expanded significantly during and after the Second World
War. During this era, Virginia's largest branches were in Norfolk and Richmond, in each
of which annual memberships reached five thousand in the late 1940s. Branches in other
cities were also reliably active; county branches, particularly in rural areas, less so. In
virtually every community, black churches supported the organization. The leaders of
Virginia's NAACP branches worked in a variety of vocations; women were notably
active, including in the highest leadership roles (this could not be said of the State
Conference or the national office). Several branches, most commonly in northern
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Virginia, also contained white members, and a small number of white volunteers were
active in state NAACP matters throughout the civil rights era.14
The NAACP was not a mass-based civil rights organization. Although the
Virginia State Conference was the largest black civil rights organization in the state in the
1950s, its membership was limited to only a small percentage of the state's black
population. While the State Conference included twenty-five thousand dues-paying
members at mid-century, Virginia's black population at the same time numbered roughly
750,000. The relatively small number of members was due to the national NAACP's
annual membership fee as well as the national office's strictly-enforced requirement that
branches contain at least fifty dues-paying members. Transportation issues made it more
difficult to recruit members in rural areas, particularly during World War II, as did
greater white resistance. As a result, the largest NAACP branches in Virginia (and
throughout the South) were in urban areas, and the organization's civil rights efforts were
often concentrated in cities as well.15
Most African Americans in Virginia were concentrated in two large geographic
regions—Southside (southern) and Tidewater (eastern) Virginia. Roughly speaking, these
two areas lie between Richmond and Lynchburg in the North, Martinsville in the West,
North Carolina to the South, and the Chesapeake Bay and Atlantic Ocean to the East. As
of the 1920s, approximately seventy-five percent of Virginia's black population resided
14
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in these two regions, where they made up more than forty percent of the local population.
Encompassing roughly 35 contiguous counties, the two regions made up Virginia's
section of the South's Black Belt and the state's leading agricultural area.16
Throughout the South, white opposition to racial change was greatest in areas
with large black populations, and this was true in Virginia as well. Southside and
Tidewater were known as the most racially intransigent sections of the state, and here
blacks faced a variety of pressures to conform to the racial standards of the day. Blacks
who lived in urban areas within the two regions were less directly affected than those in
rural areas, but challenges to white supremacy or segregation were taken seriously
throughout this area. The NAACP's principal opponent in the struggle to improve the
status of African-Americans in the Commonwealth was also based in Tidewater and
(especially) Southside Virginia. This was the state's Democratic political machine, the
Byrd Organization.
As governor in the 1920s, Harry Flood Byrd Sr. had used patronage to create a
political oligarchy that ruled Virginia during the mid-twentieth century. In positions of
power throughout the state government, members of his organization implemented
Byrd's plans and ideas with great effectiveness. Future Governor J. Lindsay Almond, Jr.,
explained the Byrd Organization this way: "It's like a club except it has no bylaws,
constitutions, or dues. It's a loosely knit association, you might say, between men who
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share the philosophy of Senator Byrd." In 1949, in Southern Politics in State and Nation,
V. O. Key wrote, "Of all the American states, Virginia can lay claim to the most thorough
control by an oligarchy."17
Byrd ran the organization from Washington D.C., where he represented Virginia
as a U.S. Senator from 1933 to 1965. A Southern Democrat known for his fiscal
conservatism, Byrd regularly clashed with the national Democratic Party on spending
issues and matters related to civil rights. Though not virulently racist, the Byrd
Organization's leadership strongly supported segregation, defining its stance as an effort
to defend states' rights.18
By the late 1940s, the national Democratic Party's growing support for civil rights
clearly concerned Senator Byrd. The migration of millions of African-Americans to the
nation's northern cities, where they voted with few restrictions, had attracted the attention
of northern, and national, political figures in the 1930s and 1940s. Moreover, Franklin D.
Roosevelt's New Deal and his attention to African-American leaders had produced a
steady migration of blacks from their traditional Republican home into the national
Democratic Party. In part because of these trends, President Harry Truman (1945-1953),
who succeeded Roosevelt, became the strongest supporter of civil rights of any president
in the twentieth century up to that time. Truman's remarks to the NAACP's annual
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convention in 1947, his administration's civil rights report in the same year titled "To
Secure These Rights," and his executive order of 1948 integrating the United States
military demonstrated that Truman understood something about the level of black
discontent in the United States and the reasons behind it.19
Truman's actions and the growing support for civil rights within the Democratic
Party, however, raised concerns among southern Democrats, including Senator Byrd. At
the 1948 Democratic national convention, a number of southern party leaders walked out
and created a separate political party for the upcoming presidential election. Byrd chose
not to walk out of the convention, but the senator refused to endorse Truman in the
general election. Though the Dixiecrats' efforts failed to attract widespread support
(Virginia's Electoral College votes went to Truman), their displeasure reflected white
southern opposition to Truman's racial policies and his growing support for civil rights,
even as African-Americans celebrated these same changes.20
Adding to the Byrd Organization's concerns in the 1940s was the growing success
of the NAACP's school equalization campaign. After the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of the NAACP in Alston v. School Board of the City
of Norfolk in 1940, the NAACP expanded its school equalization campaign in Virginia,
filing additional lawsuits statewide, particularly in the later 1940s. State Conference
attorneys handled the litigation, in close consultation with Thurgood Marshall and his
assistants. Increasingly, the lawsuits targeted unequal school facilities, including school
buildings and the facilities within the buildings. By the end of the decade the Virginia
NAACP had filed salary or facilities equalization lawsuits against more than a hundred
19
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school districts throughout the state, a time-consuming legal process that was required
because each district was locally administered (a similar process would be required to
desegregate southern schools in the 1950s). In the end, the number of equalization
lawsuits filed in Virginia was far greater than in any other southern state, reflecting the
importance of the Virginia State Conference to the national office of the NAACP as well
as the state NAACP's strength and vitality in the 1940s. During this time, State
Conference attorneys, because of their expertise, also helped with equalization lawsuits in
other states. As the NAACP won court-ordered improvements throughout Virginia, state
officials set aside increasing amounts of money for black education, particularly for the
construction of new schools, and in the early 1950s the Washington Post estimated that
the NAACP's lawsuits had forced Virginia to spend over fifty million dollars equalizing
teacher salaries and school facilities. The victories, which were reported on and
discussed in the state's black newspapers, also helped the NAACP attract memberships,
particularly among African-American educators.21
World War II occurred in the middle of the NAACP's equalization efforts, and
the conflict had a mixed impact on the struggle for racial equality. On the one hand, a
number of civil rights leaders from Virginia entered the military, including Oliver Hill,
W. Lester Banks, and S. W. Tucker, as did tens of thousands of other southern blacks.
Without a doubt, their absence slowed the push for racial equality—Hill even suspected
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that Harry Byrd purposefully had him drafted to hinder the equalization campaign. In
their absence, State Conference President J. M. Tinsley, attorney Spottswood Robinson,
and countless local leaders struggled to fill the void. At the same time, World War II
clearly increased African American aspirations for better treatment, in part because the
nation's stated war aims—including the defense and extension of basic human rights and
civil liberties—seemed at odds with the realities of southern society. Throughout the war
years, the membership of the national NAACP grew dramatically. Afterwards, black
veterans, including Hill and Tucker, returned home more committed to racial change than
ever before, and they were encouraged by growing signs of broader black discontent. In
Virginia and elsewhere, the postwar era witnessed a growth in activism that revitalized
the struggle for civil rights and propelled it to new levels.22
One example of rising black discontent occurred in Middlesex County, Virginia,
during the war. In July 1944, Irene Morgan, a twenty-seven year-old mother of two, was
arrested for refusing to give up her seat on a Greyhound bus traveling to Baltimore. In
the process, Morgan tore up her ticket in front of the arresting officer and kicked him, as
Morgan later explained, "where it would hurt a man the most." Morgan turned to the
NAACP for help, and the State Conference appealed her conviction (which had occurred
in Virginia courts) to the U.S. Supreme Court, with help from Thurgood Marshall and the
Legal Defense Fund. Before the Supreme Court, NAACP attorneys argued that
Morgan's status as an interstate passenger provided her with federal protection, trumping
state laws requiring segregation. The court concurred, ruling that segregation on
22
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interstate bus lines was unconstitutional because it interfered with interstate commerce.
As might be expected, the decision was widely praised among African-Americans in
Virginia, who increasingly viewed the NAACP as their most effective vehicle for racial
change.23
One key to the NAACP's success during the 1940s was the personal relationships
among its leading attorneys. Thurgood Marshall and Oliver Hill, for instance, had
graduated first and second, respectively, in the Class of 1933 at Howard University's
Law School—while also becoming, as Hill recalled, close friends. Spottswood Robinson
also attended Howard Law, graduating a few years after Marshall and Hill. Trained, like
Hill and Marshall, by Charles Hamilton Houston, "Spot" earned the highest grade point
average ever from Howard Law and later served as its Dean. Throughout the Morgan
litigation, the NAACP's equalization campaign, and more importantly during the
litigation leading to Brown v. Board of Education and its implementation, the close
relationship between Marshall, Hill, and Robinson helped ensure that the Virginia State
Conference of the NAACP would be crucial to the national NAACP's legal efforts.24
In the late 1940s, the Legal Defense Fund focused much of its attention on
equalizing higher education opportunities for African-Americans in the South. LDF
lawsuits against the University of Oklahoma and the University of Texas both led to
significant NAACP victories. In 1948, the Supreme Court ordered the admission of a
black graduate student, Ada Sipuel, to the University of Oklahoma because the state did
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not offer a comparable educational opportunity to African-Americans. Subsequent cases
raised questions about whether the South's newly and hastily created black programs
were, or could be, equal to longstanding white institutions. In Sweatt v. Painter (1950),
for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court ordered the admission of Heman Sweatt to the
University of Texas Law School because "intangible factors" such as the reputation of a
hastily-created black law school, and its networking connections for black graduates,
were inferior to those of the white school. To Thurgood Marshall and his colleagues at
the LDF, the Supreme Court by now seemed to be pondering the legality of segregation
itself.25
All along, the NAACP had hoped that its equalization lawsuits would establish
legal precedents supporting an NAACP attack on the constitutionality of segregation.26
The association's litigation seeking equal teacher salaries and school facilities at the
primary and secondary levels in the 1930s and 1940s failed to do this, as the court
decisions merely reaffirmed the "separate but equal" doctrine. Moreover, though the
association's salary and facilities equalization lawsuits had noticeably improved the
educational opportunities available to African-Americans in the South, the cost to the
NAACP, in terms of time and money, had been significant. Forced to file lawsuits
against each individual school district, for instance, the Virginia State Conference's legal
staff was spread thin as its equalization campaign continued in the late 1940s.
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The NAACP's lawsuits against colleges and universities in the South, however,
produced direct support for the organization's long-term goal of attacking the
constitutionality of segregation itself. The higher education court rulings, most of which
came from the U.S. Supreme Court, dealt more explicitly with the impact of segregation
on African Americans than the association's primary and secondary school equalization
lawsuits. In case after case at the higher education level, the NAACP asked the court to
narrow the legal justifications for segregation, a process which inevitably forced the
justices to consider the institution as a whole.
By mid-century, both the shortcomings of the equalization strategy and the
increasingly positive rulings emanating from the U.S. Supreme Court convinced the
NAACP that the time was right for a change in strategy. In 1948, the organization's
board of directors approved a policy change allowing the NAACP's attorneys to directly
challenge the constitutionality of southern segregation laws. Thurgood Marshall and his
assistants had argued for this change and put it into effect almost immediately. By 1950,
all new education cases filed by the NAACP challenged the legitimacy of southern
segregation laws.27
The key to the NAACP's new legal strategy was the belief that segregation was
discriminatory and harmful. Rather than existing as an unbiased arrangement that
affected blacks and whites equally, as the Supreme Court suggested in 1896, the NAACP
viewed segregation as a system that disproportionately, and negatively, affected AfricanAmericans. The fact that southern schools were so disparately funded supported the
NAACP's claim, as did psychological evidence gathered in the late 1940s by Dr.
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Kenneth Clark which suggested that segregated education harmed the morale of black
students. In its new lawsuits, the NAACP argued that segregation harmed AfricanAmerican by denying them the treatment that whites received, and that the arrangement
was therefore a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause.
The Virginia State Conference welcomed the national office's decision to
challenge the legality of segregation. State Conference attorneys had worked closely
with national NAACP attorneys throughout the equalization campaign, and had regularly
traveled to New York City to discuss and debate legal strategies. By the late 1940s,
Spottswood Robinson had joined the Legal Defense Fund's paid staff part-time as a
southern representative, and Oliver Hill's close relationship with Thurgood Marshall
meant the Virginia State Conference's legal staff played an integral role in the national
NAACP's legal proceedings within the state. Hill, Robinson, and the remainder of the
State Conference's legal staff quickly began to work toward implementation in Virginia
of the association's new legal strategy.28
How African Americans in Virginia and elsewhere would react to the new
strategy, however, was unclear. Spottswood Robinson reported to Thurgood Marshall in
1950 that he knew of no instances in which black organizations had refused to go along
with the NAACP's new policy, but Robinson also believed the association would have a
difficult time finding plaintiffs in Virginia who were committed to attacking segregation
outright. To do so was to engender the animosity of the local white community and to
invite retribution. Talking about the NAACP's abandonment of equalization and its new
frontal attack on the constitutionality of segregation, NAACP Labor Secretary Herbert
Hill later recalled: "There was lots of resistance in the branches because real progress
28
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toward equalization was now beginning to be made in schools and other facilities like
parks, libraries, and swimming pools."29
In Virginia, it was another World War II veteran, L. Francis Griffin, who
connected the NAACP to its most important lawsuit of this era, Davis v. Prince Edward
County. Griffin, from Farmville, served in the Army for four years during World War II;
he then returned to Prince Edward County and took over as minister of his father's
Baptist church. Recognizing the injustices of the county's educational system, Griffin
and other black leaders pushed county officials to equalize the schools throughout the late
1940s, to no avail. Frustrated with the severely overcrowded and poorly appointed
building they were consigned to, students at the local all-black Moton High School took
matters into their own hands in the spring of 1951, walking out of school in protest.
Initially the students sought only a new black high school, and they contacted the
state NAACP seeking help. State Conference leaders explained that the association no
longer filed equalization lawsuits, and that the NAACP would only file a lawsuit that
challenged the constitutionality of segregation in the county's public schools. Meetings
with the students and their parents convinced Oliver Hill of their willingness to challenge
segregation outright, although several students expressed concern that integration might
dismantle the black education system. Afterward, State Conference leaders suggested
that the black community in Prince Edward County hold a mass meeting to determine
how to proceed. At the community gathering in Farmville, local blacks agreed with the
NAACP's new strategy, although again there were signs of opposition within the local
black community—Barbara Johns denounced one opponent as an "Uncle Tom."
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Immediately thereafter, State Conference attorneys submitted a petition to the local
school board seeking desegregation, and when this was rejected, the attorneys filed Davis
v. Prince Edward County in federal district court in May 1951.30
To most white southerners, desegregating schools was an extremely troubling
proposition—much scarier than equalizing black schools or even desegregating other
areas of southern society. The great fear of some, perhaps many, was that integrated
classrooms might lead to integrated relationships, and perhaps to marriage and racial
mixing—or "miscegenation."31 Many southern whites believed, moreover, that proximity
to black children might promote immorality or disease among white youths, and that
combining black and white school children would lower educational standards and
reduce the effectiveness of Virginia's education system. As legal historian Michael
Klarman explains, "Segregation of public grade schools lay near the top of the white
supremacist hierarchy of racial preferences."32
As a result, white leaders in the South, including those in Virginia, vigorously
resisted the NAACP's anti-segregation lawsuits. Prince Edward County received direct
and extensive help from the Virginia state government to defend against the NAACP's
legal attack, and state officials were clearly aware of the danger of defeat. Future
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governor J. Lindsay Almond, attorney general of Virginia at the time, played an integral
role, coordinating efforts with county officials and some of the most prominent white
attorneys in Virginia to defend the state's segregation statutes. The state government also
increased its equalization efforts now, hoping to forestall future attacks on segregation by
convincing African Americans in Virginia to accept new, segregated schools. In
September 1953, for instance, a new black high school opened in Farmville—the student
strikers' original goal.
In the meantime, Davis v. Prince Edward County worked its way through the
federal court system. Both the federal district court and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled against the NAACP in 1952. As expected, the State
Conference then appealed Davis to the U.S. Supreme Court, where it joined similar
NAACP cases from Kansas, South Carolina, the District of Columbia, and Delaware.
Obtaining a decision from the Supreme Court took two years, during which Oliver Hill
and Spottswood Robinson regularly traveled to New York to plan legal strategy and work
on legal briefs and arguments for the Supreme Court with Thurgood Marshall and the
Legal Defense Fund. That May, four of the five cases that had been bundled together by
the U.S. Supreme Court became known to the world as Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka, Kansas.33
On the eve of Brown v. Board of Education, however, segregation remained
remarkably solid in Virginia. True, the Virginia State Conference's litigation had
dismantled small pieces of the racial edifice over the previous decade, most notably in
33
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interstate transportation and higher education. The Virginia NAACP had also forced the
state to expend a large amount of money to equalize the Commonwealth's black and
white teacher salaries and public school facilities, and had initiated an important legal
challenge to segregation in public education. Still, segregation seemed to have assumed a
somewhat immutable character in the southern United States by the 1950s, and racial
separation had been repeatedly legitimized by the U. S. Supreme Court. On the eve of
Brown v. Board of Education, as historian Robbins Gates has pointed out, "There is no
reason to assume that any responsible, white, public official in Virginia envisioned that
state's governmental policy as moving 'gradually' toward a time when white and Negro
children would attend integrated public schools."34
At the same time, white Virginians boasted of amicable race relations in the
Commonwealth. The state had not experienced significant turmoil as the NAACP had
dismantled some elements of the Jim Crow system. Racial violence directed at African
Americans in Virginia was rare, which could not be said of many areas of the South. In
the twentieth century, fewer African Americans were lynched in Virginia than in any
other southern state, in part because of a state anti-lynching law adopted in 1928. As a
result, white Virginians generally felt as if their relationship with their black neighbors
and fellow citizens was good. In 1949, political scientist V. O. Key stated that Virginia's
"race relations are perhaps the most harmonious in the South," and Governor John S.
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Battle later said, "I think there were no serious problems as far as the races are concerned
before 1954."35
Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, encountered a less positive
side of racial segregation when he traveled to Virginia in the spring of 1954, however.
On a short personal trip to visit Civil War monuments, Warren brought along his
chauffeur, an African-American man. After touring sites the first day, the chief justice
checked into a segregated hotel, leaving his chauffeur to find another, presumably less
expensive, place to stay. The following morning, however, Warren realized the man had
spent the night in the car. When the chief justice asked why, the man explained that he
had been unable to find a hotel that would allow a black man to spend the night.
Embarrassed and ashamed, the chief justice abandoned the trip immediately. The
discriminatory and harmful effects of segregation were undoubtedly crystal clear to the
chief justice that day.36
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Chapter 2,1954-1955
Brown and the Southern Backlash

On Monday, May 17, 1954, the United States Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Brown v. Board of Education. A unanimous ruling, Brown declared
segregated schools inherently unequal and therefore unconstitutional, as the NAACP had
argued. Chief Justice Earl Warren, author of the decision, wrote, "Does segregation of
children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities
and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of
equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does."1
The decision overturned state-mandated school segregation in seventeen southern
and border states, and locally-based segregation policies in four others. In the seventeen
requiring segregated education, including Virginia, the Brown decision affected more
than eleven million black and white school children in 11,173 school districts.2 Historian
Richard Kluger later wrote, "Probably no case ever to come before the nation's highest
tribunal affected more directly the minds, hearts, and daily lives of so many Americans."3
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Reactions to the decision varied significantly. In the northern and western United
States, responses were mostly favorable.4 States on the edge of the former Confederacy,
and Upper South states (states within the South but on the border with the North),
generally accepted the decision and pledged compliance. The Governor of Maryland, for
instance, called the idea of resistance "fantastic nonsense."5 At least some districts in
Delaware, West Virginia, Kentucky, Arkansas, Missouri, Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, and
the District of Columbia began school desegregation that academic year.6
Reactions in the remainder of the South were hostile, with the strongest
opposition coming from the Deep South. In Georgia, Governor Herman Talmadge said
the decision had reduced the Constitution to "a mere scrap of paper."7 Senator James
Eastland of Mississippi condemned the Supreme Court for creating new law, stating that
"The South will not abide by or obey this legislative decision." The Jackson, Mississippi,
Daily News editorialized: "Human blood may stain southern soil in many places because
of this decision, but the dark red stains of that blood will be on the marble of the United
States Supreme Court Building."8
Virginia's political leaders reacted negatively to the Brown decision as well, but
not uniformly. Governor Thomas B. Stanley initially said the decision called for "cool
heads, calm study, and sound judgment." He added, "I shall call together as quickly as
4
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practicable representatives of both state and local governments to consider the matter and
work toward a plan which will be acceptable to our citizens and in keeping with the edict
of the court. Views of leaders of both races will be invited in the course of these
studies."9 When U.S. Senator Harry F. Byrd, head of the state's political organization,
heard of Stanley's statement, however, he was furious. Future governor J. Lindsay
Almond later said, "I heard ... that the top blew off the U.S. Capitol."10 Senator Byrd
had already denounced Brown, arguing that Virginia faced "a crisis of the first
magnitude."11 Now Byrd led Virginia's political leaders into a policy of resistance. By
mid-summer, the political elite had fallen into line. In mid-June, Governor Stanley
declared, "I shall use every legal means at my command to continue segregated schools
in Virginia."12
Southern opposition to the decision, including Virginia's, was based on a number
of factors. Many southern whites criticized the decision's reliance on sociological
evidence, including the studies and testimony of Dr. Kenneth Clark, an African American
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scholar.13 Others pointed to Chief Justice Earl Warren's recent appointment to the Court
and his role in fashioning the decision; many denounced the "Warren Court." But these
were secondary considerations. The underlying fears of many segregationists were that
educating blacks and whites together would lower the quality of education for all
students, and that black and white children who were educated together might become
comfortable with one another enough to have sexual relations, leading to the decline of
the "superior" white race. This fear of miscegenation was widely used as a justification
for resistance in Virginia.14
Worries about miscegenation haunted whites on the visceral level, but, in public
discourse, probably the most widely accepted rhetorical argument used to oppose the
Brown decision in Virginia was the ideology of states' rights. Segregation had been
accepted by the federal government since its codification after the Civil War (and even
earlier in the northern states); mandating racial separation therefore was a recognized
power of the states, the argument went. To take this right away was a dangerous
expansion of federal power. The states' rights argument both reinforced and put a
seemingly respectable face on purely racist arguments for preserving segregation in
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Virginia. More important, it drew white Virginians who were not necessarily afraid of
miscegenation into the camp of the segregationists.
Demography also influenced the responses to Brown in Virginia. Resistance was
greatest where African Americans made up a large percentage of the population—east of
the Appalachian Mountains and south of the Rappahannock River, in Southside and
Tidewater Virginia. Historian Mark Tushnet explains: "Southside politicians, an
important force in Senator Harry Byrd's political organization, insisted that the state
stand firm against desegregation anywhere. In contrast, white politicians and their
constituents in the Virginia suburbs of Washington, D.C., did not welcome desegregation,
but neither did they think that maintaining segregation was the state's highest priority;
they could live with desegregation if they had to."15
Once the Byrd line on the Brown decision became clear, state officials searched
for means to preserve segregated education. On May 27, 1954, Superintendent of Public
Instruction Dowell J. Howard announced the continuation of segregation statewide for
the 1954-1955 school year. In August, Governor Stanley appointed a thirty-two-man
board, officially known as the Commission on Public Education but more commonly
called the Gray Commission, to study the Brown decision and recommend a course of
action. The committee was composed of state legislators, and Virginia's Black Beltincluding Southside and Tidewater Virginia—was disproportionately represented.16 The
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group's chairman, Garland Gray, was a state senator from the Southside town of
Waverly, in the heart of Virginia's peanut country, and a Byrd Organization stalwart. In
October, Gray proclaimed, "I have nothing against the Negro race as such, and I have
lived with them all my life, but I don't intend to have my grandchildren go to school with
them."17
Governor Stanley also organized a meeting of southern governors in Richmond to
rally resistance to Brown. Nine attended the June 1954 gathering, with three others
sending representatives. After a day-long session, nine of the states resolved "not to
comply voluntarily with the Supreme Court's decision against racial segregation in the
public schools."18 The remaining states—Kentucky, Maryland, and West Virginiadecided their problems of adjustment were surmountable. That these three states
bordered Virginia did not prevent the Old Dominion from aligning itself with states
further south.
In fact, the meeting of southern governors suggested that Virginia was prepared to
help lead the South in opposition to the Supreme Court's ruling. Perhaps this stance
derived in part from the memory of the state's role in the founding of the nation or its
leadership of the Confederacy during the Civil War. As former state legislator Benjamin
Muse put it in the Washington Post, "the South ... looked to Virginia more than to any
other state for leadership in this crisis. Virginia, with its glorious role in the early history
of the republic and again in the struggle for the great Lost Cause—also with its genteel
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and honored political leadership of the day—was surely indicated to carry the banner of
the South in this latest conflict."19 In 1956, with massive resistance on the rise
throughout the South, Senator Byrd offered another justification for Virginia's
leadership: "If Virginia surrenders, if Virginia's line is broken, the rest of the South will
go down, too." 20
At the same time, the NAACP geared up to bring about the implementation of the
historic decision. The nation's leading civil rights organization, the NAACP was largely
responsible for Brown v. Board of Education, and the organization's leadership was
committed to playing a key role in bringing about school desegregation thereafter. The
association's implementation program, which was developed and directed by the national
office in New York City, involved the coordination of thousands of representatives across
the nation.
Realizing that a favorable Supreme Court decision would require the NAACP to
launch the most important project in its history, the national office had begun formulating
an implementation program in early 1954, and its leaders made plans to sponsor an
NAACP meeting in the South following the decision. The weekend following Brown,
the national office sponsored the gathering in Atlanta. At the meeting, staff from the
national office outlined to the association's southern State Conference presidents a
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program for implementing Brown and bringing about school desegregation.21 The
southern leaders then adopted resolutions—proposed by the national office—mandating
that local efforts to promote implementation of Brown be overseen by the national and
state NAACP.22 In a letter sent to all southern branches after the meeting, the national
office emphasized, "It is imperative that all of our units act in concert as directed to
effectively implement this historic decision."23
The Atlanta Conference delegates also adopted the Atlanta Declaration, which
outlined the NAACP's implementation program for the immediate future. That program
was remarkably moderate and conciliatory toward white Southerners. Branch leaders
were encouraged to gather the support of black and white community organizations to
help bring about desegregation. Rather than initiate widespread litigation to force
desegregation, branches were ordered to negotiate and cooperate with their local school
boards. Branches were told to collect signatures from black parents who favored
desegregation, but the gathering of such petitions was not to be coupled with the threat of
litigation.24 As the Atlanta Declaration explained, "We are instructing all of our branches
in every affected area to petition their local school boards to abolish segregation without
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delay and to assist these agencies in working out ways and means of implementing the
Court's ruling."25
A month after the Atlanta Conference, the NAACP's annual convention in Dallas,
Texas, endorsed the Atlanta Conference's implementation program and attempted to spur
its branches into action.26 Daylong workshops explained the national office program and
the prospective role of the branches. A key goal was building community support among
whites as well as blacks to bring about desegregation. Local branches were encouraged
to seek support for desegregation from ministers, labor unions, educational organizations,
and social and civic groups 27 Channing H. Tobias, chairman of NAACP's board of
directors, "called for a 'spirit of give and take' in the discussions. 'Let it not be said of us
that we took advantage of a sweeping victory to drive a hard bargain or impose
unnecessary hardships upon those responsible for working out the details of
adjustment."'28 Court suits, potentially effective but abrasive, were to be avoided.
Conference delegates resolved that "the enjoyment of many rights and opportunities of
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first class citizenship is not dependent on legal action but rather on the molding of public
sentiment and the exertion of public pressure to make democracy work." 29
Looking back, it is clear that NAACP leaders initially were overly optimistic
about the implementation of Brown. Historian Alfred Kelly, who worked closely with
Marshall and other leading NAACP attorneys, later noted, "In a sense, these men were
profoundly naive. They really felt that once the legal barriers fell, the whole black-white
situation would change."30 Marshall himself predicted that school segregation in the
United States would be completely eliminated within five years.31 Oliver White Hill,
head of the Virginia State Conference legal staff, later explained that his optimism was
based on the belief that southern whites respected the law. When Brown declared
segregation unconstitutional, however, Hill noted that "many Negroes experienced a rude
awakening as white folks' reputed great respect for the law disappeared."32
African-American optimism in 1954 was related to the Brown decision itself. The
ruling did not address who would be responsible for the implementation of Brown, how
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the process would occur, or when desegregation would take place. Instead, the Court
instructed the parties involved in the case to submit additional briefs and prepare for
additional arguments, after which the Court would issue a follow-up ruling. This
decision, commonly known as Brown II, was not handed down until May 1955. In the
interim period, it was anyone's guess how school desegregation would proceed. A
number of school districts began desegregation in the fall of 1954. This fact, in addition
to the hope that the Supreme Court's follow-up decision would mandate rapid and
complete desegregation, as requested by the NAACP's attorneys during the re-argument,
increased the optimism of African Americans throughout the nation. The interim period
between Brown I and Brown II also would have made it difficult to frame additional
NAACP lawsuits; this fact, too, led the association to focus on voluntary compliance
rather than litigation for the remainder of 1954 and most of 1955.
The 1954 annual convention of the NAACP and the association's original school
desegregation plans emphasized the importance of the organization's southern State
Conferences in the implementation process. At the annual convention, meetings and
workshops made sure the state units of the NAACP understood and followed the national
implementation program. Keeping in close contact with its State Conferences, the
national NAACP could discern where to direct more, or less, attention—allowing it to
respond more effectively to developments in the South as they unfolded. As NAACP
special counsel Thurgood Marshall noted after the 1954 annual convention, "the state
level is the implementation level of national

policy."33
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The Virginia State Conference, like the national office, hailed the Brown decision.
State leaders described the decision as "a landmark comparable to the Declaration of
Independence."34 The weekend after the decision, members of the Virginia State
Conference legal staff, as well as State Conference president Dr. J. M. Tinsley and
executive secretary W. Lester Banks, attended the Atlanta Conference. In June, Banks,
Tinsley, and Oliver Hill also represented the State Conference at the NAACP's 1954
annual conference in Houston. While the state NAACP's legal staff worked with
national office lawyers on briefs for the Supreme Court's implementation decision, the
Virginia State Conference directed its branches to begin working toward school
desegregation. ^ 5
During the four weeks between the NAACP's Atlanta Conference and its annual
convention, the State Conferences were asked to call together representatives of their
local branches and "instruct them on procedure to implement the [Atlanta]
Declaration."36 On May 26, 1954, Virginia State Conference executive secretary Lester
Banks sent a letter to the officers of the Conference's eighty-eight branches announcing a
"State-wide Emergency Meeting" to discuss carrying out the national office's
implementation program in Virginia.37 The meeting took place in Richmond on June 6,
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1954, and more than three hundred NAACP representatives from around the state
attended. The delegates unanimously endorsed the recommendations of the Atlanta
Conference. They decided that the State Conference, in consultation with local branches,
would develop a statewide program that would allow the Virginia NAACP to operate
with both "uniformity and efficiency" while carefully following national office
directives. In the meantime, the delegates asked Virginia's NAACP branches to refrain
from desegregation activities.38 Shortly after the gathering, executive secretary Banks
said he hoped that '"friendly co-operation between school officials and the Virginia
NAACP' would be possible."39
Also in May, Oliver Hill and a small delegation of other African American
leaders were asked to meet with Governor Stanley. During the closed-door session on
May 24, the governor urged the black leaders to accept continued segregation in
exchange for improvements to black schools throughout Virginia. Hill later recalled that
the governor essentially asked them "to let things ride." Refusing to do so, the black
leaders instead suggested the governor position Virginia to lead the South in compliance
with the historic ruling.40
Hill's friend, Thurgood Marshall, visited Virginia several times that year to
support state and local NAACP efforts. In mid-June, Marshall spoke to the Richmond
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branch, promising to attack all forms of segregation, including laws governing
segregation during public assemblies and on transportation. With regard to the schools,
Marshall argued that decision-making should be left to local school boards rather than to
state governments; he may well have understood by then that Harry Byrd's statewide
organization would try to prevent the more flexible local governments in the state from
accepting desegregation.41 That October, Marshall addressed the State Conference's
annual meeting in Martinsville. Still optimistic about the progress and potential for
southern school desegregation, Marshall argued that the problems of adjustment would be
relatively easy for school children, and he "said the NAACP never has been more
encouraged nor more certain that the [country] is moving toward eventual
desegregation."42
The following month, Oliver Hill and fellow NAACP attorney W. Hale
Thompson, along with some other African Americans and several white liberals, attended
a public hearing on the Brown decision sponsored by the Gray Commission. The hearing
symbolized the challenges facing the supporters of integration in Virginia. Hill implored
the Commission, "Gentlemen, face the dawn and not the setting sun. A new day is being
born."43 Most of those who addressed the Commission, however, including a number of
elected officials, called for the continuation of segregation. After Sarah Patton Boyle, a
native white Virginian, spoke in favor of integration, an audience member accused her of
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supporting the mongrelization of the white race.44 One leading white newspaper, the
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, called the November 15 event a "field day for [white]
extremists."45
By the fall of 1954, segregationists had organized and developed plans for the
post -Brown era. The state's leading segregationist organization, the Defenders of State
Sovereignty and Individual Liberties, was established in October 1954 and rapidly
became influential in state affairs. The organization eventually boasted 12,000 members
and developed close ties to Virginia's political elite. State Senator Garland Gray, head of
the Gray Commission, for instance, was at the group's organizing meeting, and Byrd
Organization regulars such as Congressman Watkins Abbitt and former governor William
Tuck often attended meetings. In the tradition of Virginia paternalism, the Defenders of
State Sovereignty denounced violence and outright intimidation, focusing instead on
political persuasion and social and economic pressure to bring about its goals. Based in
Southside, the group rallied white Virginians to oppose Brown on the basis of both white
supremacy and states' rights.46 Other segregationists in Virginia also generally avoided
using physical violence against those who supported integration. Instead, it was
considered more civil to use threats or intimidation to silence those—especially fellow
whites—who supported integration.47
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Though only a small percentage of white Virginians joined the Defenders of State
Sovereignty or other segregationist organizations, the vast majority did support the
preservation of segregation.48 White liberals such as Sarah Patton Boyle, who openly
supported racial equality, constituted a small minority of the state's white population.
Many of these liberals founded their opposition to segregation on personal relationships
with blacks, religious beliefs, or experiences outside the South. In the more racially
tolerant regions of the state, including northern Virginia and the largest cities, liberals
openly supported the NAACP throughout the mid-twentieth century, although public
white support for school desegregation, never widespread, diminished significantly in the
tense years following Brown
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As opposition to school desegregation—and to white liberals and other potential
"race traitors"—solidified in the years after the decision, fewer liberals were willing to
risk stating publicly their support for integration.50 In Virginia and elsewhere, even some
white liberals asked the NAACP to slow its efforts to bring about school desegregation,
fearing that pushing too hard, too quickly, would energize the segregationist camp and
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only make matters worse. Long-time NAACP supporter (and future member of the board
of directors) Eleanor Roosevelt, for instance, pointed out that "go slow doesn't mean,
don't go." When Democratic Presidential nominee Adlai Stevenson made a similar
suggestion in 1956, NAACP executive secretary Roy Wilkins, who by that time had
already become frustrated with the slow pace of change, responded with "one of the
angriest letters of my life."51
Another segment of Virginia's population—known as white moderates—preferred
segregation, but accepted at least nominal compliance with Brown rather than open
defiance of the Supreme Court. Moderates' disdain for complete and outright resistance-and their opposition to closing public schools in order to preserve segregation, once the
latter became the Byrd policy—distinguished them from segregationists. In the late
1950s, these differences led to a period of intense and bitter conflict between moderates
and segregationists in Virginia, but prior to that period the two groups were drawn
together by a shared desire to maintain segregation in the Commonwealth.52 During 1954
and 1955, segregationists dominated the debate over school desegregation in Virginia,
and they opposed the liberals, NAACP, and the Supreme Court.53
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In 1954, opposition to school desegregation was noticeable throughout the state.
Many county boards of supervisors and city councils adopted resolutions calling for the
maintenance of segregation. The trend began in the Southside, not surprisingly, and was
strongest there. African-Americans opposed such resolutions—in Pittsylvania County an
African American man was booed for speaking against a segregation resolution at a
board of supervisors' meeting—but by the spring of 1955 more than half of Virginia's
counties had adopted similar resolutions. To Virginia's political leaders, the resolutions
represented a clear and powerful statement of the white public's continued support for
school segregation.54
Meanwhile, state leaders in the fall of 1954 refined their arguments for the
Supreme Court's upcoming hearings on the implementation of Brown. Virginia's legal
brief called for essentially unlimited time to implement the decision, saying the justices
"must permit a now indeterminable period to elapse before requiring integration of the
races in Virginia's public schools." The following April, in the oral arguments before the
Supreme Court, one of Virginia's attorneys hinted at the supposed inferiority of blacks
and the likelihood of southern defiance to reiterate the case for an indefinite delay in
implementation of Brown.55
The emergence of widespread, hard-core resistance and its promotion by the Byrd
Organization ensured that implementation of the Brown decision in Virginia would be
more difficult than previously imagined by the NAACP. At its annual convention in
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1954, the national NAACP had identified September 1955 as the target date for
desegregation to begin in the South, and in April 1955, NAACP attorneys asked the
Supreme Court to adopt this date as well. 56 But in Virginia all signs were pointing
toward growing white resistance. State NAACP officials—and some in the national
office—recognized this. At the State Conference's annual meeting in late 1954, President
Tinsley "lashed out at [Attorney] General Almond for ... attempts to retain segregation
for Virginia public schools." Tinsley stated: "These men and other officials like them,
are our enemies."57
The Supreme Court announced its ruling on the implementation of Brown,
commonly referred to as Brown II, on May 31, 1955. The seven-paragraph decision gave
comfort to those who opposed the desegregation of southern schools. There was no set
timetable under which the process was to unfold, delays arising from issues such as
school construction or changes in pupil assignment practices were deemed acceptable,
and the lower federal courts—presided over by southern white judges—were assigned to
oversee the process. The ambiguous decision required that authorities make "a prompt
and reasonable start" and that desegregation proceed "with all deliberate speed," but
rejected the NAACP's argument that desegregation should begin by the fall of 1955.58
Most white southerners celebrated the decision, and Brown II was widely viewed
as a setback for the NAACP. Still, some in the NAACP was saw a silver lining in the

56

"Association Press Release, July 4, 1954," Supplement to Part 1 (1951-55), reel 10, NAACP
Papers microfilm; Madison Jones, "The Impact and Consequences of the U.S. Supreme Court Decision of
May 17, 1954," Part 3, series C, reel 17, NAACP Papers microfilm; Kluger, 726-30, 744-745. Throughout
1954, Oliver W. Hill urged the State of Virginia to adopt this date as well; see "Statement on Behalf of the
Virginia State Conference, NAACP Branches at Public Hearing Before the Commission to Study Public
Education At the Mosque on November 15, 1954," Part II, Box A228, NAACP Papers.
57
"Good government is key to integration," Richmond Afro-American, October 23, 1954, in Part
II, Box C212, Virginia State Conference, 1954, NAACP Papers.
58
Brown v. Board of Education, Topeka, Kansas, 349 U. S. 294 (1955).

49

clouds. In a private conversation a few days after Brown II with Carl Murphy, owner of
the Baltimore Afro-American newspaper and one-time member of the NAACP board of
directors, Thurgood Marshall explained that "some people want most of the hog, other
people insist on having the whole hog, and then there are some people who want the hog,
the hair, and the rice on the hair. What the hell! The more I think about it, I think it's a
damned good decision!" Outlining the NAACP's plan for the future, Marshall went on to
say, "We're going to actually adopt what we're going to do state by state, that's what I
hope. For example, we're going to treat Georgia one way, we're going to treat Maryland
another way. But now if Maryland doesn't act right, then we treat Maryland like we treat
Georgia.... Virginia we're going to bust wide open!"59
Shortly after Brown II, the national office of the NAACP sponsored another
"Emergency" Southwide Conference on Desegregation in Atlanta. The conference
focused on the consequences of the latest ruling and on what course of action the
association would take. Basically the NAACP used this conference as a forum to
downplay assertions that Brown II represented a setback for the NAACP and its cause.
NAACP leaders pointed out that the ruling clearly reaffirmed the original decision and
ordered that desegregation take place as quickly as possible. Shortly after the conference,
the national office reiterated this sentiment to its branches: "make no mistake about it,
this decision in no way cuts back on the May 17th [1954] pronouncement."60
In the spring and summer of 1955, the association reiterated its commitment to the
national office's original implementation program established in 1954. In April 1955,
59
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Roy Wilkins published a short essay, "The Role of the NAACP in the Desegregation
Process," in the journal Social Problems. "Popular opinion to the contrary," Wilkins
wrote, "the NAACP would prefer using legal action as a last resort in the many situations
which will arise in hundreds of
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the additional hurdles posed by Brown II, the national office maintained that "[i]n the
overwhelming majority of instances it can be expected that compliance without legal
action will be the rule, perhaps grudgingly and reluctantly in some areas, but compliance,
nevertheless."62 In late June, southern branches were requested to press local school
boards and community organizations to implement desegregation that fall.63
The Virginia State Conference dramatically increased its desegregation efforts
following Brown II, carefully following the dictates of the national office. On June 12,
1955, the State Conference sponsored another statewide meeting of NAACP members to
explain how to carry out the NAACP program in Virginia. At the gathering, held in
Petersburg, NAACP officials told branches in communities where authorities were acting
in "good faith"—where school boards were making a "prompt and reasonable" start
towards desegregation—to work with school officials and community organizations to
bring about desegregation at the earliest practicable date. Branches in communities with
recalcitrant school boards were ordered to formally petition their school boards for the
admittance of black students into the white schools.64
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By the summer of 1955, the State Conference was beginning to recognize that the
national office's implementation program was going to face significant challenges in the
Commonwealth. It was clear by then that few school boards in Virginia were willing to
consider voluntary school desegregation. As a result, while the State Conference
encouraged its branches to press for voluntary compliance, it emphasized the importance
of the petitioning process, which was also a necessary step should the association choose
to proceed with school desegregation litigation.
In Virginia and throughout the South, legal observers recognized that the
NAACP's petitions posed a threat to the white establishment—as in the 1940s during the
equalization campaign, the petitions, upon being ignored or rejected by white authorities,
could be used in court as evidence of southern intransigence to comply with the law.
More broadly, the petitioning process suggested that the NAACP was increasing its
efforts to demand compliance with Brown. As a result, as petitions were filed throughout
the South, whites responded fiercely. In some areas, petitioners were pressured to
withdraw their names; those who refused sometimes lost their jobs or saw their children
threatened. In Yazoo City, Mississippi, for example, the Citizens Council published the
names of petitioners in the local newspaper; under pressure, 51 of the 53 signers
withdrew their names, and the remaining two left the area. Such actions led Roy Wilkins
to denounce southern whites' reprisals against blacks who signed NAACP petitions
before the Senate Judiciary Committee.65
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In the summer of 1955, the Virginia State Conference provided specific
instructions for the petitioning process to its local branches. Branches were asked to
obtain signatures from individuals "living in mixed neighborhoods, or near formerly
white schools" (emphasis added). The idea was that school boards demonstrated
discriminatory behavior most blatantly when they assigned individuals to black schools
far from their homes. Branches were also advised to seek out petitioners who had an
unwavering commitment to school desegregation. If the State Conference decided to
initiate litigation, it would need plaintiffs who were willing to "go all the way." Finally,
the State Conference instructed its branches to return the petitions directly to the State
Conference. Before filing the petitions with local school boards, the State Conference
would meet with the signatories to secure permission to represent them in court if
necessary.66
Many NAACP branches in Virginia undertook the petitioning process in the
summer of 1955. Despite growing white opposition, association members convinced
black parents in many communities to support their desegregation efforts. The State
Conference later reported that 55 branches circulated petitions that summer. By the fall,
the state NAACP had submitted petitions to school boards in Alexandria, Arlington,
Charlottesville, Isle of Wight County, Middlesex County, Newport News, and Norfolk.
Others were in preparation. Still, each of these school boards refused to desegregate its
schools that fall.67
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In Virginia, the white response to the NAACP's petitions was also almost
uniformly negative. As mentioned previously, each of the school boards petitioned by
the NAACP in 1955 refused to desegregate its schools that fall. More important, a
growing number of white Virginians came to perceive the NAACP's efforts, as journalist
Benjamin Muse later put it, as "something diabolical."68 Historian Andrew Buni
concurs: "Although better informed citizens gave little credence to such charges,
thousands of others viewed the N.A.A.C.P. as a rabble-rousing pawn of the federal
government, Communist-infiltrated, financed through sinister sources with lawyers
seeking high financial reward or political gain."69 In Virginia and throughout the region,
the NAACP's early efforts to bring about the implementation of Brown v. Board of
Education clearly stimulated significant white concern and resistance. 70
Other examples of growing defiance in Virginia troubled the State Conference. In
April 1955, the State Department of Education had adopted a policy allowing local
school districts to fire teachers on thirty days' notice, a move aimed at intimidating
African American educators.71 Then in late June 1955, following Brown II, the State
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1956 school term.72 As historian James Hershman explains, "during the entire year
between the two [Brown] rulings black Virginians could find no sign in the state
government's actions which indicated any alteration in school segregation or racial
relations was contemplated. All indications pointed in the other direction."73
In November 1955, the Governor's Commission on Public Education (the Gray
Commission) issued its final report, outlining a number of ways the state could negate or
minimize the impact of Brown. The commission made three principal suggestions. The
first was to allow the adoption of locally-administered pupil placement plans (meaning
pupil assignment policies) which would enable school officials to maintain segregation
without explicitly referring to race. Secondly, the commission suggested the legislature
amend its compulsory attendance law so that no child in Virginia would ever be forced to
attend an integrated school. Finally, the commission urged the state to set up a publiclyfunded program that would award tuition "grants"—if requested—to any student assigned
to a desegregated school. Technically available to both races, these funds would allow
white students assigned to desegregated schools the option to attend private segregated
schools at little to no cost

instead.

The Gray Commission's tuition grant scheme required altering the state
constitution, because Section 141 of the constitution prohibited state appropriations to
schools not owned or operated by the state. On November 30, 1955, a special session of
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the General Assembly, called by Governor Stanley, passed legislation establishing a
referendum for Virginians to vote on whether or not to amend the constitution.
Scheduled for January 9, 1956, the referendum would determine whether Virginia would
call a constitutional convention as part of its anti-desegregation

efforts.

The Virginia State Conference of the NAACP, of course, adamantly opposed the
Gray Commission's proposals, including the Commission's recommendation to amend
Virginia's constitution. Henry L. Marsh Ill—then a student at Virginia Union University
in Richmond, later a staff attorney for the Virginia State Conference, and eventually
Richmond's first black mayor—attended one General Assembly session in 1955 during
which legislators listened to public comments about whether or not to alter the state
constitution. At the gathering, Marsh watched in amazement as Oliver Hill spoke
vigorously against altering the constitution and other attempts to avoid the
implementation of Brown in Virginia. Marsh recalled, "I couldn't believe that a black
man would stand up in front of the joint session of the General Assembly and shake his
fist at them. I mean, I was looking around for the door. And when he said, if you do this,
we will beat you, and he slammed his fist down, I ducked down. I said I'd better get out
of here quick." It was the first time Marsh met the state NAACP's lead attorney, and
Marsh later recalled it as "one of the great moments of my life." 76
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Although the Gray Commission called for resistance to school desegregation in
Virginia, its suggestions were more moderate than many other proposals of the day. The
commission, for instance, by suggesting local option in pupil placement, envisioned a
time when small numbers of well-qualified black students might be willingly admitted to
formerly-white schools in the more liberal regions of the state. The Defenders of State
Sovereignty, on the other hand, suggested abandoning the state's public schools
completely and setting up a system of publicly-funded but private segregated academies
instead should that prove the only way to avert desegregation, and a growing number of
political figures supported the indefinite maintenance of school segregation statewide.
Thus, while most white Virginians favored the maintenance of segregation, they were
divided on how to accomplish that end.77
In late 1955, state officials were increasingly influenced by the pen of James
Jackson Kilpatrick, editor of the Richmond News Leader. Starting in late November,
Kilpatrick wrote daily editorials promoting the idea of "interposition" as a means of
resisting the implementation of Brown. Rooted in antebellum southern political rhetoric,
the theory of "interposition" asserted that the state government could "interpose its
sovereignty" between the federal government and the state's localities in order to defend
the interests of the latter and of the people. Many state leaders recognized the obvious
limitations of such an idea, but Kilpatrick's editorials nonetheless fueled support for
resistance. Kilpatrick wrote, "[I]n May of 1954, that inept fraternity of politicians and
professors known as the United States Supreme Court chose to throw away the
established law. These nine men repudiated the Constitution, sp[a]t upon the tenth
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amendment, and rewrote the fundamental law of this land to suit their own gauzy
concepts of sociology."78
Segregationists in Virginia and elsewhere were also fortified by the lack of
support for integration shown by President Eisenhower and by the actions of a strong axis
of opposition in the United States Congress. The president publicly said he supported
gradual change and compliance with the law, but Eisenhower declined to play a leading
role in the school desegregation process. In part, this was due to the president's desire to
increase white southern political support for the Republican Party.79 NAACP executive
secretary Roy Wilkins later commented: "President Eisenhower was a fine general and a
good, decent man, but if he had fought World War II the way he fought for civil rights,
we would all be speaking German today."80
In the midst of rising opposition to integration, the NAACP became increasingly
skeptical about the prospects for voluntary compliance with Brown. Federal district court
rulings in the summer of 1955—involving two of the locations that were part of the
original Brown decision (Clarendon County, South Carolina and Prince Edward County,
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Virginia)—fueled the association's concerns. In both cases, the courts failed to require
school desegregation that fall, as the NAACP's attorneys had requested. Commenting on
the importance of the two cases before they were decided, Thurgood Marshall and
NAACP assistant special counsel Robert Carter wrote, "Certainly the hearings in these
cases will be of major significance because these courts may be the first to give definite
and specific content to 'a prompt and reasonable start' and 'good faith compliance at the
earliest practicable date.'" 81 In an NAACP press release acknowledging the setback after
the rulings, Roy Wilkins hoped the decrees were "not necessarily 'typical of what will
happen throughout the South. "'82 Growing racial violence in the South, including the
harassment of NAACP members and the murder of Emmett Till, a black adolescent from
Chicago who had supposedly acted "fresh" toward a white woman while visiting in
Mississippi, also troubled NAACP leaders.83
By late 1955, a growing number of individuals within the NAACP's national
office came to believe that widespread litigation would be required to bring about
southern compliance with Brown. Meetings that fall with southern NAACP attorneys
encouraged this view, because the latter reported vividly on the growing resistance to
school desegregation among southern officials and the general public. After a year and a
half of virtual non-compliance with Brown v. Board of Education, particularly in the
eleven states of the former Confederacy, the national office of the NAACP moved to
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abandon its original implementation program.84 That October, the NAACP national legal
staff argued "that the only solution [to southern noncompliance] is to file law suits in
every state."85
Virginia State Conference attorneys likewise recognized that that legal action
would be required to bring about compliance with Brown. In October 1955, the State
Conference legal staff discussed future plans with national office attorneys at the State
Conference's annual meeting in Charlottesville. Both NAACP executive secretary Roy
Wilkins and special counsel Thurgood Marshall attended the meeting. Afterward,
Wilkins noted that, as of October 1955, "... no responsible official or body in Virginia
has given any indication that it is willing to discuss plans for desegregation—any plan,
slow or fast." 86 Shortly after the meeting, Virginia State Conference attorney Spottswood
Robinson approached representatives of the Arlington branch of the NAACP and
informed them that the State Conference was ready to prepare to file suit in that
community. The NAACP had decided to return to the federal courts to attempt to force
the white South to comply with Brown v. Board of Education.87
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Chapter 3,1956
The Rise of Massive Resistance

The national office of the NAACP shifted its strategy for securing implementation
of Brown v. Board of Education in early 1956. During the previous year and a half, the
association had instructed its southern branches to cooperate with local school boards to
bring about the implementation of the Supreme Court's desegregation rulings. This
approach worked only in moderate areas of the South, however, and even there the policy
failed to bring about significant desegregation. In the more intransigent states, including
Virginia, the policy had failed to achieve any voluntary desegregation at all. Frustrated,
the national office in 1956 adopted the recommendations of its legal staff and began to
file school desegregation lawsuits in federal courts in the South. This change in tactics
resulted in a sharp rise in white southern resistance to desegregation, and pressure on the
NAACP from both southern state governments and from private groups reached new
heights. The association weathered the storm, but combating the attacks required a great
deal of time, money, and effort.
The national office announced its new implementation policy shortly after the
new year began. In a press release, NAACP Special Counsel Thurgood Marshall
declared that the national office's legal staff would henceforth make itself available to all
branches requesting legal advice and assistance with desegregation litigation. Marshall
noted that the association's commitment to cooperation with local school boards would
continue where progress was being made, but the NAACP's shift in strategy highlighted
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the fact that such cooperation was rarely forthcoming.1 Where the NAACP had earlier
filed lawsuits in federal courts only selectively to bring about desegregation in the South,
Marshall explained that "the legal department is now ready to file suit in every
community where such a suit is requested to secure compliance with the Supreme Court
anti-segregation decisions."2
The association set up a timetable for its new round of litigation at a conference
on desegregation in Atlanta in February 1956. Representatives from fourteen—mostly
southern—states attended the gathering, as did the national NAACP leadership. Southern
State Conference presidents and others presented reports on the situation in their states,
discussing where desegregation petitions had been filed, how state laws had changed, and
what general patterns of compliance or resistance had emerged. Most highlighted white
resistance.3 It quickly became apparent that eight southern states, including Virginia,
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were resisting desegregation absolutely, and the NAACP decided to concentrate its legal
4
• ,
action in these states.

Also in Atlanta, the national legal staff established a schedule for filing lawsuits
in the chosen states. Based on Thurgood Marshall's suggestion, the NAACP chose to
proceed state-by-state, starting immediately, with the association's attorneys essentially
filing litigation in one and then moving on to the next. Localities within each state were
chosen based on the level of commitment within the black community, the likelihood of
white community resistance (which discouraged NAACP lawsuits), the location of
NAACP attorneys, and the case histories of southern federal judges, some of whom were
more liberal than others. Among these considerations, the level of commitment within
the black community and the location of NAACP were probably most important. The
association expected white community resistance, and chose to focus on the most
intransigent states, but carefully chose where to file its suits within these states—liberal or
progressive locations were clearly preferred. The association sought to initiate litigation
by June 1 in all of the eight states, including Virginia, which had completely resisted
desegregation thus far.

5
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Perpetually short of funds and resources, NAACP attorneys were concerned about
spreading themselves too thin, and the national office encouraged its representatives in
states not chosen for litigation to continue negotiating with their local school boards.
This was not a hard and fast rule, as some State Conferences, including Virginia's, had
considerable autonomy in their legal programs. Still, the national office clearly sought to
direct the process of southern school desegregation. Delegates to the Atlanta Conference
adopted a resolution stating that "much can be accomplished through further
6

negotiations" in those states not explicitly chosen for legal action. In June delegates to
the NAACP's 1956 annual convention reiterated the point—State Conferences outside the
Deep South were asked "to negotiate ... to secure desegregation within a reasonable time
and to proceed with such negotiations as long as the local board is acting in good faith.
In those states legal action in the courts is only to be used as a last resort."7
White Virginia's resistance was certainly not in doubt. NAACP attorneys Oliver
Hill and Spottswood Robinson, along with executive secretary W. Lester Banks and
president E. B. Henderson, represented the Virginia State Conference in Atlanta, and
Henderson outlined a clear pattern of noncompliance on the part of state officials.
NAACP State Conference desegregation petitions—fifteen had been filed with local
school boards by the spring of 1956—fell on deaf ears. Frustrated, Henderson stated that

NAACP's determination to treat the southern states individually, based on the actions of their state
governments and the status of desegregation in each state, is one of the reasons for the state-based approach
of this dissertation.
6
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7
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the Virginia NAACP was "ready to go ahead with as many law suits as would be
necessary."8
Increasing calls for defiance from political leaders troubled State Conference
leaders. In November 1955, Governor Stanley's Commission on Public Education had
laid out an elaborate plan to minimize the impact of Brown for years to come. The
governor and state leaders embraced the report, and most white Virginians appeared to
support the "Gray Plan." In late November, acting on the Gray Commission's
recommendations, the General Assembly had passed legislation calling for a referendum
on whether to amend the state constitution to permit appropriations to private schools.9
African Americans throughout Virginia, including the NAACP, opposed the
referendum and called on Virginians to vote "no" on January 9. Within the black
community, the NAACP worked with labor unions, church groups, fraternal
organizations, and public education organizations to stimulate voter turnout. In
Richmond, supporters of the NAACP campaigned on radio stations WRVA and WRNL-stations that were highly popular with predominantly white audiences—against amending
the constitution via ten fifteen-minute spots.10 Most white Virginians, however,
supported the constitutional amendment, and the NAACP actively worked with only a
handful of white organizations. Leading up to the referendum, these included a small
8
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number of religious organizations, labor unions, the Virginia Society for the Preservation
of Public Schools, and the Virginia Council on Human Relations, the most racially liberal
organization in the state and Virginia's only prominent bi-racial organization.11
The referendum occurred on January 9, 1956. Of the approximately 80,000
registered black voters in Virginia in 1956, historians estimate that perhaps 50,000 voted
in the referendum, and local statistics suggest that the vast majority voted "no." 12 Those
who did not, or who chose not to vote at all, may have been influenced by claims from
state political leaders that black teachers and colleges would suffer under desegregation.13
White voter turnout was also high, particularly in the Black Belt, and overall more
Virginians voted in the 1956 referendum than in the state's 1953 gubernatorial election.14
The referendum passed by a margin of two-to-one, and shortly thereafter the General
Assembly passed legislation calling for a constitutional convention. In March 1956 this
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body met and altered the state constitution to legalize tuition grants. Virginia had placed
itself clearly in the forefront of growing southern opposition to desegregation.15
Most Virginians assumed the General Assembly would also adopt the remaining
recommendations made by the Gray Commission in 1955, particularly provisions
allowing local school districts to choose whether to voluntarily begin desegregation.
Political leaders, including former governor John Battle and Congressman Watkins
Abbitt, had given this impression during the referendum campaign, and members of the
Gray Commission itself felt the referendum results endorsed this course of action.
Historian James Sweeney explains, "The impression left with the voters was that the local
assignment plan and the tuition grant plan were bound together as part of the same
comprehensive approach."16 Senator Byrd, however, conspicuously refused to endorse
the full Gray Plan in December 1955, leaving the door open for even more radical
resistance.17
Shortly after the referendum and the NAACP's announcement of impending
lawsuits, the issue of local option came to the forefront of Virginia politics. Assuming
that the local option provisions would be put into effect, the Arlington County school
board—which had received an NAACP school desegregation petition in 1955—adopted a
school desegregation plan for the coming fall. Frightened and angered by the move,
however, segregationists in the General Assembly revoked Arlington's right to have an
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elected school board.

Looking back in 1962, historian Robbins Gates noted that

Arlington's plan "drove the interpositionists to even greater effort"; at the time, state
senator and future governor Mills E. Godwin asserted that massive resistance was
"needed as a deterrent to those localities in Virginia which have, or may indicate, a
willingness to integrate."19
Rather than allow localities to integrate their schools if they chose to do so, state
political leaders in the spring of 1956 increasingly spoke of maintaining segregation in
every corner of the Commonwealth, by passing new laws if necessary.20 Events outside
Virginia, including the start of the Montgomery bus boycott in late 1955 and the
admission of Autherine Lucy to the University of Alabama in February 1956, fueled
opposition to desegregation in Virginia as well. By February 1956, when Senator Byrd
explicitly called for white "massive resistance" to school desegregation throughout the
South, he had the support of most Virginia politicians.21
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Rising support for massive resistance can also be attributed to Jack Kilpatrick's
editorials in the Richmond News Leader. Having begun in late 1955 to promote the
political idea from the antebellum era known as "interposition," Kilpatrick continued his
campaign into the spring of 1956, arguing that the state had a responsibility and a right to
interpose its sovereignty between the malicious federal government, particularly the U.S.
Supreme Court, and Virginia's counties and cities. "God give us men!" he thundered.
"We resist now, or we resist never. We surrender to the court effective control over our
reserved powers, or we make a fight to preserve these powers. We lie down, piteous and
pusillanimous, or we make a stand."22 Senator Byrd noted that he had "a great respect for
Jack, who [had], in a very brilliant fashion, aroused the country to the evils of the
Supreme Court's decision."23
On February 1, 1956, highlighting the growing acceptance of massive resistance
within the state's political ranks, the General Assembly adopted a formal resolution of
interposition, pledging to oppose the implementation of Brown. The vote was 36 to 2 in
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the Senate and 88 to 5 in the House of Delegates.

Virginia's resolution resembled

statements adopted by other southern legislatures that spring, as well as the Southern
Manifesto drafted with the help of Senator Byrd and endorsed by most southern members
25

of the U.S. Congress in March.

The Virginia resolution stated that the Commonwealth

would create legal obstacles to prevent the integration of its public schools. Kilpatrick,
its leading supporter, had written to Senator Byrd, "I would toss an old battle-cry back at
26

the NAACP: Hell, we have only begun to fight."
As Kilpatrick's quotation suggests, perhaps the most important reason for the rise
of southern white massive resistance in 1956 was the actions of the NAACP itself.
Historians of the civil rights era, however, have often failed to acknowledge this catalyst
in bringing about the rise of massive resistance in the South. A significant amount of
civil rights scholarship portrays massive resistance as a southern white reaction to the
growth of federal power represented by the Brown decision. In this interpretation,
massive resistance represents an assertion of state's rights, and most resistance is aimed
at the federal government and the federal court system. This portrayal, though it conveys
part of the truth, reigns because of a lack of understanding of the association's actions in
the years after 1954, and it fails to explain comprehensively how and why massive
24
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resistance came about. Clearly the NAACP's shift toward widespread litigation, and the
filing of lawsuits in early 1956, fueled the growing backlash. White Virginia—and the
white South as a whole—were responding to the greatest and most immediate threat to its
27

segregated way of life.
In Virginia, political leaders had expressed concern about the NAACP for
decades.28 Some recalled the organization's success in equalizing Virginia's black and
white teacher salaries and school facilities via legal action in the 1930s and 1940s; the
state had been forced to spend nearly fifty million dollars as a result. Davis v. Prince
Edward County, of course, was also one of the five original Brown v. Board of Education
cases, meaning the state had been battling the association, unsuccessfully, in federal
courts since 1951 in an effort to preserve the constitutionality of segregation. Some of
the most vehement opposition to the NAACP in Virginia—not surprisingly—developed in
Prince Edward County, the birthplace of this lawsuit. When the Virginia State
Conference of the NAACP initiated its school desegregation petitioning campaign in
1955, moreover, white Virginians had viewed the effort as "something diabolical," and
even white liberals suggested that the association not press for the implementation of
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Brown so quickly.29 The NAACP refused to slow its implementation campaign,
however, and its shift in late 1955 toward planning widespread school desegregation suits
fueled the resort to massive resistance by Virginia's political elite that winter. In 1956,
following the NAACP's announcement of school desegregation lawsuits, Virginia's
political leadership began to increase pressure on the association and its members,
focusing on the State Conference's ability to carry out legal action. As Andrew Buni
correctly notes in The Negro in Virginia Politics, "What provoked action from white
Virginian leadership . . . was that Negroes continued to press for school integration
through the federal courts."30
One example was legislation adopted by the state legislature during its regular
session in late February 1956 allowing courts to require parties filing suit against school
boards to furnish information, including the name of those financing the suit. The goal
was to expose supporters of integration, including the NAACP, and the bill probably
came in response to the NAACP's announcement that school desegregation lawsuits were
being planned for Virginia, its well-publicized Atlanta Conference of February 18-19,
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and a follow-up announcement that lawsuits were being developed by the Virginia State
Conference.31 Further anti-NAACP actions would follow.32
Despite the growing opposition, the Virginia State Conference developed and
filed its school desegregation lawsuits in Virginia that spring. In April and May 1956,
actions were filed in federal district courts against the school boards of Newport News,
Norfolk, Charlottesville, and Arlington. In addition, litigation against Prince Edward
County was renewed. In each of these class action lawsuits the NAACP sought to force
33

the localities to begin school desegregation by September 1956.

As Oliver Hill and

Spottswood Robinson explained to newspaper reporters, "No one seems to want to do
34

anything. We have no alternative but to resort to the courts."
In addition to being urban areas, the four localities other than Prince Edward that
now faced lawsuits shared important characteristics. One was the relatively moderate
beliefs of whites who resided there. The Newport News school board had expressed to
31
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the governor its preference for local option, and public officials in both Arlington and
Norfolk had indicated in 1956 their desire to comply with Brown and their willingness to
begin plans for desegregation. A member of the Arlington NAACP, Edith Burton, later
said that the NAACP's suits had been filed "where the first steps in desegregation would
produce a minimum of community dislocation."35
The latter quotation gives the impression the NAACP chose where to file its
lawsuits, but NAACP records suggest the State Conference waited for branches to ask for
help before deciding whether to provide legal assistance or not. In this sense, the
NAACP did not seek out plaintiffs or locations, but rather chose the best ones from those
that presented themselves. This policy allowed the association to avoid the label of
"outside agitator" and assured that its litigation came from areas where blacks were
strongly committed to school desegregation. It also allowed the State Conferences some
autonomy within the confines of the national office's legal directives. The wealth of
local opportunities for legal action by the NAACP in Virginia testifies to the desire
among African Americans around the state to see school desegregation begin.36
The four localities also had large and active NAACP branches, which could more
easily recruit plaintiffs for litigation, often from within their own ranks, than weaker
35
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branches could have.37 In fact, each of the four branches had submitted a school
desegregation petition to its local school board in 1955.38 Furthermore, three of the four
branches included among their members attorneys who were part of the State
Conference's legal staff, which simplified the handling of litigation.39 Finally, the four
branches possessed relatively large amounts of money from membership dues and
fundraising to help pay attorney's fees, although most of the financing came from the
national NAACP via the State Conference, and although national NAACP attorneys such
as Thurgood Marshall and Robert Carter provided legal help as well.
Other than granting the State Conference permission to proceed, the national
office played little role in the initial stages of the litigation. National NAACP attorneys
did not prepare or direct the suits, though they did review briefs prepared by State
Conference lawyers and the national office's attorneys sometimes made court
appearances. This modest involvement by the national office appears to have been
standard operating procedure for the Virginia State Conference, which was viewed as one
of the more responsible units of the association.40
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The shift to widespread litigation was not without its drawbacks for the NAACP.
In Virginia and elsewhere in the South, segregationist activity increased as NAACP
lawsuits were filed.41 Because the litigation cast the NAACP in the role of a more
militant agitator, segregationists labeling the association "radical" were able to rally more
supporters than previously. Harassment of association members and supporters
increased, and even white liberals—fearing that the association's actions were fueling
42

white opposition to desegregation—urged the NAACP to reconsider its approach.
Looking back in 1961, Benjamin Muse wrote, "It is difficult to describe the intensity with
43

which the NAACP was hated by white Virginians."
Black families involved in the NAACP's desegregation lawsuits in Virginia knew
this hatred well. In many locations, plaintiffs and others associated with the litigation
faced threatening telephone calls, cross burnings, and other forms of intimidation.
Several plaintiffs in the Charlottesville case lost their jobs, and two plaintiffs withdrew
from the lawsuit in Arlington County because of the pressure. In 1996 Dorothy Hamm, a
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leader in the movement to integrate the schools in that locality, recalled: "After that suit
was filed, all hell broke loose."44
State government-sponsored attacks on the association also multiplied. Southern
legislatures passed numerous laws in 1956 aiming to disrupt or shut down NAACP
activities. The Louisiana legislature forced the NAACP to hand over the membership
lists of several large branches; the state NAACP was "decimated."45 Arkansas,
Mississippi, and other states created "sovereignty" commissions to investigate and
undermine organizations that supported school integration, and the state of Alabama shut
down NAACP operations statewide, including an NAACP regional office in
46

Birmingham, by late summer 1956.

Such attacks forced the association to divert

precious resources, personnel, and funding to combat the new threat. As NAACP
executive secretary Roy Wilkins put it, "We have had our hands full." That fall the
association began a southwide membership campaign to replace members, funds, and
47

resources lost in these attacks.
In Virginia, Attorney General Almond recommended that Governor Stanley call a
special session of the General Assembly immediately after the NAACP's school
44
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desegregation lawsuits were filed. The governor did so on June 6. State leaders had
introduced and debated various plans for dealing with the NAACP's litigation throughout
the spring, and now the General Assembly convened to implement a comprehensive
program that would be markedly more radical than the modes of resistance that the Gray
Commission had proposed only six months earlier.48
Historian Andrew Buni writes, "The Confederate flag-waving by spectators in the
crowded galleries set the tone of the special session."49 During the month-long session
starting in late August, segregationist legislators easily prevailed over a coalition of
moderates and liberals. In the end, the body adopted twenty-three laws addressing school
segregation. Together the measures, colloquially known as the Stanley Plan or the
50

massive resistance legislation, mandated and defended school segregation statewide.
Two court decisions that summer encouraged the General Assembly to act. In
July 1956, federal district court judge Albert Bryan of northern Virginia handed down the
first ruling on one of the NAACP's 1956 lawsuits, ordering the Arlington County school
board to begin operating its schools on a nondiscriminatory basis no later than January
31, 1957. Then, on August 6, federal district court judge John Paul of the Western
District Court of Virginia ordered the Charlottesville school board to begin operating
desegregated schools that fall.51 Both decisions were somewhat remarkable, in that few
federal judges in the South ordered immediate school desegregation in 1956. Both cases
48
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were appealed, suspending the court orders, but the victories served as a wake-up call to
the state legislature.52
The General Assembly's new legislation was meant to stall legal action by the
NAACP and prevent school integration in the state. One law created a state Pupil
Placement Board (PPB) charged with assigning Virginia's public school students to
schools. The legislature authorized this board to assign students based on a variety of
factors that purported to be racially neutral, but which in fact allowed the body to avoid
assigning black students to white schools. Though the NAACP challenged the pupil
placement legislation in federal court, it took several years before the judiciary ruled the
policy unacceptable.53
The special session also passed legislation to prevent integration even if its pupil
assignment policies failed. The most important provisions were known as the school
closing laws, a handful of related bills that authorized the governor to close any public
school ordered by the federal courts to integrate. Should federal courts order a school
board to enroll black students in a formerly all-white school, which was considered the
most likely path to integration, the governor would close the affected white school(s),
withhold all state funds from them, and begin providing tuition grants (for enrollment in
private segregated schools) to the displaced white students.
52
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Most of Virginia's white leadership believed, or assumed their constituents
believed, that the state NAACP, by continuing to press its litigation, was threatening
Virginia's way of life and traditions, as well as those of the white South as a whole. At
an annual picnic at Senator Byrd's farm near Winchester, Virginia, in late August, with
the special session of the General Assembly just days away, Byrd had explained: "It's no
secret that the NAACP intends first to press Virginia.... If Virginia surrenders, if
Virginia's line is broken, the rest of the South will go down, too." The massive
resistance laws were Virginia's attempt to lead the South in resistance to Brown, the
NAACP, and the federal government.54
Byrd's keen attention to the actions of the NAACP explains why the General
Assembly also adopted legislation aimed at the association and the supporters of school
integration in Virginia. Seven so-called "anti-NAACP" laws were passed during the
special session. This legislation sought to undermine the NAACP's legal campaign for
school desegregation by prohibiting the solicitation of litigation, redefining commonly
accepted legal practices related to the solicitation of clients, and providing state legal aid
to local school boards to defend against NAACP suits. The General Assembly also
required the registration and public disclosure of NAACP members' names and created
two legislative committees to investigate advocates of racial integration and their
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efforts.55 Referring to the NAACP, Delegate James Thomson of Alexandria declared,
"With this set of bills ... we can bust that organization ... wide open."56 Roy Wilkins,
executive secretary of the NAACP, added: "The intent of this legislation was clear: to
destroy the NAACP in Virginia."57 Firing back at its school desegregation litigation, the
state of Virginia had declared war on the NAACP.
The NAACP actively opposed these attempts to forestall school desegregation in
Virginia. A State Conference press release dated July 23, 1956, blasted Governor
Stanley's support for massive resistance legislation, calling it "simply another
demonstration of his total incapacity to provide intelligent leadership to the people of
Virginia during these significant times."58 A number of NAACP supporters addressed
the General Assembly during its special session, and the national office also publicly
criticized state officials. 59 But the NAACP had few defenders in the legislature, and
those who supported compliance with the federal courts or the protection of the
NAACP's right to operate were soundly defeated during the legislative session. Most of
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the massive resistance bills—and all the anti-NAACP legislation—passed easily. Only
three members of the state legislature opposed all seven anti-NAACP bills.60
That fall, the new laws diverted the NAACP State Conference's attention from
handling and expanding its desegregation lawsuits to defending its right to exist. In
response to the General Assembly's actions, the State Conference initiated litigation
testing the constitutionality of the new massive resistance laws, but the action quickly
became mired in the state's judicial system, where it remained for years. That winter, in
a variety of federal and state courts throughout Virginia, the NAACP also repeatedly
sparred with the two legislative committees set up to investigate the supporters of
61

integration in Virginia.

Attorneys for the state, recognizing that the anti-NAACP

litigation would probably eventually be overturned by federal courts, still labored
effectively to delay that outcome.62 As the NAACP won legal victories against the antiNAACP, and massive resistance, laws in the courts, the General Assembly also made
subtle alterations to its legislation, prolonging the legal battle. In subsequent years, the
State Conference would have to file multiple suits to challenge the same set of antiNAACP laws, and its legal campaign against the legislative attempts to destroy it was not
complete until 1963.63
60
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In the meantime, the State Conference sought to assure its members and
supporters that their anonymity would be preserved. Despite their efforts, segregationists
succeeded in their effort to intimidate supporters of the NAACP. It became an
"elementary fact," white liberal Sarah Patton Boyle noted, "that threats and insults are
breakfast cereal for the integrator."64 Over the next several years the association would
lose hundreds of branches in the South, and the damage to the NAACP in Virginia was
already evident by the end of 1956—national office records show the collapse of a
disproportionate number of Virginia branches that year.65 Publicly, the association
argued that the anti-NAACP legislation had united the black community behind the
NAACP, but, when pressed, NAACP officials conceded that the attack had cost the
66

association members, money, and valuable resources.
Massive Resistance also hampered the effectiveness of the Virginia NAACP's
school desegregation campaign. Hostility directed toward plaintiffs in the NAACP's
school desegregation cases made it more difficult to recruit additional plaintiffs and led a
white liberal plaintiff in the Arlington County suit to withdraw from the case. More
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importantly, the NAACP litigation against the state's anti-NAACP laws took time away
from State Conference attorneys' school desegregation efforts.67
Massive Resistance, however, did not shut down the NAACP in Virginia or force
it to abandon its desegregation campaign. This was partly because physical violence
aimed at the supporters of integration was less common in Virginia than elsewhere in the
South. To counteract the loss of members and funding, the State Conference asked its
branches to step up membership drives and fundraising. One letter in early 1957
entreated, "Never before has our NAACP needed the support of every Negro citizen as it
has today."

68

To protect its finances, the State Conference transferred its "principal
69

monies" to New York.

And perhaps most important, the association tried to maintain

morale with a stream of pronouncements and memorandums. One, written by executive
secretary Lester Banks in early 1957, urged members to "keep on keeping on" until the
70

NAACP's objectives had been achieved.

Under the circumstances, it is doubtful Banks

could have asked for more.
In the meantime, the State Conference's legal staff continued to push its school
desegregation lawsuits through the federal court system. Given the complete
recalcitrance of Virginia's political leadership, Oliver Hill and his assistants now knew
they had to rely solely on the federal courts to achieve school desegregation. In his
autobiography, Hill later noted: "Reporters and others constantly questioned us regarding
67
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when we thought schools would be desegregated. I consistently replied that desegregated
schools would exist when we got judges who would order that Negro children attend
white schools."71 In November 1956 the State Conference legal staff celebrated another
victory when the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit sustained the
federal district court rulings of the summer of 1956 requiring desegregation in the
Arlington and Charlottesville cases. As expected, however, both localities immediately
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, suspending the desegregation orders.72
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit ruling came after the General Assembly's special
session and its adoption of additional roadblocks to school desegregation. By
concentrating the pupil assignment process in the hands of the Pupil Placement Board, for
example, the General Assembly ensured that the local school boards the NAACP had
been suing became all but irrelevant in the struggle over school desegregation; racially
separate schools would be maintained by authorities in Richmond. In response, the
NAACP opened a new front in the legal war over school segregation: even as it fought
Virginia's appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court, the association also challenged the
constitutionality of the new pupil placement law and the remainder of the newlyestablished massive resistance program.73
The plethora of lawsuits the NAACP had to file to implement school
desegregation and strike down anti-NAACP legislation would occupy the Virginia State
71
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Conference well into the early 1960s. As of the end of 1956, the road ahead of the
association appeared fraught with difficulty and peril. Though Brown v. Board of
Education had declared segregation in southern education unconstitutional, the
implementation of that ruling in Virginia seemed distant at best. NAACP executive
secretary Roy Wilkins later wrote, "Eventually we were able to cut through all these legal
entanglements, but the fight took time, money, and energy that might otherwise have
gone into more fruitful enterprises. In one sense, however, the harassment was rather
flattering: it showed how pervasive our influence was—and how desperate the South was
to stamp us out."74
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Chapter 4,1957-1959
The Height of Massive Resistance

In Virginia, the years between 1957 and 1959 brought grave hardships to the
supporters of school desegregation. The size and power of segregationist organizations
such as the Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties peaked in the late
1950s, as did state government efforts to prevent integration in Virginia's schools. The
Virginia NAACP, the preeminent supporter of integration in the Commonwealth,
struggled to survive—even as it continued its efforts to bring about desegregation in
Virginia's public schools.
Ultimately, however, in early 1959, state and federal judges overturned key
elements of the Virginia General Assembly's massive resistance program. The rulings
forced state leaders to choose between continuing outright resistance by crafting new
massive resistance laws, or capitulating to the courts and allowing school desegregation
to begin in the Commonwealth. Governor Almond and a majority in the state legislature
chose the latter. On February 2, 1959, nearly five years after Brown v. Board of
Education, school desegregation began in the Commonwealth when twenty-one AfricanAmerican students entered formerly-white schools in Arlington and Norfolk. The
process was peaceful, although the black students faced a variety of challenges in their
new schools. After this historic event, the NAACP sought—primarily through litigation—
to increase the number of black students admitted to white schools and of Virginia
localities implementing desegregation. State leaders, shifting from outright defiance to
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token compliance, handed control of school desegregation to local officials and continued
to aid them in preserving as much segregation as possible.
In early 1957 the General Assembly organized two new bodies sanctioned by its
massive resistance legislation of 1956. The House of Delegates created the Committee
on Offenses Against the Administration of Justice (known as the Boatwright Committee),
while the state Senate established the Committee on Law Reform and Racial Activities
(known as the Thomson Committee). Both panels were set up to impede and counteract
the efforts of Virginians who wanted integration, primarily the NAACP, by questioning
national and state NAACP leaders, intimidating plaintiffs and witnesses in the NAACP's
cases, attempting to obtain the organization's membership lists and financial records, and
challenging the credentials of association attorneys. Over the next several years, the
committees also investigated potential violations of state tax laws by organizations that
supported integration, examined the solicitation of business by attorneys associated with
the NAACP, monitored all of Virginia's legal aid societies for the General Assembly, and
asked the Virginia State Bar to investigate whether civil rights attorneys in Virginia were
violating its standards.1
Unbowed, the national office of the NAACP developed a flexible but coordinated
strategy for handling attacks on the association mounted by Virginia and other southern
states. Typical of the NAACP, most of the final decisions were made by the staff in New
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York City. In January 1957, following the Thomson and Boatwright committees' initial
requests for information, Virginia State Conference officials met with the national office
staff. The Virginia NAACP had already filed a suit, NAACP v. Almond, against the
state's anti-NAACP laws in 1956, and now its leadership discussed what actions to take
while the courts considered their requests. The following month, the national board of
directors of the NAACP chose to provide general information to Virginia's legislative
committees but to withhold the names and addresses of members and contributors in
Virginia, a move that was meant to preserve their anonymity and limit reprisals from
white segregationists. That it was executive secretary Roy Wilkins who communicated
the decision directly to the legislative committees highlights the importance of the
national office of the NAACP in the 1950s. Between 1957 and 1959, the national office-in consultation with its State Conferences—responded to countless requests for
information from government officials in Virginia and throughout the South.2
The Virginia NAACP's litigation, NAACP v. Almond, which had been filed in
federal district court in Virginia in late 1956, sought to abolish the Thomson and
Boatwright committees and overturn the state laws that created them. State Conference
lawyers, working with the national legal staff and attorneys from the Legal Defense and
Education Fund, also hoped to protect the association's membership information and
right to litigate. This litigation continued until the U.S. Supreme Court ruled for the
NAACP in 1963. Between 1957 and 1959, the State Conference legal staff handled the
state's appeal of NAACP v. Almond, filed as Harrison v. NAACP, as well Scull v. Virginia
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(1959), which resulted in a U.S. Supreme Court decision that overturned the contempt of
court conviction of a white NAACP member from Virginia. By the fall of 1959, Oliver
Hill noted that Virginia NAACP lawyers were handling at least six cases dealing with the
disclosure of membership information.3
The process involved countless hours of legal preparation and hearings. The
NAACP's national board of directors established a separate fund to pay for the effort to
overturn the anti-NAACP laws in Virginia, and both the national legal staff and Legal
Defense and Education Fund helped prepare and manage the litigation. NAACP records
also show that attorneys' fees paid by the State Conference skyrocketed in 1957.4 In a
report issued in 1960, the Boatwright Committee stated that "solely because of the
NAACP and its affiliated person and organizations ... the Committee has been required
to obtain the assistance of various courts of the Commonwealth not less than fourteen
times during a period of ten months."5
While these cases were argued, the Thomson and Boatwright committees
continued to pressure the Virginia NAACP and its supporters. In late 1957, the
3
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committees, in formal reports to the General Assembly, accused the NAACP of engaging
in the unauthorized practice of law. The following year the legislature directed the
Boatwright Committee to take legal action against individuals or organizations violating
Virginia's legal standards. In response the committee launched legal proceedings to
obtain an injunction against the legal operations of the Virginia State Conference of the
NAACP, the national NAACP, and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund in
Virginia.6
Important though the national office of the NAACP was, the legislative
committees' focus on the national headquarters reflected a fundamental misunderstanding
of the association. Committee members, like most white Virginians, believed the
Virginia NAACP's leaders were merely doing the bidding of the association's national
office in New York. Rather than recognize black Virginians' desire for change,
Virginia's white leaders assumed that black Virginians were being pressured by the
national office. This point of view magnified the threat posed by the national
organization and, combined with the effectiveness of NAACP litigation, convinced state
governments throughout the South to take aim at the association in the later 1950s.7
Nearly every southern legislature passed legislation similar to Virginia's massive
resistance laws of 1956, designed to hinder the NAACP's ability to operate and to
forestall school integration. A number of states—including Virginia—succeeded in
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reducing the effectiveness of the NAACP, and several nearly or entirely shut down the
organization's operations. In October 1958, Bruce Bennett, the Attorney General of
Arkansas, outlined a plan to eliminate the NAACP throughout the South. Bennett said he
had "long contended that the NAACP organizations are at the root of our racial problems,
and the only way I can see to restore our people to peace and tranquility is to neutralize
those organizations."8
In Washington, D.C., Virginia's senior U.S. Senator, Harry Byrd, also attacked
the NAACP. In 1956, Byrd used his influence to convince the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) to investigate the association's tax-exempt status. Believing the Legal Defense and
Educational Fund had violated its tax-exempt status by sharing a chain of command with
the national office of the NAACP, the IRS forced the two organizations to separate in
May 1957.9
Under the new arrangement, the NAACP developed two separate but overlapping
legal staffs. Thurgood Marshall became the director of the Legal Defense and Education
Fund and Robert Carter became the NAACP's general counsel. Virginia's NAACP
attorneys continued to work with both organizations. Carter and the national office were
particularly important in defending the Virginia State Conference from state government
attacks by challenging the constitutionality of the General Assembly's anti-NAACP laws
8
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in court. In the campaign for school desegregation, State Conference attorneys worked
with both the national office and the Legal Defense Fund, though again the national
office seems to have played the more important role.10
Political scientist Gilbert Ware has examined the separation of the two groups.
Discussing the reasons for the dismemberment, he writes: "Backlashers [segregationists]
hated the NAACP-Inc. Fund alliance for what it had done and feared it for what it might
yet do" to promote school desegregation. Discussing the impact of the forced separation
of the Inc. Fund, Ware concludes the move had the effect of "impairing Blacks' ability to
insist that Brown be implemented" in the South.11 The division of the association's legal
staff and the establishment of a separate organization for much of the NAACP's legal
activities was indeed harmful. Although the NAACP and the Inc. Fund continued to
cooperate, the physical separation between the two organizations complicated this effort.
Considering the NAACP's importance, this meant the entire process of school
desegregation was affected.12
As the likelihood that some desegregation would occur grew in the late 1950s,
opposition among white southerners increased. Polls showed that roughly 16 percent of
white southerners agreed with the Brown decision in 1956, but that the number had
dropped to 8 percent by 1959. The decline reflected the expansion of initial school
10
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desegregation into new parts of the region and segregationists' successful campaign to
unite white southerners in opposition to Brown. At the same time, the percentage of
white southerners who believed that school desegregation was inevitable fell from 55
percent in 1956 to 43 percent in August 1957, suggesting that the viability of massive
resistance was winning support for the policy. The Little Rock, Arkansas, desegregation
crisis, which occurred in the fall of 1957, increased white southern opposition to school
desegregation. In that incident, President Eisenhower reluctantly used federal troops to
implement a court order to admit nine black students into Central High School, which the
governor of the state had defied. A poll conducted shortly after the incident revealed that
two out of three whites in Virginia preferred closing schools rather than integrating
them.13
In most of the South, Citizens' Councils were the leading segregationist
organization. The first council was organized in Indianola, Mississippi, in 1954, and the
movement spread rapidly, particularly in the Deep South. Over time, state and national
entities were created. NAACP executive secretary Roy Wilkins later recalled the
Councils had "spread like a plague," and the organization claimed 250,000 members by
1956.14 In Virginia, several units were active by 1956, and they grew in size and
influence in the later 1950s. As elsewhere, they sought to generate support for massive
resistance and to intimidate the supporters of integration. Sarah Patton Boyle, a white
liberal from Charlottesville, recalled that the local Council burned crosses in the lawns of
13
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white liberals and churches that supported them.15 Not surprisingly, the Councils—in
Virginia and elsewhere—expressed a particular hatred for the NAACP; one Council flyer
in 1956 claimed: "The Nigra, white-race-hating organization, NAACP, is a red-led
organization."16 In September 1958, Council representatives from Arlington, Brunswick,
Lunenburg, Mecklenburg, Fairfax and the Peninsula created the statewide Association of
Citizens' Councils of Virginia.17
In Virginia, however, the Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties
remained the leading segregationist organization, eclipsing the Citizens' Councils in size
and stature.18 By 1956 the Defenders claimed chapters throughout the state and a
membership of 12,000. The group also had access to the highest echelons of Virginia's
government, winning the allegiance of a number of legislators from Southside Virginia
who supported massive resistance. In early 1956, a delegation of southern segregationists
headed by Robert Crawford, president of the Defenders, met with Governor Stanley. By
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that time or shortly thereafter, the historian Robbins Gates writes, "the Defenders and the
[Byrd] organization seemed nearly as one."19
Like the Citizens' Councils, the Defenders of State Sovereignty attacked the
NAACP. In October 1954, the Mecklenburg County unit warned: "The question is
whether we shall pass on to our children and grandchildren the proud heritage of the
white race or whether we shall quietly submit to the dictates of NAACP, Communistic
Jews, and Political expediency...." 20 In 1958, James Jackson Kilpatrick added, "If the
Old Dominion can be humiliated, whipped to her knees, made to surrender, the NAACP
believes the rest of the South will soon cave in." The young Richmond News Leader
editor concluded, "we would say to our confident enemies: Virginia has no thought of
surrendering."21 Between 1957 and 1959, the Defenders organized political rallies to
pressure state leaders, harassed the proponents of integration with threatening phone calls
and letters, and established tax-exempt foundations to create private segregated
academies should the public schools be closed—or worse, integrated.22
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Virginia's white newspapers also generally denounced school integration and the
NAACP in the late 1950s. Benjamin Muse, who traveled the South working for the
Southern Regional Council in the late 1950s, wrote: "Once state policy pointed toward
resistance, nearly all of the press had fallen into line with it. There were fewer voices of
moderation in the Virginia press than that of any other state outside of South Carolina
and the Gulf states of Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana."23 The one notable exception
was Lenoir Chambers, editor of the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, who advocated compliance
with Brown and later won the Pulitzer Prize for his editorials on massive resistance.
As opposition to school desegregation swelled, the NAACP struggled. Southern
attempts to secure NAACP membership lists led to a sharp decline in memberships in the
South because blacks feared retribution. Historian Harvard Sitkoff noted, "By 1958 the
NAACP had lost 246 branches in the South, and the South's percentage of the NAACP's
total membership had dropped from nearly 50 percent to just about 25 percent."24
Discussing the national NAACP, Thurgood Marshall and Roy Wilkins reported in
January 1958 that memberships had dropped fourteen percent, or 48,000 members, in the
previous year—the first decrease since the late 1940s.25
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The Virginia State Conference's membership figures suffered as well. In the two
years after Brown v. Board of Education, the organization had experienced significant
growth, as its membership expanded from 16,032 in 1954 to 30,354 in 1955.26 Then the
state government's massive resistance policies began to take their toll, and the number of
State Conference members fell to 22,846 at the end of 1956. Afterward, Virginia State
Conference memberships flattened out for the remainder of the decade—the association's
membership totals for 1958 and 1959 were 21,168 and 21,777, respectively—before rising
again in the early 1960s.27
As membership declined, so did the NAACP's income. Unlike other civil rights
organizations, the majority of the NAACP's revenue came from individual, annuallyrenewed memberships; in 1958, memberships supplied approximately eighty-five percent
of the association's annual operating budget.28 As massive resistance led to a decline in
memberships and fewer donations to the NAACP, the association's income stagnated; the
association's budget showed a deficit for 1957. After rising from approximately $13,000
in 1954 to nearly $40,000 in 1955 and almost $50,000 in 1956, the amount of
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membership income sent from the national office to the State Conference remained near
that level until the end of the decade, when it again began to climb.29
Attacks on the NAACP also impaired the functioning of the Virginia State
Conference. In March 1957, fearing action by the state government, executive secretary
Lester Banks transferred the State Conference's "principal monies" to a bank in New
York as a precaution. As its income dropped, the state NAACP also appealed to the
national office for financial relief. In June, Banks wrote to NAACP executive secretary
Roy Wilkins, "We are still under the hammer.. ,."30
Massive resistance also led to reduced branch activity in Virginia. In its 1957
annual report, the Covington branch explained that much of its civil rights work had
stopped. A hand-written addendum to national Director of Branches Gloster B. Current
explained: "This is a very limited yearly report because our field of action has been
narrowed considerably the last couple of years by the effects and pressure of the antiN.A.A.C.P. laws and attempts by the state government of Virginia to secure branch
membership lists." It concluded, "Rest assured that our branch is carrying on and doing
its best under very difficult circumstances."31
The State Conference, however, maintained its core programs and continued to
press for school desegregation in Virginia throughout the late 1950s. The new dangers
29
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and hurdles failed to divert or intimidate the organization's leadership. One NAACP
supporter wrote of State Conference Executive Secretary Lester Banks, "When the timid
begin discussions about going slow or stopping certain important projects, Les acts like a
deaf man who has lost his hearing aid.. .."32 In 1959, in addition to continuing its legal
challenges against the massive resistance laws, State Conference officials distributed
more than 150,000 pieces of literature to "alert, inform and lend a feeling of security to
our members and supporters." One brochure was titled "NAACP Membership and
Contribution Lists Still Secure," which noted that the State Conference's legal actions
had prevented the state from obtaining the association's membership lists or financial
records.33
As the anti-NAACP laws and segregationist attacks took their toll, NAACP
leaders also struggled to maintain the association's position as the nation's leading civil
rights organization. Though leaders of the organization regularly cooperated with other
civil rights groups and generally shared the same goals, they also jealously guarded the
association's status and influence and feared new organizations that might challenge the
NAACP's leadership. In the late 1950s and 1960s, the very time when southern
segregationists and state governments targeted the NAACP and its members, blacks
created or turned to other civil rights organizations in larger numbers, a development that
threatened the NAACP's long-term preeminence in the region.34
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Concern among NAACP leaders increased after the Montgomery, Alabama, bus
boycott of 1955-1956, which was organized by the locally-based Montgomery
Improvement Association (MIA) and then led by that organization's young president, the
Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. While the MIA and the Montgomery branch of the
NAACP shared members, including King himself, and the national office of the NAACP
(and the Legal Defense Fund) handled the MIA's legal work, friction existed between the
two organizations from the beginning. During and after the boycott, NAACP executive
secretary Roy Wilkins downplayed the effectiveness of economic boycotts as a tactic for
bringing about change, emphasizing instead the importance of the NAACP's legal efforts
and the U.S. Supreme Court decision that ended the boycott. Ignoring the fact that the
NAACP had organized similar economic boycotts in the past, Wilkins evinced deep
concern about the growth and acceptance of competing strategies for racial change.35
Wilkins also pointed out—correctly—that the boycott had fueled the attack
mounted by state of Alabama on the NAACP. In June 1956 Alabama's attorney general
launched one of the fiercest assaults on the NAACP in the region. Legislative action and
judicial decrees shut down the Alabama State Conference as well as the organization's
regional headquarters for the Southeast, forcing the NAACP to expend great effort for the
next six years to reopen and rebuild.36 As Taylor Branch explains, "Wilkins would
hardly forget that it was King's boycott that had put the NAACP out of business in the

35

See Minutes of the Board of Directors Meeting, February 14, 1956, and Minutes of the Board of
Directors Meeting, April 8, 1956, both in Supplement to Part One (1956-1960), reel 1, NAACP Papers
microfilm; Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-63 (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1988), 186-188.
36
Wilkins, Standing Fast, 238-239; Branch, Parting the Waters, 186-188.

102

entire state, at a critical time in the school desegregation cases, and this handicap would
grow more serious as other Southern states tried to follow Alabama's example."37
The birth of a new civil rights organization—the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference (SCLC), led by Dr. King—in early 1957 intensified the NAACP's fears of
lost memberships and influence in the region. With the association struggling simply to
exist in the southern states, partly because white resentment of the bus boycott, the
creation of SCLC grated on Roy Wilkins and other national NAACP leaders. Though
King attempted to maintain cordial relations between the two organizations and
deliberately avoided confronting the NAACP's leadership, Wilkins and others within the
NAACP clearly viewed SCLC as a threat.38 As legal historian Michael Klarman
explains, "The NAACP saw itself as the civil rights organization, and it was not
favorably disposed toward an upstart group that might compete for funding, membership,
and headlines."39
Wilkins's concern stemmed partly from the fact that the SCLC offered an
alternative to blacks who had not previously joined the NAACP. Wilkins knew that the
vast majority of southern blacks were not NAACP members, in part perhaps because of
the organization's annual membership dues or its requirement that branches have at least
fifty members; also, the NAACP's policy of developing policies and programs largely in
the national office may have begun to lose appeal in an era where local, grassroots action
37
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was on the rise. Other blacks shied away from the group because of its emphasis on legal
action—a gradual mode of bringing about change. As King's organization developed, it
attracted growing numbers of southern blacks who wanted to move well beyond the
NAACP's program.
Competition among civil rights organizations, quite simply, reflected the
heterogeneity of southern blacks. Many black organizations, including fraternal
associations, civic clubs, church-based groups, parent-teacher organizations, and voters'
leagues saw integration as a means of obtaining better educational and economic
opportunities for blacks, and throughout the mid-twentieth century, these groups and their
members generally supported the NAACP and viewed it as the leading civil rights
organization. Even so, differences of class, religion, age, and the like fueled debates over
strategy, tactics, timing, and goals—and as alternatives to the NAACP emerged in the
later 1950s, divisions within the black community grew. As historian James Hershman
notes, black Virginians in the 1950s were "far from a monolithic group."40
As the decade of the 1950s neared its end, the Virginia NAACP's school
desegregation litigation progressed more smoothly than its challenges to the state's antiNAACP laws. Two of the organization's five school desegregation lawsuits—filed in the
spring of 1956 in Arlington and Charlottesville—had quickly won favorable rulings in
federal district court, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
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unanimously upheld both decisions in December 1956.41 In 1957, while the Fourth
Circuit decision was appealed to the United States Supreme Court, Judge Walter
Hoffman of the federal district court of Eastern Virginia handed down a decision
overturning the state's pupil placement law, which had created a three-person Pupil
Placement Board to prevent school desegregation. The judge also ordered that school
desegregation in Norfolk and Newport News begin that fall. Hoffman declared that "by
reason of the obvious lack of attempt to promulgate any plan looking forward to
desegregation gradually or otherwise, there remains nothing for this court to do other than
to restrain and enjoin the school board ... from refusing solely on account of race or color
to admit or enroll or educate ... any child otherwise qualified for admission...." Upheld
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the summer of 1957,
Hoffman's rulings were also appealed to the United States Supreme Court. In the
meantime, segregated schools in Virginia would continue for the 1957-1958 school
year.42
That fall Virginia and the rest of the South took a back seat to news from Little
Rock, Arkansas. Like the Virginia State Conference, the Arkansas State Conference of
the NAACP won a federal district court ruling ordering school desegregation in Little
Rock in 1957. Rather than comply with the court order, however, Arkansas Governor
Orval Faubus ordered the Arkansas National Guard to prevent the admission of the nine
African-American students scheduled to attend Little Rock's Central High School in
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order to—as he put it—maintain order and prevent violence. As national news outlets
covered the growing conflict, President Dwight Eisenhower met privately with Governor
Faubus to defuse the situation, but without success. Eventually President Eisenhower
took control of the Arkansas National Guard and sent U.S. Army troops to enforce the
court order; soldiers escorted the nine black students into the school and remained there
for the entire year.
The crisis in Little Rock reverberated throughout the South. In Virginia's
gubernatorial campaign in the fall of 1957, Attorney General J. Lindsay Almond won a
contest that focused on massive resistance and school desegregation. A stalwart
segregationist, Almond pandered to white fears about black voters and branded his
opponent, Republican Ted Dalton, an integrationist because of his ties to President
Eisenhower and his moderate views on desegregation.43 The Little Rock crisis, which
broke less than two months before the election, significantly sharpened white Virginians'
concerns about integration and doomed Dalton's campaign to become Virginia's first
Republican governor.44 Dalton later concluded, "Little Rock knocked me down to
nothing. It wasn't a little rock, it was a big rock."45
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In the spring of 1958, the Virginia General Assembly revised and expanded its
massive resistance legislation. With support from now-Governor J. Lindsay Almond, the
legislature adopted several so-called "Little Rock bills," which required the closing of
any school policed by federal troops and ordered that the federalization of the state militia
be controlled by the governor. The assembly also amended legislation related to its two
investigative committees. Delegate James Thomson sought to extend the life of his
committee and expand its agenda to examine the racial beliefs of Virginia's school
teachers, but Governor Almond opposed the effort, fearing its effect on teacher
recruitment. The General Assembly defeated Thomson's bill and the Thomson
Committee's mandate expired. The Boatwright Committee, however, and its
investigation aimed at intimidating the NAACP, were continued. That spring, the
assembly also passed legislation requiring non-profit organizations engaged in legal work
to register with the State Corporation Commission and ordered the Virginia State Bar to
prosecute supposed violators of the state's legal ethics rules. Responding to recent
federal court rulings, the lawmakers also modified the powers of the state Pupil
Placement Board to allow that body to consider additional criteria for student placement.
The goal was to allow the Board to continue to require school segregation without
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making recommendations explicitly based on race. As of the spring of 1958, massive
resistance was alive and well in Virginia.46
In the fall of that year, litigation from the Little Rock crisis led to the first
significant U.S. Supreme Court decision related to school desegregation since Brown II
in 1955. Ruling on an appeal from the Little Rock school board for more time to
implement its school desegregation plan, the high court in Cooper v. Aaron unanimously
reiterated its commitment to Brown v. Board of Education and ruled that the threat of
violence—and community resistance generally—did not excuse noncompliance. Some of
the justices might also have been frustrated with the slow pace of southern school
desegregation; by the fall of 1957, only four of the eleven states of the former
Confederacy had allowed any public school desegregation, and the number of black
students admitted to formerly white schools was minuscule.47 Still, although Cooper v.
Aaron was "more forceful and condemnatory than Brown," the decision did not
significantly speed up southern school desegregation. During the five years after Cooper,
the Supreme Court continued to accept token desegregation and refused to hear appeals
of lower court decisions requiring only minimal compliance with Brown, legitimizing the
slow pace of school desegregation in the South.48
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Roy Wilkins later said, "I am still surprised when white politicians, memories
foreshortened by the passing of time, tell me that things began to go our way once
President Eisenhower acted at Little Rock."49 President Eisenhower himself remained
noncommittal on school desegregation even after Little Rock. In the summer of 1958,
rumors swirled through Washington that the president had opposed Brown from the
beginning and privately wished the Supreme Court had given Little Rock more time to
comply. The president refused to confirm or deny the rumors. At a news conference in
late August, he admitted, "I might have said something about 'slower.'" 50
In the meantime, the NAACP continued to make slow progress in Virginia's
courtrooms. In early 1958 the United States Supreme Court chose not to hear appeals of
Judge Hoffman's decisions overturning the state's pupil placement law and ordering
school desegregation in several Tidewater Virginia localities, thereby upholding
Hoffman. 51 That spring and summer Judges Hoffman and John Paul renewed orders
requiring school desegregation in Norfolk and Charlottesville, respectively, that
September. An additional NAACP lawsuit—filed in Warren County, just north of
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Shenandoah National Park, in August—resulted in a decision ordering school
desegregation there in September as well.52
At the end of August 1958, Senator Byrd held his annual picnic at the family
apple orchards in Berryville, Virginia. Before a record-breaking crowd at a traditionally
well-attended event, on a bright, sunshiny Saturday, the senator called for continued
massive resistance and denounced the proponents of school integration in Virginia. Byrd
warned that the NAACP wanted "to bring Virginia to its knees first and then, after
conquering Virginia ... they intend to march through the South singing hallelujah."
Denouncing the organization and its efforts, Byrd proclaimed it was Virginia's duty to
hold the line.53
The following month, when federal court orders desegregating Virginia's schools
were supposed to go into effect, Governor Almond closed nine affected public schools in
Charlottesville, Norfolk, and Warren County. The remaining schools in each locale, and
Virginia's public schools in other localities, remained open. Still, Almond's decision
displaced approximately 15,000 school children.54 As the national media descended on
Virginia many of the affected white students enrolled in private schools that were hastily
created with help from segregationist organizations.
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Reporters from around the globe spent the winter of 1958-1959 in Virginia. The
day after the school closings were announced, Governor Almond appeared at the largest
press conference he had ever held—twenty-two reporters and seven television cameras
took part. The governor, whose face was increasingly paired with that of Arkansas
Governor Orval Faubus, avoided an attitude of abrasive defiance, but clearly Virginia had
cast its lot with Deep South segregationists. Throughout the winter, the standoff between
Virginia's leaders and the federal court system generated headlines in the nation's leading
newspapers and commentary on television news networks.55
Underlying the attention was the fact that what happened in Virginia would
strongly influence the battle over school desegregation elsewhere in the South,
particularly in states, like Virginia, that had not yet experienced desegregation. Quite
simply, segregationists across the region hoped the state would hold the line. As Relman
Morin put it in the Richmond Times-Dispatch, "In effect, other Southern states are telling
Virginians, 'If you go down, there is little hope for the South.'" 56 In James Jackson
Kilpatrick's view, the state's importance as the first American colony and the capital of
the Confederacy had convinced the NAACP to focus its attack there, and the organization
simply had to be defeated. In the fall of 1958, Kilpatrick wrote: "The next few weeks
will be bitter weeks for Virginia. We have sacrifice ahead, and some exhausting labor,
and a terrible harvest of worsening race relations. But we also have an opportunity to
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defend, before the whole country, constitutional principles held precious in Virginia for
more than a century and a half."57
In the fall of 1958, the Virginia NAACP filed litigation challenging the school
closings in Virginia and the legislation that authorized them. In Norfolk, a predominantly
white, moderate organization known as the Norfolk Committee for Public Schools also
filed a lawsuit, James v. Almond, challenging the state's school closing and tuition grant
laws. In October, Judge Hoffman convinced the state NAACP to withdraw its suit in
favor of the committee's case, which represented all the pupils whose schools had been
closed rather than only the black plaintiffs who had been assigned to desegregated
schools.58
The rise of the Norfolk Committee for Public Schools was part of a broader savethe-schools movement that reflected an important shift among Virginia's white
population. Facing the prospect of closed public schools throughout the state, a growing
number of white Virginians began calling for the state to maintain and protect its public
schools, even if doing so required token, or minimal, school desegregation. Though they
supported efforts to limit desegregation as much as possible, these white "moderates"
believed that maintaining segregated schools was not worth abandoning public
education.59 Carl Sanders, elected governor of Georgia in 1962, explained: "moderate
means I am a segregationist but not a damned fool."60 In December 1958 the growing
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acceptance of this perspective in Virginia led moderates from around the state to create
the Virginia Committee on Public Schools, a statewide organization committed to
reopening closed public schools and preventing future school closures in the
commonwealth.61
As white public opinion in Virginia shifted toward acceptance of token
desegregation, newspaper coverage of school desegregation changed as well. During the
fall of 1958, most of the major white dailies turned against massive resistance.62 Even
James Jackson Kilpatrick reversed course. In November the Richmond News Leader
editor endorsed the concept of local option and acknowledged that some school
desegregation was probably unavoidable, although he encouraged Virginia's leaders also
to develop "new weapons and new tactics" to preserve as much segregation as possible.63
The stalwart supporters of segregation, however, pressed state officials to
continue massive resistance even as the school closings created an atmosphere of crisis.
Sensing growing opposition to school closures among white Virginians, the Defenders of
State Sovereignty and other segregationists created private segregated school systems in
the affected localities and began to make similar plans elsewhere in Virginia. In
December, the board of directors of the Defenders resolved: "Since Virginia ... is the
battleground upon which the eternal fight for the liberties of America must be waged, let
us not falter, let us not yield."64
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With the pressure mounting, Governor Almond considered his options. Senator
Byrd and the Democratic political machine supported the continuation of massive
resistance, but Almond knew that a growing number of white Virginians felt that
statewide school segregation should be abandoned if public school closings were the
inevitable result of that policy. Governor Almond, who owed his office to the Byrd
Organization, would not defy the machine lightly, but a crucial question now arose:
whether a new political coalition, including the state's white moderates and liberals, was
viable. That fall the governor commented that "I fully realize I am in the jaws of a
vise...." 65
As an attorney, Almond also understood the likelihood that Virginia's massive
resistance laws would eventually be overturned by federal courts. That fall, Governor
Almond asked Attorney General Albertis Harrison to initiate a test case in the state courts
to assess the constitutionality of the school closing laws and tuition grants system
Virginia had created in 1956, and modified the previous spring. Apparently the governor
also sought to transfer some responsibility for school desegregation in Virginia to the
court system. Hearings were held that fall on Harrison v. Day, which would be decided
in early 1959 along with the Norfolk Committee for Public Schools' federal district court
suit.66
As tensions reached the boiling point, the NAACP helped to stage Virginia's
largest civil rights demonstration of the 1950s. In Richmond on Emancipation Day—
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January 1, 1959—more than a thousand people marched in the Pilgrimage of Prayer for
Public Schools, organized by the state NAACP, Congress of Racial Equality (CORE),
and Martin Luther King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). The goal
was to bring about national pressure on Virginia's leadership over the school closures,
and a resolution delivered to the State Capitol called for "a change of heart and a change
of policy." Martin Luther King, Jr., explained: "As Virginia goes, so goes the South,
perhaps America, and the world."67
The protest highlighted the rapidly changing civil rights milieu in Virginia.
Desperate to make inroads in Virginia, CORE—a northern-based civil rights organization
that specialized in nonviolent direct action—sent field workers to the state to organize
branches in late 1957 and again in early 1958. In late 1958, during the school closing
crisis, CORE'S efforts led to the creation of branches in Norfolk, Portsmouth, Suffolk,
and Petersburg. Though these CORE branches sought the same goals as the NAACP,
namely desegregation of education and other areas of life, they represented a challenge to
the longstanding hegemony of the NAACP in Virginia.
In Petersburg, Wyatt Tee Walker, president of the local NAACP branch,
suggested that CORE representatives organize what became the Emancipation Day march
of January 1, 1959. Soon Walker became the state director of CORE in Virginia. By
early 1960, he was serving also as head of the Petersburg Improvement Association, an
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organization that was related to the Montgomery Improvement Association and Dr.
King's SCLC. He also continued to work with the Petersburg NAACP, attended the
national NAACP's 1960 annual convention, and was a member of the NAACP's
powerful Resolution Committee. Late in the summer of 1960, however, Walker joined
SCLC full-time as its executive director; he would continue to work for the organization
until 1964 and increasingly challenged the NAACP's southern operations and agenda.68
Despite such challenges to its preeminence, the Virginia NAACP retained its
position as the state's leading civil rights organization throughout the late 1950s. Its
well-established and active branches, public relations networks, and impressive list of
accomplishments—legal and otherwise—were known among the state's African American
population. Both CORE and SCLC attempted to use the January 1, 1959 march as a way
of increasing their membership and stature, but to their chagrin the NAACP got most of
the publicity.69 Moreover, though CORE and SCLC both established branches in
Virginia in the late 1950s, neither group garnered enough members or branches to
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challenge the NAACP's preeminence, which State Conference leaders jealously
guarded.70
Shortly after the Prayer Pilgrimage, the NAACP's pending school desegregation
litigation in Virginia came to a successful conclusion. On January 19, 1959, a special
three-judge federal court, ruling on the Norfolk Committee for Public Schools' lawsuit,
declared the state's school closing law unconstitutional. That same day, in Harrison v.
Day, the Virginia Supreme Court ruled on Attorney General Harrison's test case, holding
that Virginia's constitution prevented it from closing some schools (to avoid
desegregation) while operating others. Federal judges quickly reordered the integration
of schools in several localities around the state.71
Virginia's state government now needed to choose a different path, and the
decision fell largely on Governor Almond's shoulders. Though extreme segregationists
and the Byrd Organization encouraged Governor Almond to continue massive resistance,
the governor refused. Before a special session of the Virginia legislature the following
week, Almond called for the abandonment of massive resistance and the development of
new policies related to segregation in public education. The governor had decided to
steer Virginia in the direction of token, or minimal, compliance with Brown v. Board of
Education. At his urging, a newly-created coalition of moderates and liberals in the
General Assembly prevented the passage of new massive resistance legislation and
secured the repeal of the state's school-closing law in late January. Upon Governor
70
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Almond's recommendation, the legislature also made tuition grants available for students
who wanted to transfer into nonsectarian private schools.72 Shortly thereafter, authorities
reopened the closed schools in the affected localities and on February 2, 1959, nearly five
years after the original Brown decision, twenty-one black students first entered formerly
all-white public schools in Virginia. Desegregation took place first in Arlington,
followed by Norfolk that same afternoon, and Alexandria the following week.73
As might be expected, Virginians who continued to support massive resistance
expressed outrage over Governor Almond's actions. Harry Byrd's brother-in-law,
Delegate James Thomson, said, "There's a sickness in my heart," and Delegate Sam Pope
called February 2 "one of the blackest days Virginia has faced since reconstruction."74
Later that month, in a letter to one of the founders of the Virginia Committee for Public
Schools, Dr. J. L. Blair Buck, Governor Almond wrote, "I have been held up as a traitor,
a Benedict Arnold, and subject to epithets too vile to mention to a gentleman."75 On
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April 10, the Governor asserted that he had survived an assassination attempt on the
Capitol grounds; no assailant was ever caught.76
According to Benjamin Muse, "All the king's horses and all the king's men could
never put massive resistance back together again"; but the conservatives tried. That
spring, with Senator Byrd's blessing, massive resisters in the General Assembly
attempted to revive the school closing legislation. The effort revealed a schism within
the Virginia Democratic Party and definitively alienated Almond and his supporters from
the Byrd Organization and Virginia's segregationists. That spring Senator Byrd refused
to return Governor Almond's phone calls, and political battles between the two would
occur repeatedly during the coming years. The hardliners' efforts to revive massive
resistance in the spring of 1959 failed, but some of the votes were extraordinarily close—a
law granting localities control over school desegregation passed the State Senate 20-19.77
The new policy of Virginia's elected officials was token compliance; they sought
to minimize the amount of school desegregation that would take place in the coming
years.78
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A new pupil placement law passed in the spring of 1959 allowed localities to
begin making their own pupil assignments starting March 1, 1960, if they so desired. If
not, the new pupil assignment law allowed the state Pupil Placement Board to continue
its discriminatory assignment policies by removing all references to race, a ploy used
commonly throughout the South.79 The legislature also allowed school districts to adopt
"freedom of choice of association" plans, which combined pupil placement policies,
private school tuition grants, and locally-enforced compulsory education policies to
preserve segregation.80
The state's new tuition grant system also avoided any mention of race, in an effort
to survive judicial scrutiny. The program allowed the state to distribute money, now
called scholarships, to families with children who were enrolled in private, non-sectarian
schools or in public school outside of the district in which they lived. No mention of
segregation or desegregation was made, meaning that much of the disbursed money went
to families whose children attended private schools for reasons other than avoiding
desegregation. No school desegregation had occurred in Fairfax County by the fall of
1959, for instance, but 263 private school pupils were receiving this type of state aid.
Modified over the years, the state's tuition grants program continued to exist until 1969.81
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Explaining the results of all of the state's new legislation of 1959, historians Andrew
Lewis and Matthew Lassiter write, "the policies which supplanted massive resistanceprivate school tuition grants, discriminatory pupil placement laws, freedom of choice
plans, and incessant legal delays—thwarted substantial progress toward meaningful school
integration throughout the 1960s."82
Prince Edward County, Virginia, refused to accept even token desegregation.
One of the five localities involved in the original Brown decision, Prince Edward had
been fighting to preserve school segregation since 1951. Facing a federal court order to
desegregate its schools in the fall of 1959, the board of supervisors in Prince Edward
County discontinued funding for the public schools, thus closing them for the indefinite
future. New legislation adopted by the General Assembly that spring, including a law
allowing districts to use public school buses to transport children to private schools,
tacitly supported that decision. A private school foundation, organized largely by the
Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties—which had been founded in
Prince Edward—created a private academy for the county's white students. Many
African-American students left the district to be educated or went without schooling. The
county's schools remained closed until 1964, when the United States Supreme Court
ordered them reopened.83
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After initial desegregation, the NAACP, as might be expected, continued to press
for more extensive school desegregation throughout Virginia. State Conference attorneys
filed litigation contesting Prince Edward County's school closings, launching the legal
battle that culminated in the Supreme Court's Griffin v. Prince Edward County decision
in 1964. Additional school desegregation lawsuits were filed in Richmond in 1958, and
in Galax, West Point, and Hanover County, in 1959. Many more would follow in the
coming years.84 Local NAACP attorneys, such as S. W. Tucker's brother Otto, in
Arlington, did much of the work by preparing legal briefs, making court appearances, and
working with plaintiffs. Oliver Hill, head of the Virginia State Conference's legal team,
oversaw the process.85 Over time, he did so with less input from the National Office, as
the NAACP's struggle for desegregation shifted to the Deep South, where white
resistance remained most acute.86
Unfortunately for the NAACP, federal judges continued to accept even the most
modest desegregation plans in the late 1950s and early 1960s, in Virginia and elsewhere.
In late 1958 the U.S. Supreme Court had rejected a challenge to Alabama's pupil
placement law, effectively legitimizing placement policies that were used to limit school
desegregation. The following year the high court refused to review Nashville's
desegregation plan, which had ordered desegregation within a "grade-a-year" time frame,
something Thurgood Marshall had denounced as "legally and morally wrong," and
included a transfer option which allowed white students to withdraw from desegregated
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schools. Speaking of the Supreme Court, Michael Klarman writes, "In the late 1950s, the
Court did nothing to condemn this tokenism and was widely perceived to have endorsed
it."87
Lower federal courts and judges, of course, followed the high court's lead,
accepting school plans that barely began the desegregation process. Despite the
NAACP's best efforts, the result was that token desegregation remained the norm in
Virginia and much of the South throughout the 1950s and well into the 1960s.88 In
Virginia, only four of Virginia's 128 school districts with both black and white students
had desegregated by May 1959, and only two additional districts desegregated during the
1959-1960 school year. The number of black children in desegregated schools in the
state climbed at an equally slow pace, from thirty in the spring of 1959 to eighty-six in
September 1959, out of a total black student population of over two hundred thousand.89
As 1959 drew to a close, the Virginia State Conference of the NAACP celebrated
the accomplishment of a significant victory—the initial desegregation of Virginia's public
school system. Its attorneys had broken through the legislative bulwark of massive
resistance and forced Virginia's leaders to accept the mandate of Brown v. Board of
Education for the first time. Still, a vast amount of work remained. The association now
sought to convince the federal courts of the legitimacy of its position—that school
desegregation should be eliminated as rapidly and completely as possible. At the same
87
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time, as a new decade dawned, the NAACP came to believe that more was needed to
fulfill the promise of Brown v. Board of Education than action in the nation's courts.
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Chapter 5,1960 - 1963
'Temples of Freedom': Direct Action Protest and the Campaign for School
Desegregation

The early 1960s ushered in a new era of the civil rights movement. Frustrated by
the slow pace of change in the late 1950s, a new generation of civil rights activists, aided
at times by their elders, took to the streets between 1960 and 1963, launching nonviolent
direct action protests against segregation throughout the nation, but especially in the
South. During this period the Greensboro sit-ins, the Freedom Rides, the Birmingham
campaign, and the March on Washington occurred. Nonviolent protests, their influence
magnified by media coverage, put increased pressure on the federal government to take a
stand; as a result, the Kennedy administration became more directly involved in civil
rights issues than previous administrations.1
Segregation in public education, however, largely continued throughout this period.
Though initial desegregation had occurred in Virginia in 1959 and in every southern state
except Mississippi by 1963, the number of black students attending integrated schools
remained minuscule. While direct action protests overcame segregation in restaurants
and other areas of southern life, the battle for school integration took place in courtrooms.
And though federal court orders in the South increased the extent of desegregation taking
place in public schools, the gains were small, and in this realm as in others, frustration
with the slow pace of change grew in the black community.
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Nonviolent direct action was the most popular protest technique in the early 1960s,
but it was not a new approach. Mohandas Gandhi had popularized nonviolent protest in
the 1930s as he struggled in India against British colonial rule. In the United States in
1937, workers at General Motors utilized "sit-down" strikes to wrest better pay and
working conditions from the world's largest corporation. A new civil rights organization
created in 1942, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), used sit-ins and nonviolent
direct action protests against segregation in northern cities during the 1940s and 1950s.2
Pressured by the widespread unemployment of the Great Depression, blacks in
Virginia had launched similar protests. In the mid-1930s, "Don't Buy Where You Can't
Work" boycotts and picket lines were organized in Richmond and Newport News, part of
a broader national effort to improve black economic opportunities.3 In Alexandria in
1939, a small group of African-American youths, organized and led by future NAACP
attorney S. W. Tucker, sat-in and demanded borrowing privileges at the local library.
Tucker, who had returned from the Civilian Conservation Corps in 1938, chafed at the
fact that he could not use the public library two blocks from his home.4 For him and
many others, nonviolent direct action signaled both growing frustration and a new kind of
militancy.
The resilience of segregation and discrimination after Brown v. Board of Education
had fueled some direct action protests in the late 1950s as well. The most notable was the
bus boycott organized in Montgomery, Alabama, in 1955-1956, following Rosa Parks's
2
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arrest for refusing to give up her seat on a city bus to accommodate a white rider. In
August 1958 in Oklahoma City, members of the NAACP youth council demanded
service at downtown lunch counters and refused to leave when denied. Inspired by the
Montgomery bus boycott, the youths desegregated thirty-nine businesses that year.
Members of an NAACP youth council in Wichita, Kansas, carried out similar protests,
and blacks in Mississippi bravely conducted a wade-in at a Gulf Coast beach in 1959.5
The most important instance of nonviolent direct action of this era, however, was
the sit-ins in Greensboro, North Carolina, in 1960. On February 1, four black students
from the Agricultural and Technical College of North Carolina entered a local
Woolworth's variety store, bought several items, sat at the lunch counter, and asked to be
served. When they were denied service, the four refused to leave and sat until the store
closed. The following day they returned with supporters. In the coming days, similar
protests occurred in cities and towns throughout North Carolina before spreading to
neighboring states. By April, sit-ins had taken place in 78 cities throughout the South,
including Virginia.6
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The rapid spread of the sit-ins that spring posed challenges for the NAACP. Never
a mass-based organization, the association only occasionally utilized organized protest,
and when it did, it generally avoided situations that led to arrest. Picketing and boycotts
were acceptable techniques, but trespassing, disorderly conduct, and related activities
were generally discouraged.7 Although at least two of the original four participants in the
Greensboro sit-ins were members of the Youth Council of the Greensboro NAACP, when
the four youths contacted the head of the local NAACP—seeking advice and support on
the night of the first sit-in—the NAACP head contacted CORE on their behalf.8
Initially, the national NAACP criticized the sit-ins, but the association quickly
changed its position. Thurgood Marshall reportedly "stormed around the room
proclaiming ... [that] he was not going to represent a bunch of crazy colored students
who violated the sacred property rights of white folks.. .."9 Within a month, however, as
the protests quickly spread, the national office urged its branches to give their full support
helped draft Kenya's post-independence constitution. See Wilkins, Standing Fast, 275; Oliver White Hill,
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to the sit-in movement.10 As local branches organized and took part in demonstrations,
NAACP attorneys throughout the region began defending arrested protesters. Following
a conference with southern NAACP attorneys in March 1960, Thurgood Marshall
promised to vindicate the legal rights of student participants, by taking cases to the U.S.
Supreme Court if necessary. By then the Legal Defense Fund and cooperating attorneys
were representing more than 1,200 students.11
On the local level, many NAACP officials and civil rights protestors cooperated
from the very early days of the sit-in movement, believing that litigation could be
effectively supplemented with direct action and other techniques to achieve the goal all
shared—overcoming segregation. Even before the national office switched its position on
the sit-ins, NAACP members in Virginia supported and took part in protests. After the
national office gave its blessing, this involvement mushroomed.
Throughout Virginia, NAACP members and branches participated in sit-ins and
similar protests between I960 and 1963. As in North Carolina, however, the initial
protests were organized independently by high school and college students. On February
10, 1960, students at Hampton University launched the first sit-in in Virginia—reportedly
the first outside of North Carolina—at a local Woolworth's. From there, the protests
spread rapidly across the state. Famed civil rights leader Bob Moses later noted that his
introduction to the southern protest movement occurred during a visit to an uncle in
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Virginia, where he joined a demonstration in Newport News in 1960. That October, at
the Virginia State Conference's annual meeting, Virginia college students led a workshop
on sit-ins, featuring Frank Pinkston, a leader in the Richmond sit-in movement.12
In Virginia, the amount of NAACP involvement in protests varied from place to
place. In Norfolk, NAACP members helped plan demonstrations. In Richmond, Oliver
Hill and his wife picketed, and State Conference attorneys represented arrested Virginia
Union University students in court. In March, also in Richmond, the arrest of former
State Conference President J. M. Tinsley's wife made national news when photographers
captured an image of her being arrested for allegedly taking part in a sit-in: the image
depicted Mrs. Tinsley being dragged by two policemen, one with a police dog at his
side.13 That fall, Lester Banks and State Conference president Robert Robertson wrote:
"Since February 1960, some desegregation has been accomplished in Roanoke,
Lynchburg, Charlottesville, Danville, Petersburg, Richmond, Norfolk, Portsmouth,
Newport News, Hampton, Williamsburg, Prince William County, Fredericksburg,
Alexandria, Fairfax and Arlington Counties."14
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In the spring of 1960, the sit-ins also led to the creation of a new civil rights
organization, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). Organized by
student leaders and sit-in participants in April in North Carolina, SNCC represented a
youthful, protest-oriented wing of the civil rights movement. During the early 1960s the
organization played a major role in nonviolent protests and voter registration campaigns,
particularly in the Deep South.
Of SNCC, Roy Wilkins later wrote: "The resistance of local white merchants, the
emasculation of civil rights legislation in Congress, the tortuous pace of the courts, the
unfriendliness of the White House had all pushed a new generation to fall back on its own
resources and to step up the moral, political, and economic pressure for change."15
Despite Wilkins's profession of understanding, SNCC's relationship with the national
NAACP was volatile and difficult. After it endorsed the sit-ins, the NAACP—as did other
civil rights groups—attempted to align itself with the student leaders and, in effect,
oversee their efforts. At a February 1960 conference attended mainly by student leaders,
NAACP leaders jockeying for influence among the students raised the ire of competing
civil rights groups, most notably CORE.16 Though most of SNCC's founders respected
the NAACP and its achievements, they also found shortcomings in its operations. At
SNCC's founding conference, James Lawson criticized "middle-class conventional, halfway efforts" used to challenge segregation, a thinly-veiled critique of the NAACP. 17 Roy
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Wilkins was reportedly "shocked" by the criticism, which he blamed on Martin Luther
King and SCLC, who had called the conference.18 Over time, the relationship between
the national NAACP and SNCC worsened. Stokely Carmichael later complained: "there
was no give-and-take with Bro Wilkins. He clearly had no respect for the experience or
contributions of any of us, not just the SNCC. In his mind, whatever the movement had
accomplished—the legislation—was entirely because of the insider contacts and skillful
influence of the NAACP." 19
The NAACP's relationship with other civil rights organizations also became
increasingly strained in the early 1960s. In the spring of 1960, CORE reported that
"everywhere under the surface there were conflicts between the NAACP and other race
relations organizations."20 In 1961 Roy Wilkins called CORE'S major campaign—the
Freedom Rides—"a big mistake" and discouraged NAACP branches from helping the
riders, who were using nonviolent direct action to push for desegregation of
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transportation in the South.21 In the spring of 1962 Wilkins organized a meeting of the
leaders of the major civil rights organizations and used the opportunity to criticize
challenges to the NAACP's operations. That same year Wilkins complained that "SCLC,
CORE, and SNCC were all in full-fledged competition with the NAACP." 22
In Virginia, other civil rights organizations were increasingly active in the early
1960s. The outbreak of the sit-ins helped their cause; so did the state government's
attacks on the NAACP, as Virginia's anti-NAACP laws discouraged people from
associating with the organization.23 In February 1960, CORE—which had only 4 chapters
in Virginia in 1959—led workshops in Portsmouth related to the sit-ins.24 The following
year the Freedom Rides passed through Virginia, stopping in Fredericksburg, Richmond,
Petersburg, Farmville, Lynchburg, and Danville. CORE'S national director, James
Farmer, had spent time in many of these locations in 1960—while working for the
national office of the NAACP. Yet despite the fact that the rides grew out of a lawsuit
handled by the Virginia NAACP {Boynton v. Virginia, which voided segregation in bus
and train stations), the organization did little to help the riders.25
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SNCC also sought to gain a foothold in Virginia. The organization remained small
and decentralized throughout its first year, however, and did not hire its first full-time
field secretary until mid-1961. By 1962 the group had about 20 staff members, but the
vast majority—and later staffers as well—worked in Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama, and
Georgia.26 In Virginia, the organization was mainly supported by black college students.
In 1961 students arrested during sit-ins in Lynchburg held "jail ins," in which the arrested
students chose to stay in jail rather than accept bail, similar to those being organized by
SNCC in Rock Hill, South Carolina. The "Student Non-Violent Movement" of
Lynchburg also carried out protests in 1963 against a variety of segregated businesses.27
The same year in Farmville, SNCC workers helped organize marches and demonstrations
targeting segregated businesses and churches.28 Several years later, as part of SNCC's
Black Belt Project, volunteers from that group registered black voters in Southside
Virginia.29
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In the early 1960s, Martin Luther King's SCLC was the most active new civil rights
organization in Virginia. "Improvement associations," modeled on the Montgomery
(Alabama) Improvement Association that had run the 1955-1956 bus boycott in that city,
sprang up in several locations around Virginia in the late 1950s, and these were often
converted into SCLC chapters.30 A statewide organization—the Virginia Unit of the
SCLC—was created in Petersburg in 1960. Although the Virginia SCLC initially
concentrated on voter education and registration, over time the organization broadened its
scope both tactically and geographically. King traveled to Virginia repeatedly, and
between 1960 and 1963 SCLC and its surrogates launched direct action protests in
Hopewell, Petersburg, Danville, and Lynchburg, among other places. In late 1962, Virgil
Wood, chairman of the board of the Virginia SCLC, wrote to King: "Although we do not
seek to make gain from the ineptness of other State Civil Rights organizations, yet we do
have a unique and unparalleled opportunity and responsibility in Virginia at this time."31
In Virginia, however, the NAACP remained the largest and most active civil
rights organization throughout the early 1960s. As new civil rights groups developed, the
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State Conference cooperated with them when their interests were aligned, but the
Virginia NAACP also worked to prevent other organizations in the state from supplanting
the association. After the sit-ins began, for instance, the State Conference allowed its
youth members to organize protests with other organizations so long as the protests were
"planned and guided" with help from the NAACP. 32
To counteract the rise of new civil rights organizations and the growing
acceptance of direct action, the Virginia NAACP also became more militant over time.
In NAACP branches around Virginia, younger and more aggressive members took
leadership positions in the early 1960s. In New Kent County, for example, Calvin Green
reorganized the local branch and became its president in 1960, in part because he was
inspired by the sit-ins. Green went on to file a lawsuit demanding school desegregation
in New Kent that led to a notable U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1968.33
The national office and the State Conference also supported a more demanding
approach. State Conference executive secretary W. Lester Banks was arrested for
violating a segregation ordinance in Lynchburg in late 1961.34 In Lynchburg in 19611962 and Danville in 1963, the NAACP openly jockeyed with representatives of other

32

The same year in South Carolina, an NAACP field secretary warned CORE supporters, many of
whom were active in the NAACP, that dual membership was prohibited; Meier and Rudwick, CORE, 117.
See also Report of the Executive Secretary, May 21, 1960, Part III, Box CI 59, Virginia State Conference,
1960, NAACP Papers; Letter from Gloster Current to Lester Banks, March 3, 1960, Part III, Box C159,
Virginia State Conference, 1960, NAACP Papers; Policy Action Resolutions adopted by the 25th
Convention, Oct. 7-9, 1960, Part III, Box CI59, Virginia State Conference, 1960, NAACP Papers; Program
of Action by/for the Virginia State Conference Education Committee, One Day Planning Conference,
January 30, 1960, Part III, Box C159, Virginia State Conference, 1960, NAACP Papers; Letter from E. B.
Henderson to Gloster Current, April 23, 1962, Part III, Box C160, Virginia State Conference, 1962,
NAACP Papers; Confidential Memo from Virginia State Conference to Roy Wilkins, September 10, 1962,
Part III, Box CI60, Virginia State Conference, 1962, NAACP Papers.
33

For more on Green v. New Kent County, see Chapter 7 of this dissertation.
Letter from Robert Carter to W. Lester Banks, November 17, 1961, Letter from Lester Banks to
Robert Carter, October 26, 1961, and Statement Made By Lester Banks to the Interstate Commerce
Commission, October 25, 1961, all in NAACP Papers, Part V, Box 2582, Virginia State Conference, 19561982,1993, NAACP Papers; Buni, 214 [which incorrectly dates the arrest as 1962],
34

136

civil rights organizations for influence and publicity.35 In 1963, L. Francis Griffin—then
president of the Virginia State Conference—helped lead direct action protests in
Farmville; that summer, members of the local NAACP Youth Council, together with
SNCC activists, launched a series of sit-ins, marches, and other demonstrations aimed at
overcoming segregation and discriminatory employment practices in Prince Edward
County.36 Protests such as this allowed the NAACP to maintain its position of leadership
by helping to bring about the dismemberment of segregation in public facilities
throughout the commonwealth. They also ensured that the NAACP was not easily
eclipsed by younger organizations in Virginia.37
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Focusing on its strengths, the Virginia NAACP also accelerated its efforts to bring
about public school desegregation in the early 1960s. After the first instances of
desegregation in February 1959, the organization stepped up its efforts to bring about
additional school desegregation, even as its attorneys challenged the state's anti-NAACP
laws in state and federal courts. The result was extremely slow, but steady, growth in the
number of African-American students attending formerly all-white schools in Virginia in
the early 1960s—a situation which frustrated both the NAACP and Virginia's
segregationists.38
State government officials continued to impede the NAACP's school desegregation
efforts throughout the early 1960s. Having accepted token desegregation on a minimal
scale when ordered to do so by federal courts, the state now sought to maintain as much
segregation as possible in the public schools without resorting to complete defiance. The
new, "moderate" policies—adopted in the spring of 1959 and adjusted in subsequent years
—allowed small, or token, numbers of African-American students to gain admission into
formerly-white schools in Virginia after a rigorous application process.39
The new law allowing local school districts to make pupil assignments themselves
(rather than giving that power to the State Pupil Placement Board) went into effect in
March 1960, but few localities chose to take control of the process. Those that did were
generally more accepting of school desegregation than most Virginia communities. Most
applications for transfer, however, continued to be forwarded to the State Pupil
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Placement Board with the locality's recommendation and, as before, the state board
rejected most black applicants, citing aptitude test scores, geography, and academic
qualifications.40 Approved by federal courts in the early 1960s, this process assured that
only small numbers of black students—the most academically qualified and supposedly
the least disruptive—were admitted to white schools.41
Separate legislation passed by the General Assembly strengthened state support for
non-sectarian private schools. Although the state government did not explicitly support
the private school movement that had arisen to provide segregated education for white
children, public officials took important steps that aided its development. In 1960,
donations to private schools became tax-deductible, and the legislature allowed localities
to provide free transportation to private school students. Other legislation permitted the
sale of surplus school property to private school foundations.42
At the same time, the General Assembly updated its tuition grants system to
continue to allow white students who were assigned to integrated schools the opportunity
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to attend private segregated schools at no cost instead.43 In the early 1960s, legislators
removed any reference to desegregation from the state's tuition grant laws to make them
appear non-discriminatory to the courts. By the early 1960s tax-supported
"scholarships," as they were now called, were available to any student who wished to
attend a non-sectarian private school, whether attendance was related to desegregation or
not. As a result, tuition grants cost the state and localities (who shared part of the
financial burden) over one million dollars a year by 1960. Paid directly to parents in an
effort to shield the fact that they were the "financial life blood" of segregationist
academies, the tuition grants were of questionable legality, and by then, NAACP legal
efforts were underway to have them declared unconstitutional 44
Continued attacks on the NAACP also challenged the association's school
desegregation efforts. In February 1960, as the sit-ins began, so did disbarment
proceedings against NAACP attorney S. W. Tucker. Accused by a Fourth District
Committee of the Virginia State Bar of violating Virginia's code of legal ethics for the
improper solicitation of clients, Tucker faced the revocation of his law license before a
three-judge court in Emporia, Virginia.45 The national NAACP came to his defense,
sending Chicago-based attorney Bill Ming to represent Tucker in court. After two years
of legal wrangling, in early 1962 the Greensville County circuit court reprimanded
Tucker but dismissed the charges against him. Lester Banks commented, "The mountain
43
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labored and brought forth a mouse." Still, defending Tucker had cost the NAACP both
time and money at a time when both were in short supply—undoubtedly one of the
reasons behind the segregationists' attack.46
At the same time, State Conference attorneys continued to challenge the
constitutionality of Virginia's anti-NAACP laws in court. Though federal judges had
overturned several of the statutes in the late 1950s, a divided U. S. Supreme Court
decided in 1959 that Virginia's state courts should have been allowed to rule on the
ordinances first. The continuation of this litigation—initiated in 1956 against Virginia
Attorney General J. Lindsay Almond as NAACP v. Almond--forced the NAACP's
attorneys to return time and time again to state and federal courts in Virginia in the early
1960s. After the state courts refused to overturn the remaining anti-NAACP laws, the
NAACP again appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which held hearings in 1961 and
1962 47 Commenting of the length of the struggle, Oliver Hill later noted, "by the time
the litigation ended ... the case had carried the names of [Virginia] Attorneys General
[Albertis] Harrison, [Kenneth] Patty, [Frederick] Gray, and [Robert] Button."48 Finally
in January 1963, inNAACP v. Button, the U. S. Supreme Court held the last of Virginia's
anti-NAACP laws unconstitutional. The ruling, which the Boston Globe called a "major
46
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victory," was also instrumental in ratcheting up the association's campaign for school
desegregation in Virginia.49
As its campaign against Virginia's anti-NAACP laws wore on, the state NAACP
experienced turnover on its legal staff. In 1960 Spottswood Robinson left the State
Conference to become Dean of the Law School at Howard University and then a member
of the United States Commission on Civil Rights. In 1964 he became the first AfricanAmerican appointed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, and in 1966
the first black appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District. In the meantime,
in 1961, Oliver Hill took a job as Assistant to the Commissioner of the Federal Housing
Administration for Intergroup Relations in the Kennedy administration; he would not
return to Richmond full-time until 1966. After a brief period during which Martin A.
Martin chaired the State Conference legal staff, S. W. Tucker took over in late 1962. A
native Virginian who had been active in the state NAACP since his youth, Tucker was
well qualified—and supremely motivated—to press for equal rights for African-Americans
in Virginia.50
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President John F. Kennedy's election in 1960 had raised hope among AfricanAmericans, including Oliver Hill, but over time many blacks became disillusioned with
Kennedy's civil rights policies. Roy Wilkins noted that "When John F. Kennedy became
President... everyone expected him to come in and tear up the pea patch for civil rights."
Dependent on the votes of southern Democrats in Congress for passing federal legislation
and on the votes of southern white citizens should he run for re-election, however,
Kennedy was hesitant to press for racial equality. Oliver Hill lambasted the president for
taking two years to sign an executive order banning segregation in federally-funded
housing.51 Roy Wilkins, who worked closely with the president, concluded: "Through
all the years I knew and watched Kennedy, I did not for a moment doubt his moral fervor,
and his sympathy for black Americans was real enough as well, but getting him to turn
those emotions into tangible political action was a matter of an entirely different order."52
The pace of school desegregation remained slow during Kennedy's presidency,
though the administration did take some important steps. In February 1961 President
Kennedy denounced the use of school closures to avoid school desegregation, and that
spring Attorney General Robert Kennedy attempted to join the NAACP's school
desegregation litigation affecting Prince Edward County, Virginia, as a co-plaintiff, the
first time the government had done such a thing. Unfortunately for the NAACP, which
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welcomed the move, federal district court Judge Oren Lewis denied the request.53 That
fall the president appointed Thurgood Marshall to the federal bench, a bold move which
angered southern congressmen.54 The following year the Justice Department filed a
school desegregation lawsuit against Prince George County, Virginia, for operating
segregated schools that affected U.S. military personnel, part of a flurry of similar suits
filed mainly in the Deep South.55 Despite these steps, however, in the early 1960s the
percentage of black students in the South enrolled in formerly all-white schools was
growing only about one point a year, and Roy Wilkins later commented: "At that
deliberate speed, it would take until the year 2063 ... to accomplish desegregation."56
Southern federal judges, however, continued to play the most important official role
in the school desegregation process in the early 1960s. Although a slowly growing
number of school districts integrated voluntarily, desegregation in the former
Confederacy occurred primarily because of court decisions. This situation highlighted
the importance of the NAACP in the school desegregation process, as the association
represented the principal litigants; on the other hand, the NAACP could do little without
favorable court rulings. Oliver Hill later commented, "Reporters and others constantly
questioned us regarding when we thought schools would be desegregated. I consistently
53
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replied that desegregated schools would exist when we got judges who would order that
Negro children attend white schools."57
One challenge was that the lower federal courts continued to operate with little
guidance from the U. S. Supreme Court until 1963. During the early 1960s, the Supreme
Court refused to hear appeals of most lower court rulings related to school desegregation,
including cases that could have provided guidance to the lower federal courts more
generally. Many legal historians argue that the Supreme Court did so deliberately
because of the controversial nature of school desegregation. The lack of guidance,
however, allowed for varied interpretations of "with all deliberate speed" throughout the
region. While some southern federal judges expanded the amount of school
desegregation required in the early 1960s, other courts allowed the continuation of
complete segregation—as in the Deep South.58
Even without guidance from the U. S. Supreme Court, federal courts outside of the
Deep South generally demanded more effective desegregation measures over time.
Frustrated with continued southern intransigence, a growing number of federal judges
overturned state and local pupil placement decisions and allowed blacks to skip timeconsuming administrative procedures established by the states to slow desegregation.
Black plaintiffs were also allowed to file more class action suits, which allowed federal
judges to apply their rulings more broadly. By 1962, minority transfer provisions, which
allowed whites to transfer out of integrated schools, and which had been accepted by
most federal courts in the late 1950s, were often viewed unfavorably as well. The U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights reported at the time, "It is increasingly the demand of
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Federal courts that an accelerated time schedule be adopted in new desegregation
plans."59
During most of this time, as legal scholar Michael Klarman explains, the U.S.
Supreme Court "withdrew almost entirely from the school desegregation arena."60 The
early 1960s, however, witnessed the end of the high court's silence. In 1963, the same
year it overturned the last of Virginia's anti-NAACP laws, the high court publicly
expressed disappointment with the pace of school desegregation. In May of that year, in
Watson v. Memphis, Michael Klarman notes, the justices "warned that desegregation
plans that 'eight years ago might have been deemed sufficient' were no longer so." A
week later, in Goss v. Board of Education of Knoxville, the court invalidated a transfer
provision it had declined to review in 1959. Also in 1963, the court waived the
requirement that litigants exhaust all administrative remedies before suing in federal
court. The Supreme Court now encouraged southern federal judges to demand more
effective school desegregation plans to implement Brown v. Board of Education.61
The shifting judicial winds resulted in a noticeable increase in school desegregation
in various parts of the South. The number of southern school districts integrating schools
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for the first time grew from 14 in the fall of 1960, to 31 in 1961, 46 in 1962, and 166 in
1963.62 The latter year is notable because the number of desegregating districts was more
than three times the number in the previous fall. South Carolina and Alabama also joined
the list of newly desegregated states in 1963. Only Mississippi—the "last holdout" in the
words of historian Charles Bolton—had yet to integrate a single school.63
For its part, the Virginia State Conference of the NAACP continued to press for
more, and more rapid, school desegregation. In 1960 the organization sought to create
Education Committees in each of its local branches, in part to "encourage, stimulate,
prepare and guide the applications of more students [to formerly all-white schools]
throughout the state." A statewide Education Committee composed of State Conference
leaders oversaw the effort, in conjunction with national office staff including James
Farmer, later the national director of CORE.64 At its 25th annual meeting in the fall of
1960, the State Conference resolved that "a strong and consistent program to increase
applications [by parents of black pupils] to non-integrated schools and those already
integrated is the number one problem of the Conference and the Virginia community."
The goal was to increase both the number of desegregated localities and the amount of
desegregation in areas where the process had begun.65
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When African-American students applied for such transfers and were rejected, the
State Conference often filed a school desegregation lawsuit. As a result, the State
Conference's legal program picked up considerably in the early and mid-1960s,
particularly after NAACP attorney S.W. Tucker was cleared of charges related to the
improper solicitation of clients in 1962. That year alone, school desegregation lawsuits
were filed against York, Powhatan, King George, Frederick, Chesterfield, and
Shenandoah Counties and against the cities of Hopewell and Fredericksburg.66
During this period, the NAACP's lawsuits sought the admittance of AfricanAmerican students into formerly-white schools and also the elimination of schemes
designed to minimize school desegregation. The latter included local school board
policies governing assignment of pupils as well as the General Assembly's support for
private schools and pupil placement policies overseen by the State Pupil Placement
Board. Broadly speaking, the NAACP sought the right for black students to enroll in
white schools should they desire to do so. Thus, while a growing number of white
Virginians hesitantly supported grade-a-year desegregation plans, which started
integration with one grade and integrated one additional, succeeding grade per year, the
association called for plans that allowed students of all ages to choose the school of their
choice. When blacks in Lynchburg demanded such a "freedom of choice" plan in early
1962, one leader noted that "the Negroes in Lynchburg would have accepted the grade-a-
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year plan in 1954 but now 'cannot conceive anything but... complete and immediate
integration.'" 67
The national office of the NAACP continued to aid the Virginia State Conference in
its effort to speed up the rate of school desegregation. National representatives attended
the Virginia State Conference's annual gathering each year, and the state NAACP's legal
staff had easy access to the national office legal staff and attorneys for the Legal Defense
Fund. In early 1960, after attending the national NAACP's annual meeting in New York,
Lester Banks reported that "activities in all phases of the Association's program placed
Virginia far ahead of her sister southern states and significantly, Virginia's production
and program placed high among the rest of the Association's units."68 National school
desegregation specialists also regularly visited Virginia; Special Education Assistant June
Shagaloff, a social worker on the staff of the Legal Defense Fund, took part in planning
sessions in Virginia in 1962 and 1963.69 Determined to bring about the implementation
of Brown v. Board of Education throughout the South, the national NAACP resolved in
1962: "With a sense of immediate urgency, the Association pledges itself to rededicate
every effort toward meaningful desegregation by vigorously challenging the 'token' and
less than token admission of a few Negro pupils to formerly all-white schools, grade-a-
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year and pupil assignment plans, and all other delaying plans so clearly intended to evade
the May 17th decision."70
Over time the NAACP's efforts paid off. In the early 1960s, the State Pupil
Placement Board, a longtime opponent of desegregation, approved growing numbers of
black student transfer requests. The U.S. Civil Rights Commission reported that the
agency approved 137 applications for the fall of 1961 (even as it rejected 266).71 By
1962 the board—which previously had avoided desegregation in most localities—had
begun forcing school districts in Virginia to admit African-American students into their
formerly-white schools. In the summer of 1963, during school desegregation
proceedings before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the head of
the PPB announced that the board would no longer consider academic qualifications in
making school assignments.72 Though the number of black student transfers remained
small, it grew over time, as did the number of school districts ordered to desegregate by
the agency.73
The federal courts in Virginia also gradually demanded more school desegregation;
though the pace of change remained maddeningly slow in the eyes of the NAACP. In
1961, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied additional black
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students the right to transfer into Charlottesville's formerly-white schools but warned that
the city's desegregation plan violated the rights of blacks and that the situation "cannot
indefinitely continue."74 When four black students applied to white schools in
Lynchburg in 1961, the PPB rejected their applications because the students lived closer
to black schools. As federal district judge Thomas Michie pointed out, however,
numerous whites in Lynchburg lived closer to black schools, but did not attend them.
Two of the black students were admitted, and the following year Michie approved a
grade-a-year desegregation plan for the city.75 Following the U.S. Supreme Court's 1963
school desegregation decisions, moreover, S. W. Tucker pressed the lower federal courts
to take heed of the high court's rulings, declaring that "the time of shadow boxing,
technicalities and the labyrinth of administrative procedures has passed." Judges
complied, overturning grade-a-year plans and minority transfer provisions in
Charlottesville and Lynchburg.76
As a result of the NAACP's litigation, federal court decisions, and the state PPB's
actions, school desegregation increased in Virginia during the early 1960s. Initial school
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desegregation in February 1959 had involved 21 students in two localities. By the fall of
1960, 208 black students attended school with whites in 11 districts around the state,
including Richmond. The number of desegregated districts increased to 20 in the fall of
1961, and 29 in the fall of 1962, when approximately 1,100 of Virginia's 225,000 black
school children attended school with whites. By the fall of 1963, 55 of Virginia's 130
school districts had admitted African-American students to at least one formerly all-white
school. Still, only approximately 3,700 black pupils or 1.6 percent of the state's black
schoolchildren attended school with whites. Though the pace of change exasperated the
state NAACP and its supporters, given the South's long history of discrimination and
segregation the expansion of school desegregation in Virginia represented a major
accomplishment.77
Virginia's demographics strongly influenced the school desegregation process.
Clearly the process was neither easy nor uniformly smooth, and most whites in the state
opposed school integration. Yet in northern Virginia, white community acceptance of
black students came less grudgingly, and political opposition to desegregation was less
widespread. There, perhaps because of the small number of African-American students
77
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or its proximity to Washington, D.C., whites were more likely to comply with Brown
than to resist. As desegregation increased there, earlier than elsewhere in the state,
overall numbers of children attending public schools in the northern counties and cities
remained essentially the same; no movement for segregated private schools developed.78
The same was generally true of Southwest Virginia, which—like northern Virginiacontained few African-American students. In Floyd County, the first locality in
Southwest Virginia to desegregate its schools (under court order in 1960), the process
was carried out "with extraordinary ease." The county school board and superintendent
carefully planned for the adjustment, even training and preparing the county's white
pupils for desegregation, and the process was "quiet" and "orderly." Speaking of the
white population of Southwest Virginia more broadly, the Roanoke World-News
concluded that white people there would accept desegregation "with the same calm and
good sense shown by the Floyd County people yesterday."79
Desegregating schools in Southside and Tidewater Virginia was a more challenging
endeavor. Because blacks represented a larger proportion of the population in these two
regions (a majority in a handful of counties), opposition to desegregation among whites
was more common and vehement. The decision of the Prince Edward County board of
supervisors, in Southside, to close the county's public schools rather than integrate under
court order in 1959 serves as one example of the depth of feeling (albeit not one
replicated anywhere else); Prince Edward's schools would remain closed for five years,
78
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and other localities in Southside considered similar action in the early 1960s. Partly as a
result, the NAACP filed fewer school desegregation lawsuits in Southside than in other
areas of the state. The NAACP also hesitated to focus too much attention on Southside
because it had been regularly disappointed by court rulings handed down by the federal
district judge overseeing the Prince Edward County litigation, and because of the
challenges involved in recruiting black plaintiffs in that part of the state.80 Those few
NAACP actions initiated in Southside Virginia fared poorly in the courts, and the same
held true for the rural areas of Tidewater. In the end, Southside Virginia—like the Deep
South—avoided school integration in the early 1960s. Initial desegregation in this area—
which Lester Banks described as "Virginia's most reactionary section"—would not come
until the middle of the decade.81
Central Virginia, fittingly, occupied the middle ground between the grudging
acceptance of school desegregation in northern and western Virginia and the near-total
opposition in Southside and the Black Belt. Most whites in central Virginia opposed
desegregation and resisted it, but at the same time they recognized the limits of
resistance. By the early 1960s it was obvious that desegregation would eventually be
ordered by the federal courts, and the debate focused on the extent of desegregation
required and the long-term viability of private academies. Most whites in central
Virginia preferred token desegregation over having to send their children to private
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schools, and in the early 1960s, desegregation occurred in many localities in this region,
including Lynchburg, Fredericksburg and King George County.82
Regardless of the location, school desegregation in the early 1960s affected those
black students who changed schools more than it did white students in Virginia. After
all, white students were not transferred to black schools during the early years of school
desegregation in Virginia. It was not until 1963 that the Virginia Pupil Placement Board-under judicial pressure—assigned white children to formerly-black schools for the first
time; even then the white students refused to go.83 As a result, the first black integratorsblack students admitted to formerly-white schools—attended school without access to
most of their friends, to numerous sympathetic teachers, or to symbols of pride important
to the black community.84 Many of these black students regularly faced harassment,
sometimes by teachers and administrators.85 School desegregation entailed other costs
for black students in Virginia. In 1962, when the first black students attended Stafford
County High School, they were asked to voluntarily forgo participating in sports or social
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activities. The black students refused, so the school board held the junior-senior prom
off-campus and suspended the senior class trip to New York.86
In the meantime, as the campaign for school desegregation progressed, the broader
civil rights movement picked up momentum. In 1963 black frustration with the pace of
change spilled into the streets of the South as never before. The largest protests the
nation had yet seen erupted in Birmingham, Alabama, and then in cities throughout the
region before culminating in the March on Washington in August.
In early 1963, SCLC-organized protests and mass arrests in Birmingham attracted
national media attention. Images and film footage of nonviolent protestors being
attacked by police with dogs and by firefighters with high-powered water hoses forced
President Kennedy to respond. The president sent Attorney General Robert Kennedy to
help negotiate an end to the protests, and then spoke on television in support of federal
civil rights legislation in June 1963.87 Even Roy Wilkins, never a great admirer of Martin
Luther King, was among those who lauded the success of Birmingham, later writing, "Of
all Reverend King's demonstrations and exercises in moral witness, Birmingham
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probably worked best on Kennedy. What the country saw in Birmingham was a moral
outrage that could not be condoned."88
The most visible result of Birmingham was the outbreak of major nonviolent directaction campaigns throughout the South in the spring and summer of 1963. AfricanAmerican protestors took to the streets in their largest numbers yet, demanding the
desegregation of all public businesses and public spaces, fair hiring practices, equal
access to healthcare, and legal equality in general. Michael Klarman notes that, "In the
months after Birmingham, spin-off demonstrations occurred in hundreds of southern
cities and towns; more than 100,000 people participated, and nearly 15,000 were
arrested."89 By the 100th anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation, the goal among
activists was expressed in a common protest phrase—"Freedom Now."
In Virginia, protests broke out in many communities in 1963. Historian Paul
Gaston described the beating he suffered during demonstrations in Charlottesville, and
protests also took place in Richmond, Farmville, Lynchburg, and other locations across
the state.90 The largest campaign in Virginia took place in Danville. In early June, in a
scene eerily reminiscent of Birmingham, police and newly-inducted deputies attacked
demonstrators with water hoses and billy clubs.91 As national representatives from
SCLC, SNCC, CORE, and the NAACP converged on the city, Martin Luther King said,
"I have seen some brutal things on the part of policemen all across the South in our
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struggle, but very seldom, if ever, have I heard of a police force being as brutal and
vicious as the police force here in Danville, Virginia."92
The NAACP embraced the expanded goals and techniques of the 1963 campaigns.
At its 1963 annual convention, held in Chicago, the organization adopted a Direct Action
Resolution ordering branches to initiate "picketing, sit-ins, mass action protests,
selective-buying campaigns, and all appropriate constitutional means of attacking
discrimination and segregation in public accommodations, housing, education,
employment and political action." To encourage its less militant branches, the resolution
stated: "In cases where such direct action in support of our resolutions are resisted, or
hindered by any NAACP unit, immediate corrective action shall be requested of the
Committee on Branches of the National Board of Directors." Executive secretary Roy
Wilkins was arrested for picketing with Medgar Evers, head of the Mississippi NAACP,
in Jackson in May, and at the annual convention Wilkins encouraged the NAACP to
"accelerate, accelerate, accelerate" its attack.93 In late June the Virginia State Conference
of the NAACP adopted a new Direct Action Program and then organized a statewide
"program of application." In early August, executive secretary Lester Banks was again

92

University of Virginia, Virginia Center for Digital History, Index
of/CivilRightstv/wdbj/transcripts, at www.vcdh.virginia.edu/civilrightstv/wdbj/transcripts/WDBJ02_25trans.html. See also "Danville Braces for New Clash," Daily Progress, June 12, 1963; "Gov. Harrison
Urges Danville Negroes Be Peaceful, Lawful," Daily Progress, June 12, 1963; "Danville Mayor's Action
Unlikely to End Trouble," Daily Progress, June 13, 1963; "Negroes Vow New Action in Danville," Daily
Progress, June 21, 1963; Letter from Lester Banks to Dr. John A. Morsell, November 7, 1963, Part III, Box
CI60, Virginia State Conference, 1963, NAACP Papers; Letter from Lester Banks to Dr. John A. Morsell,
December 5, 1963, Part III, Box C160, Virginia State Conference, 1963, NAACP Papers; National SCLC
Newsletter, November 5, 1963, Records of SCLC, 1954-1970, John H. Bracey, Jr. And August Meier,
editorial advisors (Bethesda MD: University Publications of America); Field Reports, Virginia, January 30,
1964, reel 17, frame 28, SNCC Papers (1959-1972); Lewis, King, 211-214.
93

Quotation is from Sitkoff, 135-136. See also "Wilkins Arrested in Jackson, 3 of Negroes'
Demands Met," RTD, June 2, 1963. Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 282-283, covers Wilkins's move
toward more militant action. Evers's death in early June 1963 greatly saddened Wilkins. The resolution is
discussed in Letter from Lester Banks to "Dear NAACP Officers," July 18, 1963, Part III, Box C160,
Virginia State Conference, 1963, NAACP Papers.

158

arrested, this time for attempting to eat at a white restaurant near Halifax, Virginia.
NAACP members participated in protests in Danville, Farmville, and other locations
around the state.94
The largest demonstration of the era took place on August 28, 1963, in Washington,
DC. Two hundred fifty thousand people took part, seeking equal job opportunities and
federal legislation protecting civil rights. All the major civil rights organizations
participated, including the NAACP. On the surface they cooperated, but beneath the
fa9ade were growing rivalries and disagreements—Roy Wilkins agreed to participate only
after the others promised to avoid arrests, and John Lewis of SNCC was prevailed upon
to temper his remarks to please other participants in the March. In the end, other
speakers at the March were overshadowed by Martin Luther King, who delivered his
famous "I Have a Dream" speech.95 The event marked one of the last times the leading
civil rights organizations would cooperate.96
Ironically, white public opinion was growing more supportive of equal rights even
as the civil rights organizations drew apart. After Birmingham, national polls showed a
clear shift in favor of civil rights legislation. President Kennedy, a latecomer to the civil
rights crusade, broached the idea of federal legislation in a nationally televised address in
94
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June. Before the nation could learn whether the changes of 1963 would lead to
congressional action, however, President Kennedy was shot and killed in Dallas, Texas,
on November 22.97
That same month, Martin Luther King Jr. returned to Danville, Virginia. That
summer's large anti-segregation demonstrations had subsided and a tense calm had
returned. Much of the city remained segregated, including the business district
downtown, a sign of the limitations of nonviolent direct action. Tucked away quietly in
the city's predominantly white schools, however, were eleven African-American
students, who had been admitted that fall by the State Pupil Placement Board after
requesting a transfer into the white schools. Their enrollment in the city's first
desegregated schools in the midst of an extremely tense and otherwise largely segregated
city highlighted both the accomplishments of, and the challenges facing, the state
NAACP. Luckily for the association, its campaign to implement Brown v. Board of
Education in Virginia was about to get significantly easier.98
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Chapter 6,1964-1967
A New 'Holy Prerogative': Freedom of Choice and School Desegregation in Virginia in
the Mid-1960s

The implementation of Brown v. Board of Education in the South picked up
noticeably during the mid-1960s. Continued litigation pursued by the NAACP and
growing pressure from the federal government accelerated school desegregation, as did
direct action protests and demonstrations. In 1964 Mississippi became the last southern
state to begin desegregation of its schools, and by the fall of 1966, 16.9 percent of
southern black students attended desegregated schools, up from one percent in 1964. On
the other hand, even as late as 1967 desegregation had yet to begin in many southern
school districts, particularly in the Deep South, and the amount of desegregation within
localities where it had begun remained small.1
As noted previously, the executive branch of the federal government played an
increasingly important role in civil rights issues in the 1960s, but Lyndon Baines
Johnson's background did not suggest a powerful commitment to civil rights. Born and
raised in the South, Johnson began representing Texas in Congress in the 1930s. After
moving from the House of Representatives to the Senate in 1949, Johnson eyed the
presidency. In the 1950s, he marshaled the votes to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1957,
which, however, applied only minimal pressure on the white South. When John F.
Kennedy defeated Johnson for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1960 and asked
1
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the well-connected Texan to join the ticket as the vice presidential nominee, Roy Wilkins
of the NAACP noted "nearly everyone's dismay."2
As president, however, Johnson defied those expectations. Building on President
Kennedy's ideas and growing white support for civil rights nationwide, Johnson pressed
Congress to enact major civil rights legislation, including the historic Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The former, passed after a nearly two-month
filibuster by southern congressmen, banned discrimination in public accommodations and
employment. It had an immediate impact throughout the nation. The following year the
Voting Rights Act established federal oversight of elections in much of the South and
prohibited the use of procedures that had the effect of disqualifying voters based on race
or color.3 President Johnson's judicial appointments—including Spottswood Robinson
and Thurgood Marshall of the NAACP—also demonstrated a commitment to diversity
and long-term change greater than that of any previous president. In the end, Roy
Wilkins concluded, "Johnson became the greatest civil rights president in our lifetime."4
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 also targeted school segregation. Title IV
authorized the U. S. attorney general to file lawsuits seeking desegregation, and Title IX
authorized him to intervene in lawsuits brought by private parties if he felt that doing so
was in the public interest. By the spring of 1967 the Justice Department was involved in
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over one hundred such cases.5 More important, Title VI prohibited discrimination by
entities receiving federal funding, including school districts—systems that continued to
discriminate could lose that money. Moreover, in April 1965 Congress passed the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which increased the amount of federal support
available to southern schools. In some cases federal aid at that point made up more than
thirty percent of local school funding, and the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights reported,
"Federal financial assistance under such programs now is so significant a portion of
school budgets that it cannot be disregarded."6
To enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, the U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW) issued compliance guidelines that explained what
southern school districts needed to do to avoid loss of federal funding. The first version
of the guidelines was released in April 1965 by HEW's Office of Education. In
conjunction with the guidelines, HEW required all U.S. school districts to submit
compliance documents by July. For districts that had already begun to desegregate,
HEW simply required the submission of a compliance assurance form. For those that had
not, HEW required a locally-developed desegregation plan meeting certain criteria, or
documentation that the district was in compliance with federal court orders.7
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For districts submitting their own desegregation plan as a means of compliance,
HEW's guidelines laid out the minimal requirements. To ensure the assignment of
children on a non-discriminatory basis, HEW encouraged districts to choose one of three
pupil assignment systems: geographically-based attendance areas, a choice of school
"freely exercised by the pupil and his parents or guardians," or some combination of the
two. Non-discriminatory admission was required for at least four grades by the fall of
1965, and for all grades by the fall of 1967. HEW also directed localities to begin
assigning teachers and administrators without regard to race, and to take steps to
eliminate existing teacher segregation.8
For white authorities in the South, freedom of choice plans provided the easiest
and most desirable means to comply with HEW, and these plans were adopted by many
school districts. Essentially, freedom of choice allowed districts to assign students to
segregated schools unless black parents chose to enroll their children in white schools.
This perpetuated segregation because many black families, faced with intimidation or
hesitant to subject their children to potentially hostile conditions in white schools, simply
left their children in segregated schools. Thus, of the methods considered acceptable by
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HEW in the mid-1960s, white southerners accepted freedom of choice as the lesser of
two evils. By the beginning of the 1965-1966 school year, 92 percent of school districts
from the southern and border states had submitted compliance paperwork to HEW, and
most had adopted some form of freedom of choice plan.9
Despite HEW's relatively modest requirements, some southern districts refused to
comply. The vast majority of noncompliant districts were small and rural, with large
percentages of African Americans. As of August 1965, about four hundred districts—
almost all in the Deep South—had failed to submit paperwork or had indicated they would
not comply with HEW's guidelines. That fall the department began proceedings against
54 noncompliant southern school districts. By August 1967 HEW had issued citations to
more than three hundred school boards, and more than fifty districts in the South had
been deemed ineligible for federal aid because of segregation-related policies.10
Still, HEW's efforts to accelerate southern school desegregation proved more
successful than the rulings of federal courts during the mid-1960s. Although federal
judges in the South overturned discriminatory placement plans more regularly than
before, bringing about change through legal action could still be a slow process. HEW,
on the other hand, revised its desegregation guidelines in 1966 and now strongly
encouraged school districts to implement plans that demonstrably eliminated dual school
systems. The agency also suggested numerical target figures for compliance for the first
9
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time, suggesting that districts meet specific desegregation goals based on the amount of
school desegregation they experienced in the 1965-1966 school year.11 Though freedom
of choice plans were still accepted as a means of compliance in 1966, HEW stated that
"the single most substantial indication as to whether a free-choice plan is actually
working to eliminate the dual school structure is the extent to which Negro or other
minority groups have in fact transferred from segregated schools." When that was not
the case, and school authorities were considered to have impeded desegregation, the
department could begin the process of withholding federal funds. 12 Thus, for most of the
mid-1960s, HEW effectively oversaw the southern school desegregation process, as
federal judges deferred to its efforts to implement Brown v. Board of Education. As the
Richmond News Leader noted, "Federal courts, for 10 years the battleground over the
desegregation question, slowly are stepping aside and letting the U.S. Office of Education
set the pace."13 Largely as a result of HEW's implementation requirements, when the
1965-1966 school year began, 7.5 percent of southern black students attended school with
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whites—the largest year-over-year percentage increase since Brown v. Board of
Education,14
By the late 1960s, concern over the effectiveness and constitutionality of freedom
of choice would grow substantially, among federal judges and within HEW itself. In
1967, for instance, Judge John Minor Wisdom of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit wrote that "boards and officials administering public schools have the
affirmative duty under the Fourteenth Amendment to bring about an integrated, unitary
school system in which there are no Negro schools and no white schools—just schools."15
The Supreme Court itself was also increasingly forceful in its calls for school
desegregation in the mid-1960s. In Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward
County (1964) the Court declared, "There has been entirely too much deliberation and not
enough speed in enforcing the constitutional rights which we held in Brown v. Board of
Education.. .,"16 In the late 1960s, frustrated with the pace of change and concerned
about the legality of freedom of choice, the federal judiciary would re-take the lead in
determining federal school desegregation policy from HEW.
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In the meantime, school districts throughout Virginia, fearful of losing federal
funding, notified HEW of their plans to comply with the agency's desegregation
guidelines in 1965. Because federal funds were paid initially to the states, and then
distributed to localities, Virginia public education officials now also encouraged
compliance. Motivated to secure over sixty million dollars in federal aid for Virginia's
education system for the 1966 fiscal year, the Virginia Department of Education
publicized HEW's guidelines, facilitated meetings between local and federal officials,
and submitted paperwork from localities to HEW. By April 1965, only five of the 130
school districts in Virginia that had students of both races had failed to submit assurance
forms, court documentation showing that they were already complying with an existing
order, desegregation plans, or some combination thereof to HEW.17
The state Pupil Placement Board also adjusted its policies to meet federal
desegregation requirements in the mid-1960s. Under pressure from both HEW and
federal courts, the state PPB began to approve most student transfer requests, increasing
the number of black students in formerly white schools throughout Virginia and in some
cases, such as when local desegregation plans were based on geographic attendance
zones, ordering white students to attend formerly black schools. In late 1964, the United
States Commission on Civil Rights reported, "The [Virginia] State PPB ... now virtually
is a funnel for the admission of Negroes."18 Some school districts now attempted to
maintain segregation by withdrawing from the PPB's oversight and establishing their
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own assignment policies, which the General Assembly had approved in 1959, but most
localities knew that would not prevent desegregation for long. As a result, most school
districts in Virginia remained under the jurisdiction of the State PPB and grudgingly
complied with HEW's new school desegregation requirements.19
As in much of the rest of the South, freedom-of-choice plans had their heyday in
Virginia in the mid-1960s. In May of 1965, the Williamsburg-James City County school
board adopted a freedom of choice plan and promised "the elimination of race" in the
selection and assignment of teachers and staff and the "termination of segregated buses."
Later that month, Nottoway County became the first in Southside Virginia to implement a
freedom of choice plan. Freedom of choice also came to Henrico and Hanover, near
Richmond, before the beginning of the fall 1965 term, and to many other localities
throughout the state. Although local officials resented HEW's requirements and the
intrusion of the federal government, the relatively modest impact of freedom of choice on
local school attendance patterns provided some consolation to them.20
As a result both of HEW's guidelines and of continued NAACP litigation, the
pace of school desegregation increased in Virginia in the mid-1960s. In the fall of 1964,
fewer than four thousand of the approximately 230,000 black students in Virginia, or
about 1.6%, went to desegregated schools in the Commonwealth.21 By the fall of 1965,
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more than twenty-six thousand black students attended schools with whites in Virginia.
This amounted to over 14 percent of the state's black students, far more than the southern
average of 7.5 percent. By the fall of 1966, the percentage of black students attending
desegregated schools in Virginia had risen to nearly 25 percent, again higher than the
regional average of 17 percent. In the summer of 1967, the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights reported, "The Southern States with the largest percentage of Negro pupils going
to school with whites are Texas, Tennessee, and Virginia."22
That is not at all to suggest that school desegregation came easily to Virginia. As
mentioned above, most districts only complied with HEW's requirements under duress.
Several localities, in fact, initially resisted HEW's mandates. Amelia County, between
Prince Edward County and Richmond, was the last to submit compliance paperwork in
1965. County officials had initially insisted segregated schools were more important than
federal assistance. However, after black residents of the county filed a school
desegregation lawsuit that spring with help from the NAACP, local leaders realized that
ignoring HEW would not preserve segregation in the schools. In June 1965, the county
announced the adoption of a freedom of choice plan and submitted compliance
paperwork to HEW.23
Other Virginia locales also resisted the demands of HEW. Counties in Southside
Virginia were generally the last in the state to desegregate in 1965, and freedom of choice
see James T. Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education: A Civil Rights Milestone and Its Troubled Legacy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 5; Kluger, 758.
22
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plans there led to only minimal desegregation into the late 1960s. Mecklenburg County
adopted a freedom of choice plan in 1965, but local black children who transferred into
white schools reported regular harassment and intimidation on the school buses. Then, in
early 1967, a local black man reported that someone had fired a gun at his home after his
two grandchildren transferred to a white school. In the spring of 1967, HEW cited a
number of Southside school districts, including Mecklenburg, for "poor performance"—
only 1.14 percent of Mecklenburg County's black students attended desegregated schools
at the time. At the end of that school year, twelve Virginia school districts had yet to
comply fully with HEW's directives, and in 1966-1967 HEW began enforcement
proceedings against ten Virginia school boards for violations of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act.24
The Virginia State Conference of the NAACP also loudly criticized the rate of
school desegregation in the Commonwealth. In May 1965, State Conference executive
secretary W. Lester Banks announced an acceleration of the NAACP's efforts "to bring
about complete desegregation of public schools" in Virginia. While State Conference
attorneys undertook legal action, Banks urged NAACP members and supporters
throughout Virginia to press for school desegregation, asking branch officers to "step up
your efforts" and urging parents to "overcome indifference, fear and complacency...." In
areas where school officials had adopted freedom of choice plans, Banks encouraged
parents to enroll their children in white schools at all grade levels—even if authorities had
established limits on what grades were eligible (HEW initially only required that freedom
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of choice be applied to four grades). In areas where authorities were using geographic
zoning plans, Banks urged parents to enroll their children in the schools nearest their
homes. Pleading for action, Banks concluded, "Let us rescue as many of our Negro
children as we can while we await the Court's determination that 'Freedom of Choice' is
not enough and that the school board must totally desegregate the school system."
Judging by the growing number of African-American students who applied for
admittance into formerly-white schools in Virginia in the mid-1960s, the State
Conference executive secretary's entreaties were successful.25
While Banks encouraged black parents to press for school desegregation, the State
Conference increased its legal efforts. With Oliver Hill and Spottswood Robinson both
working in Washington, D.C. (Hill for the Kennedy administration and Robinson as a
federal judge), the legal effort fell largely on the shoulders of S.W. Tucker and his young
protege, Henry L. Marsh III. Marsh, a native of Isle of Wight County, alumnus of
Virginia Union University, and recent graduate of Howard Law School, had joined
Tucker and Hill's law firm in the spring of 1961. He would spend much of the next two
decades handling civil rights cases throughout the state, even as he entered into Virginia
politics. In the mid-1960s, with help from NAACP attorneys throughout Virginia,
Tucker and Marsh worked tirelessly to eliminate the remaining vestiges of massive
resistance and to expand school desegregation in the Commonwealth.26

25

See Urgent Memorandum from W. Lester Banks and S.W. Tucker to All Virginia NAACP
Branch Officers, May 21, 1965, Part V, Box 2836, General Office File, Schools, Education, Virginia,
NAACP Papers; "NAACP Official Urges More Desegregation," RTD, May 16, 1965.
26
At this writing, Marsh, who in 1977 became Richmond's first black mayor, is serving as a
senior member of the Virginia State Senate; "25 Years After Brown: Tucker Recalls Battle Over
Integration," RTD, May 13, 1979; Oliver White Hill, The Big Bang: Brown v. Board of Education and
Beyond (Winter Park, FL: Four-G Publishers, Inc., 2000), 183.

172

The state NAACP won a key victory against Prince Edward County, Virginia, in
1964. County officials, ordered by federal courts to begin school desegregation in 1959,
had closed the county's public schools rather than desegregate. Shortly thereafter, local
whites created a private white segregated academy, and white students enrolled in
droves—paying tuition, at times, with taxpayer money provided by the state. In response,
state NAACP lawyers sued to reopen the public schools and to prevent the use of public
monies for the operation of private, segregated schools. The litigation dragged on for
years, alternating between state and federal courts, before the U.S. Supreme Court
conclusively ruled against county officials in May 1964. In Griffin v. County School
Board of Prince Edward County, the justices held that the board of supervisors had
violated the Fourteenth Amendment by denying funding to, and thus closing, the schools.
County officials were forced to reopen the public schools in the fall of 1964, but
integration proved elusive—most local white children continued to attend the Prince
Edward Academy, at their own expense.27
The NAACP had opposed the use of taxpayer money to help preserve segregated
education in Virginia since the tuition grant program had been created in 1959.
Virginia's program allowed the state to provide financial support to parents with children
enrolled in private schools that were created, in many cases, to educate white students
who had left the public school system because of desegregation; the NAACP contended
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that public support for private schools for white children was unconstitutional.28 The
system also required that localities supplement the state funding when the grant amount
was less than the per pupil cost of operations in the locality. In the early 1960s,
moreover, state legislators amended the tuition grants program to allow localities to
spend funds for the private schooling of children. In order words, the state's tuition
grants program involved not only the state government, but also localities around
Virginia. In 1964, State Conference attorneys launched a broad attack on the practice by
filing a lawsuit against the Virginia Board of Education (which administered the
program), the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and a number of local school boards
that were engaging in the practice. The "omnibus tuition grants case," as the suit was
known, marked the beginning of another long legal battle. In 1965 a federal district court
panel approved the tuition grants, so long as they did not make up the main source of
income of a segregated school, and the state continued to distribute money to families
with children enrolled in private schools. NAACP attorneys, led by S.W. Tucker,
continued with suits against individual school districts—to prevent them from utilizing
tuition grants to avoid desegregation—and pursued an appeal on tuition grants in
general.29
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State Conference attorneys also focused on faculty and staff desegregation in the
mid-1960s. HEW supported this effort, requiring that southern school boards eliminate
racial considerations in their assignment of teachers and staff. As a result, some districts,
such as Williamsburg-James City County in Virginia in 1965, adopted freedom of choice
plans that included school workers. In many other localities, however, concerns about
black staff members overseeing white students prevailed, and the NAACP was forced to
turn to the courts. In their lawsuits and in court hearings in the mid-1960s, NAACP
lawyers asked that teachers and administrative staff be desegregated along with the
student bodies. As a result of the NAACP's efforts, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in
favor of faculty and staff desegregation in Bradley v. Richmond School Board in 1965.
As J. Harvie Wilkinson explains, "District courts, the Court held, must not approve
desegregation plans without addressing claims of racial bias in faculty assignments."30
In many cases the issue of faculty and staff desegregation was linked to the
consolidation of schools. Facing mandatory desegregation in the mid-1960s, a number of
southern school districts began to consolidate their dual school systems into unitary biracial systems. Especially in localities with small numbers of black students, this was
generally accomplished by closing the formerly black schools and transferring the black
students into previously white schools. Faced with the loss of community landmarks,
African Americans often protested such closures, but generally without success. In fact,
the policy was supported by HEW, and the closure of historically black schools was a
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trial that numerous black communities in the South were forced to deal with during
desegregation.31
The closure of black schools, and southern school desegregation in general, also
displaced African American teachers. Rather than retain (or hire) black teachers to
instruct white students, southern white school boards preferred to employ white teachers.
When Giles County, in Southwest Virginia, consolidated its schools in 1964, the change
resulted in the dismissal of seven black school teachers. When the schools were
integrated in Wise County, also in Southwest Virginia, about ten black teachers were
assigned to white schools, but as teachers' aides. In both cases the NAACP, with the
help of the Virginia Teachers Association (the African-American counterpart to the allwhite Virginia Education Association), sought their rehiring.32
Not surprisingly, the widespread adoption of freedom of choice plans in the mid1960s was of concern to the NAACP. Though deemed an acceptable means of school
desegregation by HEW and most federal courts, the NAACP maintained, as S.W. Tucker
put it, that "freedom of choice is still massive resistance, no matter what you call it.. ,."33
Tucker felt this way because freedom of choice continued to place the burden of school
desegregation on the parents or guardians of black school children. This mechanism was
therefore not only ineffective, the NAACP believed, but also unconstitutional. In
response, the NAACP initiated a broad legal attack on freedom of choice in the mid-
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1960s. By May 1965, the Virginia State Conference legal staff had filed nine virtually
identical lawsuits in federal court against different cities or counties challenging the slow
pace of school desegregation and the constitutionality of freedom of choice. In the suits,
the association contended that intimidation, faculty and staff segregation, and other
considerations minimized the rate of desegregation under freedom of choice. NAACP
attorneys also argued that choice plans violated Brown II by placing the burden of
desegregation on the shoulders of African Americans; the high court had given that
responsibility to the local school boards. According to the NAACP, freedom of choice
was neither fair nor effective, but rather "a continuation of Virginia's 11-year effort to
stave off school integration."34
In place of freedom of choice plans, NAACP attorneys argued that the simplest
means of compliance would be geographic zoning plans. Under these plans, which were
also accepted by HEW as a means of compliance with the Civil Rights Act, children
generally attended the schools nearest their homes. School boards were supposed to
determine the boundaries of the school zones based on non-racial criteria, and students
living in a certain zone would attend schools in that area, regardless of race. The issue of
housing segregation, which blunted the effectiveness of such arrangements in achieving
desegregation, was left off the table by the NAACP's legal staff at this point. Later,
busing would be used to compel districts throughout the nation to establish uniformly
integrated schools, but in the mid-1960s geographic zoning plans were accepted by the
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NAACP—as long as the mandate to arrange and implement such plans was imposed on
the school board, and as long as they were implemented fairly.35
The association's willingness to accept geographic zoning plans in the mid-1960s
was indicative of the evolving nature of school desegregation. As shown in previous
chapters, the NAACP's goals changed over time, as did those of Virginia's government
and localities. Initially the NAACP sought simply the abandonment of policies enforcing
segregation, as Thurgood Marshall had argued before the U.S. Supreme Court in the
proceedings leading to Brown. The South fought this in the 1950s, but by the mid-1960s
southern whites had essentially embraced this concept in the form of freedom of choice
plans. Then, as the NAACP sought, and the federal courts required, more deliberate
integration measures in the late 1960s and 1970s, the South again found itself on the
defensive.
In localities throughout Virginia, blacks associated with the NAACP fought
against the adoption of freedom of choice plans in 1965. When Albemarle County, in
west-central Virginia, adopted a freedom of choice plan in the summer of 1965, a leader
in the Charlottesville branch of the NAACP castigated the school board for its decision.
Eugene Williams pointed out that faculty and staff segregation would continue under the
board's plan, as would the existence of many all-black schools. Instead, Williams urged,
the county should consider a plan similar to the one adopted by the city of Charlottesville,
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"where districts have been revised without regard to race, and all children in a given
district are assigned to one school in that area."36
With help from the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, State Conference attorneys
reached a court-approved settlement with the city of Norfolk on its school desegregation
plan. The agreement, announced in March 1966, ended ten years of litigation. The city
agreed to abandon its previous desegregation plan, based on freedom of choice, and set
up non-racial school attendance zones for pupils. All faculty and staff working in the
city's schools would also be desegregated, starting with the 1966-1967 school year. Jack
Greenberg of the LDF called the agreement "an encouraging example of what can be
accomplished if the parties to a school desegregation suit realistically face up to the issue
and meet to settle their differences," and he hoped the suit might serve as an example for
the "other 180 communities in which the Legal Defense Fund has school desegregation
suits pending."37
The most important new case filed by the Virginia NAACP arose in New Kent
County, just east of Richmond.38 Rural and conservative, New Kent had experienced no
school desegregation at all into the mid-1960s. The local NAACP branch, under the
leadership of Calvin Coolidge Green, pressed county officials to begin desegregation in
the early 1960s, to no avail. Shortly after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
however, Green attended an NAACP meeting in Richmond. At that gathering, State
Conference attorneys explained their desire to file a new round of school desegregation
36
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lawsuits throughout Virginia. Green, a Korean War veteran and Richmond school
teacher with three young sons, volunteered to press such a suit in his home county.
In 1964, Green launched a petition drive to request formally that local officials
desegregate the schools. Such petitions were regularly used by NAACP officials to build
their cases, and could be used as evidence in court. In New Kent, Green had little
problem securing the support of local blacks, and the request was submitted to the school
board. County and school officials, not surprisingly, refused to comply. Afterwards,
Green and other local leaders met with state NAACP attorneys, and in March 1965 the
State Conference filed a lawsuit to force the school board to desegregate the county's
public schools—C/zar/es C. Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, named
after Calvin Green's youngest son.
As expected, the filing of the Green lawsuit angered New Kent County's white
population. Local leaders, and even conservative New Kent blacks, pressured Green to
withdraw the suit. When he refused, the county chose not to renew his wife's contract as
a county teacher, placing the family in financial jeopardy. Threats and intimidation
against other New Kent black leaders also increased, and several, including Dr. Green,
made it clear that they would defend themselves in the event of physical attacks.39 Green
explains, "I knew from history and other kinds of things that people who filed suits were
in great danger and we soon ... we found ourselves in it."40
Faced with the NAACP lawsuit and pressure from HEW, county officials
grudgingly adopted a freedom of choice plan in the summer of 1965. The plan allowed
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students to choose between the county's theretofore all-black K-12 school, the George W.
Watkins School, and the county's all-white K-12 school, the New Kent School. In
August 1965, thirty-five black students enrolled in the latter for the first time.41 Over the
course of the next several years, however, most blacks in New Kent County chose to
continue enrolling their children at the all-black Watkins School. African American
enrollment in the formerly all-white school rose to 111 in 1966 and 115 in 1967. By that
time, about 15 percent of the county's black student population was enrolled in the
historically white school under freedom of choice, and no white student transferred to the
black school. In New Kent County, as elsewhere around the South, freedom of choice
did not lead to substantial school desegregation.42
The reasons for the failure of freedom of choice in New Kent County are
complex. First, the desegregation process was hard on black students, and by extension,
on their parents. Some white students threw spitballs at the black students in New Kent;
others pushed them in the hallways. Many white students simply ignored their new
classmates. One of the first black students to attend the New Kent School, Cynthia
Gaines, recalls: "I tried out for the girls' basketball team, and I was the first black girl to
ever play basketball for New Kent. But at that time the varsity team, the cheerleaders, and
the girls' team all rode on the same bus because we didn't have JV [Junior Varsity] girls
way back then. But no one would sit by me on the bus the entire basketball season; I don't
care if we went to Mathews, Middlesex, Yorktown, for miles no one would sit by me on
the bus. And they would sometimes sit three in a seat to keep from sitting by me on the
41
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bus, so after a while you just had to make things funny so you wouldn't be hurt. So I
would cross my legs, stretch out on the seat, put my suitcase up, and prop my feet up and
just ride."43
Adding to the difficulties, white teachers and administrators often showed little
inclination to help, or even to teach, the African American students. By contrast, in the
black schools most students knew the teachers and staff well, and recollections of
segregated black education during this era often include fond reminiscences of teachers
who cared for and mentored their students. Many black students also preferred attending
school with their friends, with whom they could study and enjoy school functions. In the
white schools, a feeling of hostility and resentment often prevailed, and those blacks who
were the first in their communities to desegregate formerly all-white schools remember
the experience as a trying one. As Dr. Francis Foster, whose daughter Carmen attended
Thomas Jefferson High School in Richmond in 1965, put it, "I guess I would describe
myself as the father of a sacrificial lamb."44
Lawyers for the Virginia State Conference developed and handled the Green case
almost alone. S.W. Tucker and Henry Marsh did most of the work, but they were joined
by Oliver Hill when he moved back to Richmond and rejoined the State Conference legal
staff in 1966.45 In the original suit, the NAACP attorneys pointed out that the county's
schools remained one hundred percent segregated eleven years after Brown; subsequent
iterations of the suit pointed out that the county had adopted its freedom of choice plan in
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the fall of 1965 only under duress. More to the point, the plan was not producing
appreciable school desegregation, even as late as 1967.
The NAACP hoped that questions about the effectiveness and constitutionality of
freedom of choice would sway the federal courts, which were divided on the acceptability
of such plans in the mid-1960s. Though most federal judges continued to endorse
freedom of choice plans, a growing number were critical of this form of pupil
assignment. Judge Thomas J. Michie of the federal district court of western Virginia fell
into the former category. When NAACP attorneys asked in 1965 that he order the school
board of Frederick County, Virginia, to take the initiative in desegregating the county's
schools, meaning that the court require the board to develop and implement a proactive
desegregation plan, Michie responded, "However the issue may be worded, it is clear that
the plaintiffs in this case are simply asking this court to force the school authorities to
force Negro students into totally integrated county schools which they have voluntarily
chosen not to attend." Michie denied the NAACP's request.46
The following year, however, Judge Minor Wisdom of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit wrote a stinging criticism of freedom of choice plans in a
ruling that ordered the New Orleans school board to abandon such policies, which had
failed to desegregate the local schools. Though the federal courts had largely deferred to
HEW in the mid-1960s, allowing the agency to set and implement school desegregation
goals throughout the nation, a number of federal judges by 1967 were concerned about
the department's acceptance of freedom of choice. In Bradley v. School Board of the
City of Richmond, on appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
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Circuit, Judges Simon Sobeloff and J. Spencer Bell stated: "the initiative in achieving
desegregation of the public schools must come from the school authorities.... Affirmative
action means more than telling those who have long been deprived of freedom of
educational opportunity, 'You now have a choice.'" 47
Still, federal district court and appeals court judges hesitated to overturn freedom
of choice without precedent, and so the federal judiciary continued to endorse such plans
in the mid-1960s. In the New Kent County case, the federal district court ruled against
the NAACP in 1966, as did the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit the
following year. Both courts ruled, not incorrectly, that the county's desegregation plan
fulfilled currently-accepted judicial (and HEW) standards.48
The courts may also have hesitated to overturn freedom of choice plans because
such methods were clearly an improvement over previous methods of school
desegregation. Questions of legality aside, freedom of choice plans led to more school
desegregation in the South in the mid-1960s than any earlier assignment policies. In the
spring of 1964 approximately one percent of black students in the eleven states of the
former Confederacy attended school with whites. By 1967, largely because of the
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adoption of freedom of choice plans, the figure had risen to nearly 17 percent, and in
Virginia it approached 25 percent.49
Despite the amount of school desegregation achieved under freedom of choice,
the lower court rulings in Green v. New Kent County were disappointing to the NAACP.
After the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's decision in 1967, the
association's attorneys debated whether to take the Green case to the U.S. Supreme
Court. By then, State Conference attorneys had about 150 civil rights cases before state
and federal courts, and it was important to choose carefully which cases to appeal. As a
test case to show that current desegregation programs—including "freedom of choice"—
were not working, Green had a lot to offer. County demographics showed that, up until
1965, school segregation had been a deliberate policy, because children of both races
were bused long distances to attend racially-designated schools. Moreover, the county's
freedom of choice plan had not substantially altered the racial makeup of the schools, so
the case against the effectiveness of freedom of choice was strong. "We had all these
school cases, and we wanted to get a case to be the pilot case so the Supreme Court could
really break the logjam," former State Conference attorney Henry L. Marsh III explained.
"New Kent was the logical choice." The NAACP petitioned the Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari in October 1967, and the Supreme Court agreed to consider the Green
case in December 1967.50
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Chapter 7, 1968-1973
From Brown to Green: The NAACP and School Integration in Virginia, 1968-1973

By the late 1960s, the Virginia State Conference of the NAACP had helped to
bring about a dramatic rise in the amount of school desegregation in the commonwealth.
By 1967, desegregation had begun in every school district in the state, and Virginia's
progress compared favorably with that of its southern neighbors. In 1968, the U.S.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) ranked Virginia second of the
eleven states of the former Confederacy, behind only Texas, in the percentage of black
students attending desegregated schools.1
Still, like the national NAACP, the members and leaders of the Virginia NAACP
continued to seek greater racial mixing. By the late 1960s, their goal had advanced
beyond the elimination of segregation from education; now the NAACP sought judicial
decrees requiring districts to proactively develop and implement plans to completely
desegregate their schools. In the language of today, the desired end had shifted from
desegregation to integration, meaning school systems which could not be distinguished
by race, in which black and white students commingled and interacted as equals.
In 1968 the Virginia State Conference legal staff, with help from national
NAACP attorneys, won yet another major U.S. Supreme Court victory. With Green v.
New Kent County, the high court reentered the desegregation fray and demanded that
school boards throughout the South initiate plans that would lead to quick and complete
desegregation. Afterward, the Virginia State Conference of the NAACP used the Green
1

"Court Junks Most Dixie Pupil Plans," Norfolk Journal and Guide, June 1, 1968.
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decision to convince federal court judges to require more effective and comprehensive
integration plans throughout the commonwealth.
One means of achieving school integration, however, greatly angered many white
Virginians during this era. By the early 1970s, busing, which had been used to maintain
segregated schools for generations, was sometimes required by federal judges to integrate
school districts—particularly in urban areas where residential segregation continued to
result in mostly-white and mostly-black schools. For many whites, however, busing
meant long-distance rides and enrollment in predominantly black schools. Busing
imposed parallel hardships on blacks, but the likelihood of gaining access to better
educational opportunities in formerly white schools reduced African-American concerns.
In Virginia and elsewhere, a large and vocal movement against busing developed,
supported by white segregationists, moderates, and even white liberals. Over time,
opposition to busing fueled a backlash against school integration that challenged the
accomplishments of the Virginia NAACP and the Civil Rights Movement more broadly.

As explained previously, the expansion of school desegregation in Virginia during
the mid-1960s came because of growing pressure on the South from the federal
government, especially the U.S. Office of Education within the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW), with its newly acquired power to deny federal funding to
recalcitrant districts. In Virginia, freedom of choice plans were adopted by the vast
majority of school districts by 1967—by some estimates upwards of 90 percent.2
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In the spring of 1968, however, HEW reported that only 14 percent of the black
pupils in the eleven former states of the Confederacy attended desegregated schools,
confirming the relative ineffectiveness of freedom of choice plans in promoting
desegregation.3 Critics of freedom of choice also argued that it was unfair—and illegal—
to place the burden of school desegregation on the shoulders of African-Americans, as
freedom of choice plans did by requiring black students and their parents to request
desegregation. They pointed out that in Brown II the U.S. Supreme Court had placed
responsibility for school desegregation on southern school boards.
Such questions about the legality and the effectiveness of freedom of choice plans
led the federal government to demand new methods of school desegregation in the late
1960s. HEW announced in March 1968 that, starting with the 1969-1970 school year, it
would no longer accept freedom of choice plans as a means of complying with the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Instead, it was suggested that districts adopt geographic attendance
zones, not based on race. In a four-part document titled National School Policies, the
agency added that southern school districts that had not ended segregated schooling by
that point would face a cut-off of federal funds for education.4
Just two months later, the U.S. Supreme Court offered additional support for
abandoning freedom of choice plans, handing down the first of three school
desegregation decisions that dramatically altered education policies throughout the
United States. By addressing school desegregation issues after a long period of relative
non-involvement, the high court reclaimed control of the desegregation process for the
3
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federal judiciary and provided guidance to lower-level federal judges. HEW, which had
led the campaign to increase southern school desegregation since 1965, now began to
play more of a supportive role while federal judges largely determined school
desegregation policy in the late 1960s and 1970s.5
The first Supreme Court decision of the late 1960s affecting school desegregation
was Charles C. Green v. New Kent County, Virginia. Filed in federal district court in
Virginia in the spring of 1965, Green asked federal judges to force New Kent County to
initiate and implement a plan that would lead to greater school desegregation than had
been accomplished under the county's freedom of choice system. Sponsored by the
president of the New Kent County NAACP branch, Calvin Coolidge Green, the case had
been handled primarily by State Conference attorneys S.W. Tucker and Henry Marsh,
with the help of lawyers from the national NAACP. After losses at the federal district
court and circuit court of appeals levels, the NAACP took Green to the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1967. After accepting the case in late 1967, the Supreme Court heard oral
arguments in Green the day before Martin Luther King Jr.'s assassination, and handed
down its decision on May 27, 1968.
The ruling was a significant victory for the NAACP. In Green, the Supreme
Court found that New Kent County had deliberately violated Brown and Brown II for
more than a decade by operating two school systems, one black and one white, down to
"every facet of school operations—faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities
and facilities." Furthermore, and more important, the court found that the county's

5
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freedom of choice plan—adopted under pressure from HEW in 1965—had failed to
produce significant desegregation, and that "rather than further the dismantling of the
dual system, the plan has operated simply to burden children and their parents with a
responsibility which Brown //placed squarely on the School Board."6
In the unanimous ruling, the justices also expressed frustration with continued
attempts by southern whites to prevent or minimize school desegregation. Discussing
New Kent County's freedom of choice plan, for instance, Chief Justice William Brennan
wrote, "it is relevant that this first step did not come until ... 10 years after Brown II
directed the making of a 'prompt and reasonable start.'" The justices unambiguously
ordered the county school board to develop a plan that "promises realistically to work,
and promises realistically to work now."1
In Green, the justices did not rule that freedom of choice plans were in and of
themselves unconstitutional, but they did say that, where other methods of desegregation
promised to be more effective, they were preferable. In most southern school districts,
this meant that more effective techniques, such as geographic zoning, unitary school
systems, or busing, would be required. Justice Brennan explained that, "if there are
reasonably available other ways ... promising speedier and more effective conversion to
a unitary, nonracial school system, 'freedom of choice' must be held unacceptable." In
addition, the court made it clear that it was the school board's responsibility to develop
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and implement such plans, as opposed to placing the burden on the shoulders of AfricanAmerican parents or their children, as freedom of choice had done.8
In Green and in subsequent rulings, the Supreme Court also emphasized the
importance of results. In other words, starting in 1968 the legality of school
desegregation plans would depend largely on their effectiveness in ending segregation in
the local schools—a profound change in the law of the land. In Green, the court listed six
factors that could be used to measure success: the composition of the student body,
faculty, and staff; and the accomplishment of integration in school transportation,
extracurricular activities, and facilities. The overarching goal, wrote Justice William
Brennan, became "a system without a 'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just
schools." For southern districts, this meant eliminating all racially-identifiable schools.9
Importantly, the Green decision also altered how school desegregation was
defined and what the process entailed. As defined in Brown v. Board of Education,
desegregation simply meant removing or eliminating mandatory segregation. As
Thurgood Marshall had argued before the Supreme Court in 1952, "The only thing that
we ask for is that the state-imposed racial segregation be taken off, and to leave the
county school board, the county people, the district people, to work out their own
solution of the problem to assign children on any reasonable basis they want to assign
them on."10 To comply with Brown, then, school districts had only to remove racial
distinctions and discrimination from their pupil assignment policies. Green, however,
transformed Brown's prohibition of segregation into a positive requirement that school
8
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boards throughout the region develop and implement ways of bringing about racial
integration in their schools. The change was based on the high court's continued
frustration over southern resistance to school desegregation, and was undoubtedly
influenced by the appointment of new justices (such as Thurgood Marshall) to the
Supreme Court. Regardless, the new interpretation of Brown was quite different from the
original, and widely accepted, interpretation, and the change later prompted Supreme
Court Justice William H. Rehnquist to refer to Green as a "drastic extension of Brown."{1
By altering what school desegregation entailed and highlighting the role of the
federal judiciary, Green v. New Kent County transformed the school desegregation milieu
of the late 1960s. Afterward, the number of southern black students attending integrated
schools skyrocketed. A National Park Service study of school desegregation in the
United States explains: "The results were startling. In 1968-69, 32 per cent of black
students in the South attended integrated schools; in 1970-71, the number was 79 per
cent."12 Acknowledging the decision's impact, the historian and legal scholar Davison
Douglas calls Green "the Court's most important school desegregation opinion since
Brown
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Many whites in the South, of course, denounced the Green decision. Although
they had been hesitant to accept freedom of choice desegregation plans in the mid-1960s,
white southerners had grown to support freedom of choice over time. Most likely this
was because the approach did not led to significant school desegregation, yet it preserved
the flow of federal funds into southern schools. By June 1968, the Norfolk Journal and
Guide reported, ninety percent of all southern schools were using freedom of choice
plans.14 Not surprisingly, when the Supreme Court demanded that southern officials
develop more effective desegregation plans, white southerners rallied around freedom of
choice as never before. The historian J. Harvie Wilkinson noted the irony: "What was
unthinkable five or six years ago suddenly assumed, in light of more threatening
alternatives, the status of holy prerogative."15 James Jackson Kilpatrick, editor of the
Richmond News Leader, predicted, "the court, in its own omnipotent fashion, might as
well undertake to reverse the orbit of the earth around the sun."16
Predictably, many whites in New Kent County were also distressed by the
opinion. Almost immediately, a number of local teachers and students threatened to
leave the county's public schools for nearby private, segregated academies. Shortly
thereafter, when blacks held a celebration dinner at the all-black Watkins School, a cross
was burned on the front lawn.17 School superintendant H. Kenneth Brown struggled to
preserve the county's public school system by complying with the Supreme Court's
decision, though at a pace more palatable to the local white population. In June 1968,
14
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county officials announced a new school desegregation plan that would integrate the
county's teachers and school workers that fall, but would not integrate the students until
the fall of 1969. Federal district court judge Robert R. Merhige initially rejected the
timetable, but the judge then decided to visit the county to investigate. After touring New
Kent County's schools and holding discussions with school personnel in August, Judge
Merhige approved the county's desegregation plan and its fall 1969 time frame for the
integration of the student population.18
The plan adopted by county officials created a unitary school system, a technique
many rural southern districts would emulate in the coming years. Like many rural areas,
New Kent County had previously bused its black and white students, who lived
throughout the county, to racially identifiable schools. In this instance, one black school
and one white school had served all the country children during the era of segregation.
After the adoption of the county's freedom of choice plan in 1965, this arrangement
continued—except that some black students now chose to attend the formerly all-white
school. After Green, county officials simply merged the county's two schools and their
student populations to comply with the high court's new mandate. Starting in 1969, the
county's formerly white school served as the middle and high school, and the formerly
black school served as the county elementary school. All students, regardless of race,
now attended one school or the other, depending on their age. As a result, the new
system eliminated the formerly-racial identities of the county's schools and created what
federal courts referred to as a unitary system. In rural areas throughout Virginia, and
18
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elsewhere in the South, compliance with the Supreme Court's mandate in Green was
accomplished similarly.
As it had since the beginning, however, school integration came at a cost to
African American communities, in Virginia and around the nation. This was particularly
true in the late 1960s, when complete desegregation began to occur. The process was
usually overseen by white public officials, and decision-making was not always evenhanded. In New Kent, without input from county citizens, officials stripped the black
school of its name in 1969; presumably they did not want white children attending a
school named for George W. Watkins, a well-respected black leader and longtime
principal. At about the same time, Prince Edward County officials renamed the formerly
all-black R.R. Moton School, which till then had borne the name of Booker T.
Washington's successor as head of Tuskegee Institute, who was a native of the county.19
Elsewhere in Virginia black schools were closed or converted into lower-level schools as
a result of school integration. In Lynchburg, local blacks protested when Dunbar High
School, which had been central to the black community for decades, was converted to a
middle school. Furthermore, African American teachers and administrators were often
fired or demoted when formerly-black schools were converted or closed. One federal
study found that the number of black secondary school principals in Virginia declined
from 107 to 17 between 1965 and 1971.20
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Despite these costs, the Virginia NAACP pressed immediately for statewide
implementation of the Green ruling. State Conference attorneys expressed deep
satisfaction with the new mandate, particularly the fact that it shifted the burden of
implementation to local school boards and emphasized results. S.W. Tucker, chairman of
the Virginia State Conference legal staff, said, "Now that the Supreme Court... has made
clear the duty of school boards to eliminate racial segregation in the school systems, we
hope that the school boards will implement the law all over the state of Virginia with the
beginning of the next school session."21 The day after Green v. New Kent County was
handed down, Tucker paid a visit to federal district court Judge Robert R. Merhige in
Richmond. The NAACP attorney brought with him an armful of desegregation cases he
wanted reopened in the wake of Green. In August, however, Tucker was disappointed
when Judge Merhige allowed New Kent County to delay full integration until the fall of
1969. Afterward, Tucker initiated litigation in federal court seeking complete school
integration in nine Virginia counties, all of which operated under freedom of choice, as
quickly as possible—by the fall of 1969 at the latest.22
Tucker's effort to bring about complete school integration in Virginia at the
earliest practicable date mirrored the efforts of national NAACP attorneys. In New York,
Jack Greenberg, director of the NAACP's Legal Defense Fund, said the Green case
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would be used to reopen most of the organization's two hundred school desegregation
suits.23
As the NAACP's new, and renewed, school desegregation litigation wound its
way through the federal courts, the impact of the Green decision spread beyond the
borders of New Kent County. Across Virginia, school boards adjusted their policies to
achieve the Supreme Court's new mandate in the late 1960s. Virginia NAACP attorney
Henry Marsh later recalled: "That's when we had real meaningful desegregation—all
over in 1968. Before we had the [Green] decision, desegregation was stymied because
you only had desegregation where you had black applicants willing to run the gauntlet in
white schools. After Green v. New Kent, as long as 'freedom of choice' was not working,
it was unlawful. So ... that was a crucial case."24 Using geographically-based school
zones (in which the entire county constituted a single zone, as in New Kent County), a
number of school boards integrated their schools in 1968, including the city of
Fredericksburg, Spotsylvania County, and King George County, all to the north of
Richmond. Other localities waited to integrate until ordered by the courts, which
generally delayed the process until the fall of 1969. After losing a court battle to
maintain its freedom of choice plan, for example, Powhatan County, a short distance
southwest of Richmond, merged its black and white schools in the autumn of 1969. That
fall, HEW reported: "Sharp increases in faculty integration, the use of attendance zones
and the closing of all-Negro schools are prominent in desegregation plans this year
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[throughout the South]." The result was a substantial rise in school desegregation in
Virginia at the end of the decade.25
In the meantime, separate NAACP litigation ended Virginia's tuition grant
program, which since 1959 had provided taxpayer-funded financial support to parents
with children enrolled in private schools. Perhaps the most famous such institution was
Prince Edward Academy, created in 1959 when the county closed its public schools
rather than desegregate under court order, but dozens of other "segregation academies"
had been created in Virginia since the 1950s. Predictably, the NAACP challenged the
right of the state to indirectly fund such segregated institutions, particularly since part of
the tax money involved came from the state's black citizens. In 1964, NAACP attorneys
launched a broad-based legal attack on the tuition grant program by filing a lawsuit
against the Virginia Board of Education, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and a
number of local school boards that were engaging in the practice. Subsequent court
rulings on the "omnibus tuition grants case," as the lawsuit was known, had restricted the
use of tuition grants to schools that obtained the majority of their funding from other
sources, but failed to end the program. As a result, tuition grants continued in Virginia
into the late 1960s, even as federal courts in other states invalidated similar programs. In
response, NAACP attorney S.W. Tucker used legal action against school districts to
prevent them from utilizing tuition grants to avoid substantial desegregation while also
challenging the legality of the tuition grants program in federal courts. Finally, in
February 1969, a panel of three federal judges in Virginia found the state's tuition grants
program unconstitutional. The court explained, "any assistance whatever by the State
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towards provision of a racially-segregated education exceeds the pale of tolerance
demarked by the Constitution." After ten years and twenty million dollars in grants,
Governor Mills Godwin ordered the program ended, and Virginia's whites were left
without one longstanding means of avoiding the impact of Brown v. Board of
Education,26
The NAACP's campaign to bring about school integration in the South benefitted
from support from HEW and the Department of Justice after Green v. New Kent County,
even though that decision signaled the federal courts once again to assume the leading
role in desegregation. Shortly after the decision was rendered, the Department of Justice
asked federal courts to require 160 southern school districts to abandon their freedom of
choice plans in favor of more effective measures. The following year, the department
filed an unprecedented lawsuit seeking to bring about integration throughout the entire
state of Georgia, leading the Los Angeles Times to conclude: "Plainly, the government
means business."27 HEW, too, ratcheted up its pressure on southern school boards after
Green. When districts refused to adopt unitary school systems, HEW withheld federal
funding; by June 1968 funds had been cut off to fifty-two districts in the South and
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another 107 districts had been cited for noncompliance—meaning that the process of
cutting off federal funds had been initiated.28
Over time, however, political considerations negatively affected the campaign for
southern school desegregation. In the presidential election campaign of 1968,
Republican candidate Richard M. Nixon had employed a "southern strategy," expressing
support for freedom of choice desegregation plans despite the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Green, in an effort to win the support of southern white voters. Similarly,
Nixon expressed support for a "middle course on integration" as opposed to "immediate
integration" or "segregation forever." The approach worked, and a number of southern
states, including Virginia, handed their Electoral College votes to the Republican
candidate—part of a broader realignment of southern white politics following the passage
of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Like many other African Americans, however, Roy
Wilkins of the NAACP expressed chagrin: "It was beyond me how he could talk about
'instant integration' when we were fifteen years beyond the Brown decision.. ,."29
Despite Wilkins's displeasure, and that of African Americans nationwide,
Nixon's administration withdrew the federal government's longstanding support for
complete school desegregation in the South. During the president's first term, HEW and
the Justice Department moderated their school desegregation activities to be more
acceptable to white southerners, leading to some grumbling and staff turnover within
both departments. A federal report on school desegregation between 1966 and 1975
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concluded: "Starting in 1965, HEW started to play a decisive role in initiating
enforcement in hundreds of highly segregated districts. This enforcement continued until
1970, when the administration withdrew substantial support from the desegregation
effort." 30 Political scientist Gary Orfield, a historian of school desegregation, reported
that by 1971 HEW had also abandoned its policy of withholding federal funds from
school districts not in compliance with judicial mandates. Much to the dismay of the
NAACP, the Department of Justice followed a similar path. Once an ally of
integrationists, the department now "gave low priority to school cases and sometimes led
the opposition to legal theories advanced by civil rights lawyers." In the early 1970s it
was common for Justice Department lawyers, who had sided with the NAACP on school
desegregation cases since the 1950s, to support the opponents of integration in school
desegregation cases before federal courts.31
With the executive branch less inclined to promote school integration during the
Nixon presidency, the federal courts assumed a more active role. Ironically, it was
HEW's actions, in part, that promoted greater involvement by the judiciary. In the
summer of 1969, HEW asked the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to
allow several dozen school districts in Mississippi to delay implementation of their
desegregation plans until December—the first time HEW had supported a desegregation
delay before the federal courts. With support from the Justice Department, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals granted the delay, but in October 1969 the Supreme Court
prevented the postponement and reiterated its position on school desegregation in the
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second of its major school desegregation decisions of the late 1960s, Alexander v.
Holmes County, Mississippi,32
In Alexander, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Green decision had to
be implemented immediately. The court's decision directed the lower federal courts to
order southern school districts "to terminate dual school systems at once and to operate
now and hereafter only unitary schools." Subsequently, federal judges throughout the
region ordered school boards to bring about complete school desegregation at the earliest
possible date. In many cases, their rulings required major changes in the middle of the
1969-1970 school year. Virginia, which had experienced a notable increase in integration
following the Green decision in 1968-1969, now underwent another wave of change as
localities across the state responded to the new mandate. In December 1969, ruling on
the desegregation plans of Halifax and Amherst counties, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit declared: "Further delays will not be tolerated in this
circuit. No school districts may continue to operate a dual system based on race."33
Discussing Louisiana, the historian Adam Fairclough writes: "February 1970 witnessed
the biggest educational upheaval of the twentieth century, with integration becoming a
social reality for the first time since the Brown decision sixteen years earlier."34
In urban areas throughout the South, however, achieving unitary school systems
posed greater challenges than in rural communities. Whereas rural school districts could
32
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generally integrate their schools by adopting non-racial geographic school zones (as in
New Kent County), cities contained numerous segregated neighborhoods and the
racially-identifiable schools that served them. Geographic attendance zones in urban
areas would therefore mirror rather than counteract widespread residential segregation.
As a result, integration in urban areas often required more proactive measures, such as
busing. Transporting black students to predominantly white schools and vice versa
allowed a district to determine the racial makeup of individual schools, offering a direct
and effective way of bringing about school integration in southern cities. Recognizing
this fact, federal judges in the South began to order desegregation plans that included
busing provisions around the turn of the decade.35
In Virginia in the early 1970s, busing became a central issue in the NAACP's
campaign for school integration. In early 1970, for instance, State Conference attorneys
asked federal district court Judge Robert R. Merhige, in Bradley v. School Board of the
City of Richmond, to require the Richmond school board to develop and implement a
proactive and effective desegregation plan in light of the Green and Alexander decisions.
Sixteen years after Brown, the city still had a handful of all-white schools, more than
thirty predominantly white schools, and twenty-six all-black schools. After discussions
with the school board that summer, Judge Merhige approved an interim plan which
included busing, pending the onset of a more substantial plan to be developed after the
school year began. As a result of this decision, Richmond began to bus thirteen thousand

35
Busing to accomplish integration was used in at least one southern school district in the fall of
1969; see "Third of Negro Pupils in South To Be in Mixed Classes in Fall," RTD, August 20, 1969.

204

black and white students in the fall of 1970, out of a total school population of roughly
fifty thousand.36
In Richmond as elsewhere, the decision to use busing to overcome segregation
was angrily contested by many whites. In addition to subjecting school children to long
bus rides, busing often meant enrollment of whites in predominantly black schools with
largely black administrations and staffs (Richmond's school population was only 35
percent white in 1970). Instead, many white parents supported the idea of neighborhood
schools. Richard Kluger explains: "... bussing to maintain segregation had been happily
countenanced by white parents, but the prospect of bussing their own youngsters for the
purpose of integration produced bared teeth."37 In Richmond, some whites avoided
busing by renting apartments in other sections of the city or by moving to the surrounding
counties, which were not part of the busing plan. Anger toward the NAACP and Judge
Merhige also boiled over. Merhige sought protection from federal marshals for nearly
two years; still, his guest house was burned to the ground and his dog shot. "I would say
there was a time when he [S.W. Tucker] and I were two of the most hated men in the
entire commonwealth," Merhige later recalled—noting that Tucker was not afforded
federal protection.38
Busing in Richmond also affected state and local politics. In the fall of 1970,
Governor Linwood Holton, the first Republican governor in Virginia since
Reconstruction, stepped into the fray. Holton, a moderate from Southwest Virginia who
36
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had opposed elements of massive resistance in the 1950s, enrolled his children in the
schools to which they would have been assigned under Richmond's desegregation plan,
even though the Holton's residency on state property exempted them from the ruling.
The decision was an affront to the opponents of busing, and the anti-busing crusaders
vowed to make the governor pay. Indeed, in subsequent statewide elections several of
the candidates Holton supported were defeated. In the end, Holton and a number of
political observers concluded that the governor's political future—including a possible
seat in the U.S. Senate—had been irrevocably damaged. Writing in the Richmond TimesDispatch, William Ruberry surmised: "A bright star once considered destined for lofty
political heights, Holton was brought down by the very events that secured his place in
history."39
Despite the uproar against busing among whites, the Virginia NAACP continued
to press for full school desegregation statewide, including busing when appropriate. With
compliance in the state's rural areas growing, the organization focused its legal strength
on Virginia's cities. During the summer of 1970, State Conference attorneys juggled
desegregation lawsuits against Richmond, Norfolk, Roanoke, Lynchburg, and Newport
News. Largely because of Green and Alexander, the NAACP's work was noticeably
easier than before. With the onus now on local school boards to produce and implement
desegregation plans resulting in unitary schools, the NAACP attorneys focused on
pointing out deficiencies in the plans produced by Virginia's urban centers.40
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NAACP attorney Henry Marsh pointed out, for instance, that Norfolk's
desegregation plan, which had been approved by federal district court judge Walter
Hoffman in 1969, failed to address faculty segregation or eliminate all segregation of
students. In the summer of 1970, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit agreed in Brewer v. School Board of the City of Norfolk, noting that "white
schools remain predominantly white; black schools remain black." Highlighting their
frustration with the local school board, Justices Sobeloff and Winter added that the suit
had been "frustratingly interminable ... because of the unpardonable recalcitrance of the
defendants...." In the end, the court ruled that, if the school board could not integrate the
city schools because of residential segregation, then "the school board must take further
steps...." The result that fall was busing.41
In Lynchburg, one difficulty in the path of desegregation was that the school
board owned no school buses or bus facilities. This situation had limited desegregation
under the city's freedom of choice plan (as it had in Richmond), but in 1970 it proved an
even greater obstacle to integration, in that it prevented busing. In the 1970s, federal
judges would order localities to purchase buses to increase desegregation, but that step
was not considered acceptable prior to then. Farther west in Roanoke, the NAACP
pointed out in Cynthia D. Green v. School Board of the City of Roanoke that Roanoke
had also failed to develop an effective plan to shift to a unitary school system. In the
summer of 1970 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit assigned a fall
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deadline for the school board to do so; the ruling led to the adoption of busing in
Roanoke in the fall of 1970 as well.42
Meanwhile, a federal district court judge in North Carolina grappled with the
same challenges facing the proponents of school desegregation in Virginia's cities in a
case that would have substantial ramifications for school desegregation throughout the
region. Like many cities in Virginia, Charlotte, North Carolina, had operated under a
geographic assignment desegregation plan until shortly after Green v. New Kent County,
when federal district court judge James McMillan—in his first major ruling from the
bench—recognized that the "rules of the game have changed" and that the city's
desegregation plan failed to meet the new constitutional requirements. After rejecting
several revised plans offered by the school board in 1969, Judge McMillan adopted a
remedy proposed by one of the expert witnesses in the case—busing. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected McMillan's decision, ruling that the
judge had gone too far, and the defendants appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.43
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Judge McMillan's decision in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg on April 21, 1971. Writing for the unanimous court, Chief
Justice Warren Burger agreed that implementing Green often required new school
desegregation guidelines. The high court shied away from requiring a specific remedy,
such as busing; it reiterated its long-held policy that local circumstances should determine
the nature of desegregation plans, leaving the question of remedy to lower-court judges.

42

Roanoke school desegregation lawsuit, decided June 17, 1970, by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, Part V, Box 2836, General Office File, Schools, Virginia, Legal Cases, 1946-1948, 1959-1970,
n.d., NAACP Papers; Cecelia Jackson et al v School Board of the City of Lynchburg ruling, April 28, 1970,
issued by Judge Robert R. Merhige, Part V, Box 2836, General Office File, Schools, Virginia, Legal Cases,
1946-1948, 1959-1970, n.d., NAACP Papers.
43
Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke, 139-149.

208

In some locations, geographic zoning or even freedom of choice might lead to the goal of
"the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation," said the court. In other cases,
however, particularly in cities, busing might represent a legitimate and necessary
remedy.44
In Swann, the justices refused to offer guidance on how school districts would
know they had achieved integration. The court did not require, for instance, each school
within a district to match the racial composition of the district as a whole, but the justices
did note that racial ratios might be considered a "starting point" in shaping remedies,
including busing. As a result, lower-level federal judges would struggle with the
question of appropriate remedy in coming years. Nonetheless, the high court's
acceptance of busing expanded its use in the South in the early 1970s, resulting in a
dramatic rise in school desegregation throughout the region.45
As expected, President Nixon strongly opposed the Swann decision. The
president publicly denounced busing as "forced integration" and asked officials in the
Department of Justice to draw up a constitutional amendment to nullify the Supreme
Court's decision. He also reiterated his support for neighborhood schools and argued that
the primary goal of any public school was to educate, not to integrate. Much later,
Richard Kluger described the president's actions with regard to school integration in the
early 1970s as "downright obstructionist," and argued "it was not just neglect that Nixon
offered the Negro; it was downright opposition...." Most white southerners, however,
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were pleased, and for this and other reasons they rewarded Nixon with a record number
of votes in the 1972 presidential election.46
More important, Nixon's appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court began to
dramatically affect the struggle over school desegregation, and the controversy over
busing in particular. Between 1969 and 1971, Nixon appointed four justices to the high
court: Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, and
William Rehnquist. In subsequent years these four justices voted together more often
than any bloc of justices since the 1950s, and their conservative views shifted the
Supreme Court's perspective on school integration, leaving more liberal justices,
including Thurgood Marshall, isolated.47
In the meantime, Marshall's former colleagues at the NAACP used the Swann
decision to expand their campaign for school desegregation. In New York, the NAACP's
Legal Defense Fund "moved swiftly to follow up the Swann breakthrough by pushing
similar cases elsewhere." In Virginia, Swann legitimized Judge Merhige's decision to
require busing in Richmond, as well as similar court orders applying to other Virginia
cities, by declaring the technique an acceptable remedy.48
In the late 1960s, federal courts also began to require school boards in the
northern United States to eliminate dual school systems. Judges now recognized that
school segregation in the North had also been perpetuated by deliberately discriminatory
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policies such as creating racially identifiable school attendance zones and building
schools near racially-identifiable neighborhoods to reduce the likelihood of racial mixing
in the schools. Widespread segregation in northern schools, then, which was easily
discernible in attendance statistics, was at least partly the result of deliberate choices
made by school and city officials. In many northern urban areas, this realization in the
late 1960s brought about court decisions in the early 1970s requiring the adoption of
desegregation plans which included busing.49
Still, busing faced a growing challenge in Richmond and throughout the nation
through the phenomenon known as "white flight"—the exodus of whites from inner cities
to surrounding suburbs in the mid-to-late twentieth century. White flight had its roots in
the massive suburbanization which occurred in the U.S. in the post-World War II era,
promoted by improvements in transportation, housing construction, and the desire to
achieve the "American Dream." Racial discrimination, financial constraints, and even
government policy ensured that the exodus would be mostly white, leaving the inner core
of many American cities inhabited by a growing black population.
Although white flight had been taking place for decades before the advent of
busing, the trend picked up dramatically in the 1970s as growing numbers of whites
sought to avoid having their children bused to accomplish integration. In Richmond, one
source reported that the percentage of white students in the city schools fell from 45
percent to 21 percent between 1960 and 1975. And while it would be simplistic to
suggest that the transition occurred entirely because of school desegregation or busing,
49
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the historian Robert Pratt points out that "it seems equally obvious that opposition to
busing prompted a good many whites to abandon Richmond in favor of the
overwhelmingly white suburbs." The ease with which white parents could commute into
the city for work or other reasons also fueled white flight in Richmond—in larger southern
cities such as Charlotte and Tampa, a longer commute made moving to surrounding
counties logistically more difficult. In Richmond one black student recalled the change
in her own neighborhood: "When my family first moved into that neighborhood, one of
the blocks had ten houses on one side of the street, and there were six white families
living in them. Within a year or so, there was only one white family left on that block."50
The changing racial demographics in America's cities boded poorly for busing
plans and for integration more broadly. Put simply, an integrated school system was
impossible without a bi-racial population. In Richmond, a dramatic escalation of white
flight, which was partly the result of busing, reduced the likelihood of success for the
city's court-ordered busing plan within just a few years. As a result, in the early 1970s
the state NAACP pressed Judge Merhige, in Bradley v. School Board of the City of
Richmond, to include the counties surrounding Richmond—nearly all-white Chesterfield
and Henrico—in the city's busing plan. State Conference attorneys argued the state had
an obligation to provide a unitary system that was not racially identifiable for
Richmond's black students, and that a merger was the simplest and most effective way to
do so.51
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In January 1972, Judge Merhige agreed. In a 325-page opinion, Merhige noted
that state education officials in previous years had made countless decisions that led to,
and perpetuated, the dual school systems evident in Richmond and the surrounding
counties. Because of those choices, Merhige ruled, the state was responsible for creating
a unitary school system for the children in all three localities. Interdistrict busing,
according to the judge, was the most logical solution.52
The Virginia State Board of Education and Henrico and Chesterfield counties
quickly appealed Judge Merhige's decision. In hearings before the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that spring, their attorneys argued that Merhige's ruling
was without precedent and did not represent a valid interpretation of the Supreme Court's
desegregation guidelines. That June, in a five-to-one decision, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed, holding that a federal district court judge could not
"compel one of the States of the Union to restructure its internal government for the
purpose of achieving a racial balance in the assignment of pupils to the public schools."53
The following year the United States Supreme Court heard the case on appeal.
Justice Lewis Powell, recently appointed by President Nixon, recused himself from the
case because he had served as chairman of the Richmond school board in the 1950s and
1960s. In a decision handed down in May 1973, the remaining eight justices split evenly
on the constitutionality of interdistrict busing. That outcome allowed the decision of the
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United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit-overturning Judge Merhige's
interdistrict busing ruling—to stand.54
The following year, the Supreme Court heard a similar case dealing with
interdistrict busing in Detroit. This time, the court ruled 5-4, with Justices Burger,
Stewart, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist pitted against Justices Marshall, Douglas,
Brennan, and White, to overturn an interdistrict busing plan in a decision that upset many
advocates of desegregation. That case, Milliken v. Bradley, represented a major setback
for the NAACP and its effort to achieve school integration in urban areas throughout the
nation, including Virginia. By prohibiting the use of interdistrict busing to achieve
integration, the court reduced the options available to combat segregation in urban areas.
White opposition to busing had already led to increasing rates of white flight from
America's cities, and now the court had placed their primary destination—suburban
enclaves ringing those urban centers—out of the reach of city busing plans. Thurgood
Marshall's dissenting opinion in Milliken noted, "After 20 years of small, often difficult
steps toward that great end [of equal justice under law], the Court today takes a giant step
backwards." The result, as Marshall predicted, was increasingly black urban centers,
surrounded by predominantly white counties with separate school systems. As a result,
busing within America's urban areas in the 1970s increasingly meant transferring small
numbers of white students into overwhelmingly black city schools.55
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For the Virginia NAACP, then, achieving school integration throughout the
Commonwealth in the early 1970s was a pyrrhic victory. On the one hand, it had been
the association's principal goal for the previous twenty-five years, and its
accomplishment represented a major success. Virginia and the South as a region had,
ironically, become the most integrated region of the nation, primarily because of the
NAACP's efforts to secure implementation. By 1971, according to HEW estimates, 44
percent of black students attended majority white schools in the South, as opposed to 28
percent who did so in the North and West.56 The integration of Virginia's public schools
opened up additional avenues for scholastic and economic success for African-American
students throughout the Commonwealth, and reduced lingering negative stereotypes held
by both races—improving race relations and promoting better racial understanding in
Virginia.57
On the other hand, integration of public education in Virginia's urban areas would
not withstand the test of time. Integration in the state's counties was generally
accomplished more easily and with less turmoil than in its urban areas, but court-ordered
busing faced significant opposition, including judicial headwinds, from the outset, and
these challenges grew over time. Within a generation, the same busing plans that had led
to significant integration would be ruled abandoned by federal courts in Virginia and
throughout the nation as school districts successfully eliminated the racial identifiability
of their schools. As a result, the peak of integration in the 1970s would be followed by
re-segregation, particularly in the urban centers of Virginia and elsewhere, as the nation
reverted to neighborhood schools and "color-blind," or race neutral, pupil assignment
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policies-a trend strongly opposed by the NAACP in Virginia and on the national level.
As a result, the struggle to preserve the achievements of the campaign to integrate public
education in Virginia continues.
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Afterword
The End of This Long Struggle Is Not in Sight?: School Re-segregation in Virginia,
1973-

"Everything has changed and nothing has changed."
—Reverend Joseph Lowry on the 25th anniversary of the 1963 March on Washington1

Questions related to school integration in Virginia, of course, were not resolved in
the early 1970s. Differences of opinion as to the desirability of integration, and questions
about how to best accomplish integration (assuming it is desirable) continue to the
present day in both the black and the white communities. The history of school
desegregation since the mid-1950s may provide some guidance.
In the early 1970s, school desegregation took effect in localities all across
Virginia. Guided by the U.S. Supreme Court's recent school desegregation decisions
including Green v. New Kent County, Virginia, federal courts agreed to the requests of
NAACP attorneys from Virginia and ordered school districts throughout the state to
develop and implement plans immediately to eliminate signs of school segregation. A
dramatic rise in the amount of integration in the state's public schools and in the rest of
the South ensued, and by the early 1970s the South had become the most integrated
region of the nation.2
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region."
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This accomplishment depended on the efforts of the federal government,
specifically the federal courts. Executive branch agencies—specifically the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Department of Justice—had played the most
important role in bringing about school desegregation in the region in the mid-1960s, but
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the federal courts again assumed oversight of the
integration process.
By the early 1970s, however, national politics increasingly affected the process of
pursuing school integration and extent to which it could be achieved, in Virginia and
elsewhere. In 1968 a Republican was elected to the White House for the first time since
1956, and Richard Nixon publicly opposed several of the policies—including busing—that
sought to bring about school integration in urban areas in both the North and South.
Nixon's administration also brought about a rapid about-face within key executive
agencies linked to school integration, including HEW and the Justice Department, who
had previously demonstrated a commitment to bringing about school integration
throughout the nation. More broadly, Nixon's election represented the beginning of an
ideological shift toward more conservative politics in the United States. As a result,
African-Americans, who were long-time supporters of the Democratic Party, found
themselves with fewer friends in positions of national power. As Benjamin L. Hooks,
executive director of the NAACP from 1977-1993, explained: "When I took over this
organization, I had plans for expanding the mission of the NAACP. I had no idea I
would be fighting to retain what I thought we had already won." 3

3

Janet Cheatham Bell, editor, Till Victory Is Won (New York: Washington Square Press, 2002),

142.
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President Nixon's appointments to the federal judiciary, and those of his
successors, also had a profound effect on school integration. Starting in the 1970s and
continuing for several decades, the federal courts exhibited less support for school
integration, and previously-accepted school integration tactics, than before. By the mid1970s the high court had limited the amount and extent of busing that was considered
acceptable, most notably in Milliken v. Bradley in 1974, which restricted desegregation
plans in urban centers by disallowing plans that involved the surrounding counties. Also,
busing plans that had led to significant integration in the 1970s were abandoned by
federal courts in the 1980s and 1990s as school districts eliminated the racial identities of
their public schools—creating unitary systems.4
As a result of these changes, the peak of integration in the 1970s has been
followed by re-segregation, particularly in the urban centers of Virginia and other states.
Instead of continuing to promote school integration and diversity in the classroom, the
nation's school districts have largely reverted to neighborhood schools and "color-blind"
pupil assignment policies. In the last decade, this trend has been encouraged by some
federal judges who oppose the use of busing, or other racially-based attendance plans, to
promote racial mixing. Not surprisingly, this trend is strongly opposed by the NAACP
and many proponents of diversity.
Rural southern school districts remain a bright spot in the school desegregation
story. In many of these locales, particularly where residential segregation is minimal and
where private academies have failed to attract a large percentage of the white student
population, the schools remain largely integrated.
4

Peter William Moran, "Border State Ebb and Flow: School Desegregation in Missouri, 19541999," in Brian J. Daugherity and Charles C. Bolton, editors, With All Deliberate Speed: Implementing
Brown v. Board of Education (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2008), 196-198.
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As the twenty-first century unfolds, questions of race and education, and issues
such as equality of opportunity and the correlation between various standards of living
and race, remain controversial and unresolved. Even so, by some important measures
racial progress has been made in Virginia, and it can undoubtedly be attributed, at least in
part, to the NAACP and its efforts to bring about school desegregation in the state
between 1954 and 1973.
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